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Abstract 
Until recently, autism was assumed to be a predominantly male phenomenon, but a growing 
number of women are now identifying as autistic in adulthood after many years of 
unexplained difficulties in their everyday lives.   The findings of the few studies in this area 
indicate that ‘late diagnosed’ autistic women commonly report a longstanding sense of 
‘difference’, accompanied by efforts to conform to social norms and an increased 
vulnerability to mental health difficulties.  To date, however, little attention has been paid to 
the potential implications for autistic women of dominant androcentric and deficit-focused 
constructions of autism.  The present study employed a critical narrative methodology to 
explore this by examining the ways that discourses of autism are deployed and/or resisted 
within the autobiographical stories of women who identified as autistic in adulthood. 
Narrative interviews were conducted with five women in order to explore the experiences 
that led to them identifying as autistic in adulthood, and the significance of this for their lives 
subsequently.  The narrative analysis of the interview data was informed by critical realist 
and social constructionist perspectives, which view personal meaning making as socially 
mediated and culturally situated.  It was found that dominant negative and androcentric 
discourses initially rendered autism unavailable to participants as a hermeneutic resource 
but that this changed when they discovered an alternative construction of autism which 
construes it as a valuable facet of human diversity.  This neurodiversity discourse was 
deployed within the participants’ narratives to construct an ‘autistic identity’ characterised 
by individuality and strengths, as well as vulnerabilities and difficulties as a consequence of 
being autistic in a world created by and for the non-autistic majority. 
The participants’ richly diverse personal stories demonstrate the potential for our 
knowledge about autism to be transformed by moving beyond current research 
preoccupations with homogenising behavioural and neurobiological characteristics.   
The current lack of awareness of female autism means that this is an important issue 
to be addressed within the training of counselling psychologists: the findings of the 
study highlight the need for such training to attend to the effects of gender on the  
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lived experience of being autistic, and to develop practitioners’ insight into the 
inequalities currently inherent in being autistic in a non-autistic world.    
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background to the study 
The focus of my study is women who came to identity as autistic in adulthood.  For 
many years, they were all but absent from the research literature, reflecting a 
longstanding assumption that autism was characterised by overtly unusual social 
behaviours and interests that would typically be identified early in life by non-autistic 
‘experts’ such as psychiatrists and paediatricians.  This assumption is now being over-
turned by the growing understanding that these behavioural characteristics were 
gleaned from studies with predominantly young male participants, and that autism in 
girls and women may be expressed rather differently (Krahn and Fenton, 2012; Kreiser 
and White, 2014): in particular, they appear more able (or are more motivated) than 
their male counterparts to conceal or compensate for the difficulties they experience 
in everyday life (Lai et al, 2011; Dean, Harwood and Kasari, 2017; Lai et al, 2017).  As a 
result of this, the difficulties faced by autistic girls and women in coping with the social 
and sensory challenges of the ‘neurotypical’ world went unrecognised for many years 
by researchers and many clinicians (Gould and Ashton-Smith, 2011, Krahn and Fenton, 
2012; Hearst, 2014; Attwood, 2015).   
I embarked on my research project in 2015, when it had only recently been recognised 
that autism in girls and women had been largely overlooked by mainstream 
researchers and by clinicians (Gould and Ashton-Smith, 2011; Kopp and Gillberg, 2011; 
Lai et al, 2011; Rivet and Matson, 2011; Krahn and Fenton, 2012; Kreiser and White, 
2014).  This had prompted calls for research into sex-based differences in autism at the 
aetiological and behavioural levels (Lai, Lombardo, Auyeung, Chakrabarti and Baron-
Cohen, 2015; Halladay et al, 2015) but my own interest in the area was informed by 
the counselling psychology profession’s core values of empathic engagement with 
subjectivity and personal accounts, and commitment to social justice and diversity 
(British Psychological Society, 2005; Moller, 2011; Cutts, 2013).  From this perspective, 
the historic neglect of female autism within mainstream research appeared to me to 
raise important questions about its implications for the lives of individual autistic 
women, who might reach adulthood without any way of making sense of why they find 
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aspects of everyday life confusing or distressing.  My view that this was a potentially 
important area from a social justice perspective was reinforced by the discovery that 
autistic individuals – and especially autistic women – are highly vulnerable to mental 
health difficulties (Croen et al, 2015); a common phenomenon amongst minority 
groups of various types (Cromby, Harper and Reavey, 2013; Botha and Frost, 2018).     
The recognition of the longstanding ‘invisibility’ of autistic girls and women has served 
to highlight the epistemological – as well as ethical - consequences of the inherent 
power imbalance within academic research that has led to the exclusion of autistic 
individuals from the processes of production of ‘knowledge’ about autism (Milton and 
Bracher, 2013; Yergeau, 2013; Milton, 2014; Pellicano, Dinsmore and Charman, 2014; 
O’Dell, Bertilsdotter Rosquist, Ortega, Brownlow and Orsini, 2016; Woods, Milton, 
Arnold and Graby, 2018).  As a result of this, autistic voices and subjectivities have 
been marginalised for many years, thereby limiting and distorting ‘knowledge’ in this 
area, especially in relation to the experiences and perspectives of autistic girls and 
women.  This has started to change in recent years, with the publication of a small but 
growing body of qualitative research with the aim of exploring female autism as a lived 
experience (see Baldwin and Costley, 2016; Bargiela, Steward and Mandy, 2016; 
Tierney, Burns and Kilbey, 2016;  Kanfiszer, Davies and Collins, 2017; Webster and 
Garvis, 2017; Milner, McIntosh, Colvert and Happé, 2019; Leedham, Thompson, Smith 
and Freeth, 2020).  In the current study, I seek to add to this body of research – which 
is largely characterised by thematic approaches to analysis - by exploring the individual 
narratives of five autistic women as expressions of socially mediated and culturally 
embedded subjectivity and lived experience (Somers,1994; Hammack and Toolis, 2015; 
McLean and Syed, 2015; Schiff, 2017). 
1.2 A note on terminology  
My study is informed by critical realist principles, with its position of ontological 
realism (albeit realism that is complex and systemic) accompanied by the explicit 
recognition that our knowledge about any form of reality is socially constructed, and 
therefore – of necessity – provisional and fallible (Fleetwood, 2014; Bhaskar, 
Danermark and Price, 2018; Wiltshire, 2018).  In the case of autism, the process of 
knowledge production has long been shaped by an underlying assumption that – 
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whatever its underlying biological underpinnings may prove to be – it represents an 
‘undesirable’ departure from the normative phenotype, rather than simply a 
difference (or, rather, constellation of differences).  This is now starting to change with 
the growing influence of the neurodiversity movement, and its view of autism as a 
valuable, albeit minority, aspect of human diversity (Bagatell, 2010; Kapp, Gillespie-
Lynch, Sherman and Hutman, 2012; Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013; Ortega, 2013; Den 
Houting, 2019):  however, it remains the case at present that autism is formally 
classified as a ‘disorder’, and defined in terms of ‘deficits’, ‘impairments’ and so on 
(Chown and Leatherland, 2018).  Underlying my study is the assumption that this 
dehumanising and medicalised construction of autism has implications in terms of how 
we think about and make sense of autism, including the ways that it is predominantly 
researched at present (Pellicano et al, 2014; Chown and Leatherland, 2018), and at the 
level of individual subjectivities (Foucault, 1977; White and Epston, 1990; Weedon, 
1997; Sinclair, 2007; Burr, 2015; Gergen, 2015).         
The terminology I use in my thesis is informed by this underlying assumption, and – 
unless I am quoting another author – I seek to make my allegiance to a neurodiversity-
informed perspective on autism transparent by referring to differences (that is, from 
the majority non-autistic phenotype, or from cultural behavioural norms) rather than 
‘deficits’ and so on.  Furthermore, when I discuss ‘difficulties’ experienced by autistic 
individuals I understand such difficulties to occur largely because our social and 
physical1 environments have been created by and for the non-autistic majority and can 
therefore be problematic or ‘disabling’ for others.  I use the terms ‘non-autistic’ or 
‘neurotypical’ interchangeably to refer to those who experience the world in ways that 
are considered to be characteristic of the majority phenotype (Chown, 2016).    
Finally, when referring to individuals, I follow the preference expressed by the majority 
of participants in a survey-based study (Kenny et al, 2016) and by members of the 
autism community online (Brown, 2011; Sinclair, 2013; Kim, 2014) and use ‘identity 
first’ (e.g. autistic women) rather than ‘person first’ language, recognising concerns 
that the latter carries the implications that autism is an appendage that can be 
 
1 That is, in the form of the built environment and public spaces, including schools, universities, 
workplaces, shops, social spaces and so on. At present, these are designed for those with a ‘typical’ 
capacity to process sound, light and other forms of sensory stimulation.  
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potentially removed (or indeed ‘cured’) rather than integral to the autistic individual’s 
selfhood.  Nevertheless, individuals themselves may have different opinions and 
perspectives on the ‘language of autism’ and in this study I therefore started each 
interview by asking the participant how she prefers to refer to autism; I then used this 
preference in my interpretation of her story.    
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 The creation of invisibility: a brief history of the neglect of female 
autism 
One of the widely accepted facts about autism is that it is more commonly diagnosed 
in males then females (Fombonne, 2009; Loomes, Hull and Mandy, 2017).  However, 
the ‘diagnosis’ of autism is a complex and contested issue (Chown and Leatherland, 
2018).  Although long viewed as a developmental phenomenon with a biological basis 
(Folstein and Rutter, 1977; DeLong, 1978; Volkmar and Reichow, 2013), research 
efforts are yet to identify any meaningful and reliable biomarkers or decisive 
environmental triggers (Modabbernia, Vethorst and Reichenberg, 2017; Eshraghi at al, 
2018; McPartland et al, 2018; Fletcher-Watson and Happé, 2019).  Similarly, within 
psychology, efforts to define autism in terms of cognitive functioning have led to a 
proliferation of theories, none of which appear to decisively account for its 
heterogeneity and complexity (Happé, Ronald and Plomin, 2006; Chown, 2016).    
In the meantime, therefore, autism is classified and diagnosed largely in terms of 
observable behavioural characteristics (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; World 
Health Organization, 2016).  Within the mainstream research literature, the potential 
fallibility and subjectivity of defining a human phenomenon in such terms is rarely 
acknowledged; instead the formal ‘diagnostic criteria’ of autism are typically assumed 
to be the inevitable behavioural consequences of underlying neurobiological 
differences (Happé, 1994; Morton and Frith, 1995).  From a critical realist perspective, 
however, this is a striking example of an ‘epistemic fallacy’ of confusing social 
constructed knowledge with the reality that it purports to represent (Pilgrim, 2013; 
Wiltshire, 2018).   Instead, the critical realist worldview highlights the importance of 
understanding the potential ‘blind spots’, biases and distortions that may permeate 
knowledge that is currently taken for granted, and the potential implications of this 
(Bhaskar et al, 2018).  As I discuss below, a key consequence of the social production of 
knowledge about autism has been to render many autistic girls and women invisible to 
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clinicians and researchers for many years; a lacuna in ‘knowledge’ that is only now 
starting to be addressed.   
2.1.1 The origins of the gendering (and dehumanising) of autism 
The focus on idiosyncratic behaviours as defining characteristics of autism has its roots 
in the seminal work of Kanner and of Asperger in the 1940s (Nadesan, 2005; Evans, 
2013; Silberman, 2015; Donvan and Zucker, 2016).  Respectively a US-based child 
psychiatrist and Germany-based paediatrician, they separately identified a similar 
constellation of behaviours amongst a small number of children referred to them:  
unusual social behaviours; a need for routine and difficulty with change; and a 
tendency to engage in repetitive or ritualistic behaviours, or in intense and 
unconventional interests (Kanner, 1943 and 1944; Wing, 1981; Asperger, 19912).  
Previously, such children would have been given a diagnosis such as ‘childhood 
schizophrenia’, but both clinicians concluded that they had identified a distinctive 
phenomenon (Kanner, 1943; Asperger, 1991).  Over time, this view was validated by 
epidemiological and twin studies (Folstein and Rutter, 1977; Volkmar and Reichow, 
2013), and their vivid descriptions of behavioural eccentricities formed the foundation 
for the classifications of autism that have been enshrined in the various iterations of 
the diagnostic manuals of the American Psychiatric Association and World Health 
Organisation (Nadesan, 2005; Draaisma, 2009; Evans, 2013).   
In the context of understanding how girls and women came to be overlooked by 
autism researchers, it is striking that the children described by Kanner and Asperger 
were almost exclusively male: just three of the eleven cases reported by Kanner were 
girls, and all of Asperger’s were boys.  Furthermore, Asperger claimed that “the autistic 
personality is an extreme variant of male intelligence”, arguing that boys are 
intrinsically more skilled at logical thinking and “independent scientific intelligence” in 
contrast with girls’ tendency to “draw more strongly on feelings and instincts” 
(Asperger, 1991, p.84-85).  Asperger expressed these views in the 1940s, displaying no 
insight into the social and cultural contexts in which gendered qualities develop and 
 
2 Originally published in German in 1944 in Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankeiten (Frith, 1991).  
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are expressed. Thus, from the earliest days of its study, autism was inextricably 
associated with maleness.     
Another key theme in these early descriptions of autistic children was their 
‘otherness’, which Kanner characterised as “extreme autistic aloneness”: a way of 
being that “disregards, ignores, shuts out” the world around them (Kanner, 1943, 
p.242).  From the outset of research into autism, therefore, autistic individuals were 
depicted in dehumanising terms as living ‘in a world of their own’, disengaged from 
everyday social interactions (Broderick and Ne’eman, 2008; Huws and Jones, 2010; 
Milton, 2014).  It is a construction of autism that acted as the foundation for the 
longstanding exclusion of autistic people from knowledge production (Milton and 
Bracher, 2013; Yergeau, 2013; Milton, 2014), thus creating the wider context in which 
autistic individuals whose behaviours do not conform to the expectations of non-
autistic designated ‘experts’ went unnoticed for many years.  
2.1.2 Reifying the link between autism and maleness:  the ‘extreme male brain’ theory 
of autism  
Within psychology, research has been directed at exploring autism in terms of 
differences at the level of cognitive functioning as a presumed ‘bridge’ between its 
underlying genetic or epigenetic foundation and observable behavioural characteristics 
(Happé, 1994; Morton and Frith, 1995).  For many years, the construction of autism in 
terms of ‘lack’ was reflected by an emphasis on explaining observed behavioural 
characteristics in terms of underlying deficits in specific aspects of cognitive 
functioning, in particular in relation to theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 
1985), executive function (Hill, 2004) and central coherence (Happé and Frith, 2006).  
However, over time it was recognised that these deficit-focused models failed to 
address the relative strengths often associated with autism - such as a capacity to 
‘hyper-focus’ on areas of interest - prompting efforts to develop more ‘balanced’ and 
expansive models of cognitive functioning (Murray, Lesser and Lawson, 2005; Krahn 
and Fenton, 2012; Chown, 2016; Murray, 2018).  In terms of the pervasive gendering 
of autism, however, one such model has particular significance:  the so-called ‘extreme 
male brain’ (‘EMB’) theory of autism (Baron-Cohen, 2002a).  
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The EMB theory was an extension of an earlier influential theory which hypothesised 
that a deficit in theory of mind is a defining characteristic of autism (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie and Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1995):  a model that had the significant drawback 
of only offering a possible explanation for the social differences associated with autism 
(Krahn and Fenton, 2012).   This shortcoming was addressed in the EMB theory by the 
hypothesis that autism is characterised by a reduced capacity for empathy 
accompanied by good ‘systemising’ skills3, and that the latter can manifest as the deep 
interests and preoccupations4 that were first described by Asperger (1991).  Asperger’s 
descriptions highlighted the individuality of his young ‘patients’’ “specialised 
interests”, such as collecting poisons, designing “spaceships” (in the 1940s) or 
displaying  “rare maturity of taste in art” (Asperger, 1991, p.72).  Within the EMB 
theory, however, such idiosyncrasies are replaced by examples of toys, interests and 
professions that are currently more commonly associated with boys and men:  for 
example, playing with construction toys, computer programming and engineering 
(Baron-Cohen, 2002a and 2003).     
As the name indicates, a central tenet of the EMB theory is that the hypothesised 
‘hypo-empathising/hyper-systemising’ phenotype is an exaggerated version of 
characteristics which are claimed to be innately more common in men than women 
(Baron-Cohen, 2002a and 2003).  It is further hypothesised these supposedly innate 
differences result from differences in exposure to testosterone in utero (Baron-Cohen, 
Knickmeyer and Belmonte, 2005), but this claim lacks compelling research evidence 
(Grossi and Fine, 2012; Kung et al, 2016; Ferri, Abel and Brodkin, 2018).  Indeed, the 
EMB theory has been subject to substantial criticism, not least for its failure to address 
the significance of the social and cultural contexts in which gendered behaviours and 
interests develop, and the corresponding potential for sex/gender-based desirability 
bias in participant responses to the self-report questionnaires (Baron-Cohen, Richler, 
Bisarya, Gurunathan and Wheelwright, 2003; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004) on 
 
3 ‘Systemising is defined as: “‘… the drive to analyse the variables in a system, to derive the underlying 
rules that govern the behaviour of a system. Systemising also refers to the drive to construct systems. 
Systemising allows you to predict the behaviour of a system, and to control it.” (Baron-Cohen, 2002a, 
p.248).     
4 In terms of diagnostic criteria specified by the formal definition of autism, such interests and 
preoccupations can be viewed as evidence of “highly restricted, fixated interests that are abnormal in 
intensity or focus” (APA, 2013).  
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which its gendered claims are based (Fine, 2010; Jack, 2011; Grossi and Fine, 2012; 
Krahn and Fenton, 2012).  Its basis in essentialised and dichotomised5 sex/gender-
based differences in cognitive functioning is also now being challenged by empirical 
findings from neuroscience, which indicate an extensive overlap between the 
distributions of females and males across a range of measures (Jordan-Young, 2010; 
Joel et al, 2015; Joel et al, 2018; Rippon, 2019).  Despite these flaws, however, the EMB 
has had considerable influence on the way that ‘knowledge’ about autism is currently 
constructed, with Krahn and Fenton (2012, p.99) commenting: “Unfortunately, the 
very language used to describe [autism] is now laden with certain gender 
expectations.”  Unusually for a cognitive theory, its claims have been disseminated 
beyond the confines of academia (Baron-Cohen, 2003; Greenberg, Warrier, Allison and 
Baron-Cohen, 2018), which has arguably been facilitated by the gendered ‘packaging’ 
which gives it wider interest and appeal (Jack, 2011). 
As well as reifying an association between autism and stereotypically ‘male’ social 
behaviours and interests, the EMB theory has had another powerful influence on 
knowledge production, in the form of the central claim that autism is associated with 
an ‘empathy impairment’ (Baron-Cohen, 2002a; Williams, 2010; McDonagh, 2013; 
Yergeau, 2013).  This is grounded in a reductive and one-sided view of empathy which 
‘pathologises’ the difficulties that autistic individuals commonly describe in making 
sense of the social behaviours and norms of the neurotypical majority and at the same 
time fails to acknowledge that non-autistic people appear equally unable to empathise 
with the experiences and subjectivities of autistic individuals (Hacking, 2009; Milton 
and Moon, 2012; Dinishak and Akhtar, 2013; Yergeau, 2013; Milton, 2014): a 
seemingly mutual difficulty in comprehension which Milton (2012) terms the ‘double 
empathy problem’.  In doing so, the EMB theory implicitly reinforces and perpetuates 
misleading and stigmatising assumptions that autism is inevitably characterised by a 
lack of social motivation and self-awareness (Huws and Jones, 2010; Yergeau, 2013; 
Limberg, 2016; John, Knott and Harvey, 2018; Jaswal and Akhtar, 2019).  
 
5 Baron-Cohen acknowledges that some women have what he defines as a ‘male’ brain, and vice versa 
(with the ‘female’ brain being defined within the EMB theory as being characterised by a better-
developed capacity for empathising than for ‘systemising’).  He also defines a ‘balanced brain’ 
phenotype in which the capacity for empathising and systemising is equally well-developed (Baron-
Cohen, 2002a).   
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2.2 Removing the invisibility cloak: discovering female autism 
The many years of male-focused autism research created an epistemic monolith in 
which autism was assumed to ‘look’ a certain way:  that autistic individuals were 
socially awkward and lacking in self-awareness; more interested in numbers or objects 
than in other people; and usually male (Draaisma, 2009; Milton, 2014).  Mainstream 
research thus appeared to provide ‘scientific’ gravitas to stereotypical portrayals of 
autism in popular culture, most famously in the form of the autistic ‘savant’ character 
Raymond Babbitt in the movie Rain Man (Johnson, 1988).  More recently, the aloof 
‘eccentric scientist’ trope which characterises the EMB theory (Baron-Cohen, 2003) has 
been embodied in the form of the character of Sheldon Cooper in the TV series The Big 
Bang Theory (Belyeu, 2007).    
These gendered cultural representations of autism have been accompanied by the 
seemingly incontrovertible fact that autism is diagnosed more often in males than 
females (Shattuck et al, 2009; Russell, Steer and Golding, 2011, Rivet and Matson, 
2011; Dworzynski, Ronald, Bolton and Happé, 2012): on average – three to four times6 
more often in males than in females according to prevalence studies (Fombonne, 
2009; Loomes et al, 2017).  However, behind this ‘headline’ sex ratio lies a curiosity in 
that it appears to vary according to whether autism is accompanied by intellectual 
disability (ID) or not (Werling and Geschwind, 2013); lower MTF ratios of around 1-2:1 
are typically found in samples of autistic people with moderate to profound ID and 
higher – and more variable – MTF ratios amongst more intellectually able individuals 
(Fombonne, 2009; Brugha et al, 2009).  Within the dominant biomedical paradigm, it 
was speculated that this is consistent with an unidentified biologically-based ‘female 
protective effect’ (FPE):  empirical evidence for this claim, however, remains equivocal 
and inconsistent (Skuse, 2000; Szatmari et al, 2012; Robinson, Lichtenstein,  
Anckarsäter, Happé and Ronald, 2013; Jacquemont et al, 2014; Sandin et al, 2014; Lai 
et al, 2015; Werling and Geschwind, 2015).     
 
6 6 For many years, 4:1 was the accepted headline MTF ratio (Fombonne, 2009) but a more recent meta-
analysis found that – while the mean MTF ratio was 4:1 overall – the ratio reduced to about 3:1 when 
only those studies deemed to be of higher quality were included (Loomes et al, 2017).  
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In recent years, an alternative – or additional – explanation to the wholly biologically-
based FPE has become increasingly influential:  that for many years, autism in 
cognitively able girls and women has simply been under-identified and overlooked by 
clinicians and researchers because it does not conform to prevailing assumptions 
about what autism ‘looks like’ (Gould and Ashton-Smith, 2011; Kopp and Gillberg, 
2011; Rivet and Matson, 2011; Russell, Steer and Goulding, 2011; Dworzynski, Ronald, 
Bolton and Happé, 2012; Zwaigenbaum et al, 2012; Krahn and Fenton, 2012; Bargiela 
et al, 2016; Loomes et al, 2017).  In particular, as discussed below, it seems that 
autistic girls and women are more likely to develop strategies to help them fit in 
socially with the non-autistic majority (Gould and Ashton-Smith, 2011; Attwood, 2015; 
Tierney et al, 2016; Bargiela et al, 2016; Dean et al, 2017; Hull et al, 2019).  
Furthermore, if they have deep or ‘intense’ interests or passions, they are often in 
areas that are culturally normative for their gender – literature, animals, a particular 
TV show, other people and so on – rather than those stereotypically associated with 
autism, not least as a consequence of the androcentric EMB theory (Gould and Ashton-
Smith, 2011; Jack, 2011; Attwood, 2015).  This highlights the need to re-conceptualise 
autism as a socially and culturally-situated lived experience (Jack, 2011), rather than 
implicitly assuming that autistic individuals are wholly ‘exempt’ from societal 
influences (Happé, 1994; Morton and Frith, 1995).        
2.2.1 Learning to camouflage:  female autism during the school years 
Within the framework of the EMB theory, autistic children have long been stereotyped 
as more interested in their ‘special interests’ - in areas like numbers, cars, computers 
and such like - than in making friends with other children:  writing before the 
phenomenon of autistic camouflaging had been acknowledged in the research 
literature, Baron-Cohen (2002b, p.187) asserted that autistic children “[show] 
relatively little interest in what social groups are doing, or in being a part of them”.  
Indeed, an observational study of the social interactions of primary school age children 
found that autistic boys often played alone (Dean et al, 2017), seemingly providing a 
degree of support for this claim.  The study provided no insight into whether the boys’ 
apparent social isolation was a matter of choice or had been enforced over time by 
peers; however, there is some evidence (based on self-reporting) that autistic boys 
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may tend to be less socially motivated than their non-autistic peers (Head, McGillivray 
and Stokes, 2014; Sedgwick, Hill, Yates, Pickering and Pellicano, 2016; Sedgwick, Hill 
and Pellicano, 2019).    
While such findings appear to provide some support for the stereotypical view of 
autism encountered in the EMB theory, the same studies suggest that the social 
motivation and experiences of autistic girls during the school years may be very 
different to those of autistic boys:  that their social motivation is, in fact, similar to that 
of their non-autistic peers (Head et al, 2014; Sedgwick et al, 2016; Sedgwick et al, 
2019).  Furthermore, Dean et al’s (2017) study found that – unlike the observed social 
isolation of autistic boys – autistic girls tended to be engaged with social groups, albeit 
often on the periphery rather than fully integrated (Dean et al, 2017).  An earlier study 
provided interesting insight into the potential social implications of having more 
contact with non-autistic peers:  for example, they are likely to be exposed to social 
‘sanctions’ (such as eye-rolling, mocking or being ignored) from non-autistic girls when 
they fail to adhere to group norms (Dean, Fox Adams and Kasari, 2013).   Such findings 
are consistent with those of a rare qualitative study of the experiences of adolescent 
autistic girls, who described their strong desire for friendships and their considerable 
efforts to fit in socially (Tierney, Burns and Kilbey, 2016).  Despite their efforts, 
however, the girls reported that they experienced frequent rejection and 
misunderstandings in social situations: experiences that were variously described as 
distressing, stressful and anxiety-provoking.  The researchers reported that the girls 
appeared to feel at the “mercy of more powerful others […] those who understood 
social rules.” (Tierney et al, 2016, p.77).  
For me, reading the studies of Tierney et al and Dean and colleagues (Dean et al, 2013; 
Dean et al, 2017) brought back vivid memories of being at school, with its gendered 
‘rules’ and social hierarchies, and the pressures – implicit or otherwise – to fit in with 
one’s peers (Wiseman, 2002):  experiences that are evidently all the more complex for 
autistic girls who struggle to make sense of non-autistic girls’ social behaviours 
(Tierney et al, 2016).  The research findings suggest that school provides autistic girls 
with an intensive and often harsh ‘education’ in normative social expectations, with 
non-autistic girls providing a “normalising gaze” (Foucault, 1977, p.184) by means of 
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which gendered behaviours are policed and enforced.  At the same time, the 
motivation for friendships reported by autistic girls (Sedgwick et al, 2016; Tierney et al, 
2016; Sedgewick et al, 2019) suggests that they are willing to endure this in an attempt 
to find social acceptance.  
The efforts of autistic girls to fit in socially with their peers means that their social 
behaviours are less likely to appear unusual to teachers and parents:  a factor which 
Dean et al (2017) suggests contributes to their longstanding ‘invisibility’.  Furthermore, 
studies indicate that – as is the case for girls generally (Sroufe and Rutter, 1984; Zahn-
Waxler, Shirtcliff and Marceau, 2008) – autistic girls tend to internalise any distress 
they experience, and are therefore less likely than autistic boys to display the type of 
externalising behaviours which are typically deemed problematic in a school setting 
(Timimi at al, 2010; Mandy et al, 2012; Solomon, Miller, Taylor, Hinshaw and Carter, 
2012; Hiller, Young and Weber, 2014):  yet another way in which their difficulties are 
less ‘visible’ to those around them.  
 2.2.2 Camouflaging into adulthood:  the experiences of ‘late diagnosed’ autistic women 
Bearing in mind the reported social motivation of autistic girls, and their ‘intensive’ and 
gendered social experiences during the school years, it is unsurprising that research 
indicates that – by adulthood – they tend to display better social skills than their male 
peers (Lai et al, 2011) and to be more likely to engage in ‘camouflaging’ behaviours 
(Hull et al, 2017; Lai et al, 2017; Lai et al, 2019; Livingston, Shah and Happé, 2019; 
Mandy, 2019; Hull et al, 2020).  The growing awareness of the prevalence of 
camouflaging amongst autistic women has highlighted the inadequacy of seeking to 
evaluate autism largely in terms of observable behaviours, and has led to a shift 
towards qualitative research which engages with personal experiences and 
perspectives (Baldwin and Costley, 20167; Bargiela et al, 20168; Milner et al, 20199), 
including studies which focus on those whose autism was only identified in adulthood 
 
7 Australian survey-based study; n=82, mean age 32.7 (age range 18-64) (Baldwin and Costley, 2016).  
8 Thematic (framework) analysis; n=14, mean age 26.7 (age range 22-30).  Participants had been 
diagnosed at age 18+ (Bargiela et al, 2016).  
9 Thematic analysis of four group discussions and seven individual interviews. N= 22 (18 autistic 
girls/women and 4 mothers of autistic girls).  Age range of participants in the autism group = 11-55 
(Milner et al, 2019). 
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(Kanfiszer et al, 201710; Webster and Garvis, 201711; Stagg and Belcher, 201912; 
Leedham et al, 202013).  The latter group – ‘late diagnosed’ women – are of particular 
interest in terms of understanding why autism may go unnoticed for many years, and 
the implications of this for the lives and wellbeing of autistic individuals.   
A common theme within existing studies is the experience of ‘feeling different’ to 
other women, accompanied by descriptions of making considerable efforts to conceal 
self-perceived differences and to fit in socially (Milner et al, 2019):  of “pretending to 
be ’normal’” (Bargiela et al, 2016, p.3287; Leedham et al, 2020, p.138).  These adaptive 
strategies – now widely termed ‘camouflaging’ in the research literature – variously 
include behaviours such as mimicking the social behaviours of others; using learnt 
phrases or ‘scripts’ for interactions; suppressing ‘stimming’ behaviours in social 
situations; adopting a ‘persona’ for socialising and so on (Bargiela et al, 2016; Hull et al, 
2017; Leedham et al, 2020).  Unfortunately, these attempts to conform to social norms 
come at a potentially high cost for personal wellbeing:  such behaviours are typically 
described as stressful, exhausting and anxiety provoking, and may be experienced as 
damaging for one’s sense of self (Bargiela et al, 2016; Hull et al, 2017; Kanfiszer et al, 
2017; Cage and Troxell-Whitman, 2019; Mandy, 2019; Milner et al, 2019).   
An additional area of concern highlighted by Bargiela et al’s (2016) study was the high 
incidence of sexual abuse14 reported by the participants, which had often taken place 
in the context of a relationship.  It has been suggested (by a female autistic author) 
that the difficulties that autistic women experience in inferring the motives of non-
autistic others, alongside their desire for social acceptance, may render them 
particularly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation (Holliday-Willey, 2018) and the 
 
10 Thematic (narrative) analysis; n=7 (age range 20 to 59; no mean provided).  Participants had been 
diagnosed at age 18+ (Kanfiszer et al, 2017).  
11 Australian thematic (narrative) analysis; n10 (age range 28 to 55; no mean provided). Participants had 
been diagnosed at age 18+ (Webster and Garvis, 2017).  
12 Thematic analysis; n=9 (5 female participants). Age range 52-54; all participants had been diagnosed 
as autistic within preceding two years (Stagg and Belcher, 2019).  
13 IPA-based study; n=11; mean age 50.8 (age range 43 to 64). Participants had been diagnosed at age 
40+ (Leedham et al, 2020). 
14 Further evidence of an increased vulnerability to sexual abuse was subsequently provided by a large 
scale Swedish study (n=4500) which found that autism in girls were associated with a nearly threefold 
greater incidence of sexual abuse by the age of eighteen, compared with non-autistic girls (Gotby, 
Lichtenstein, Langstrom and Petterson, 2018). 
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participants’ references to their experiences of abuse in Bargiela et al’s (2016) study 
were consistent with this view.   
Diagnosis (and mis-diagnosis)  
The lack of awareness amongst professionals of the differences in female 
‘presentations’ of autism means that the road to obtaining an autism assessment can 
be a difficult one for women.  Hughes (2015) conducted an online survey enquiring 
about the diagnoses that autistic girls and women had received prior to being 
diagnosed as autistic:  nearly thirty were reported, including personality disorders, 
bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) and social anxiety.  Some of 
these diagnoses may have reflected ‘genuine’ co-occurring mental health difficulties, 
for which the long-term stress of being an autistic woman in the ‘neurotypical world’ is 
likely to have been a contributory or causal factor (Botha and Frost, 2018; Zener, 
2019).  Others, however, are likely to have stemmed from a misinterpretation of 
features associated with autism, such as ‘repetitive behaviours’ being construed as 
symptoms of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), or social difficulties being 
misinterpreted as evidence of a ‘personality disorder’ or social anxiety (Gould and 
Ashton-Smith, 2011; Bargiela et al, 2016; Chown, 2016; Au-Yeung et al, 2019; Milner et 
al, 2019; Zener, 2019; Leedham et al, 2020).   
In addition to the potential for misdiagnosis, participants in Bargiela et al’s (2016) 
study described difficulties in being referred for an autism assessment due to a lack of 
awareness about female autism amongst general practitioners.  Once referred for an 
assessment, another challenge reported by some autistic women is being able to stop 
camouflaging in order that they can demonstrate ‘autistic behaviours’ in a way 
currently expected by many autism ‘experts’ (Milner et al, 2019).  
In general, existing studies typically depict the experience of being diagnosed as 
autistic in largely positive terms as a means of making sense of previously inexplicable 
difficulties and a pervasive sense of ‘difference’, thereby providing a ‘lens’ through 
which life and identity can be reappraised:  in turn, this is often associated with an 
increase in self-acceptance and – for some – connection with other autistic individuals 
(Bargiela et al, 2016; Kanfiszer et al, 2017; Milner et al, ,2019; Leedham et al, 2020).   
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However, Leedham et al (2020, p.139) reported that in some cases this could be 
preceded by a period of “grieving and adjusting”, citing a participant who recalled 
experiencing sadness and self-doubt as she wondered “’am I just anything other than 
these symptoms?’”.  The reference to ‘symptoms’ is consistent with the dominant – 
and overwhelmingly negative – discursive construction of autism, which in turn may 
have negative implications for an individual’s ‘autistic identity’ and emotional 
wellbeing as I discuss below (Kapp, Gillespie-Lynch, Sherman and Hutman, 2013; 
Cooper, Smith and Russell, 2017; Cage, Di Monaco and Newell, 2018).   
2.2.3 Female autism and mental health difficulties  
In general, autism is associated with a considerably elevated risk of mental health 
difficulties compared with the non-autistic majority (Huke, Turk, Saiedi, Kent and 
Morgan, 2013; Mandy and Tchanturia, 2015; Cassidy, Bradley, Shaw and Baron-Cohen, 
2018; Au-Yeung et al, 2019; Brugha, 2019; Camm-Crosbie, Bradley, Shaw, Baron-Cohen 
and Cassidy, 2019; South et al, 2019).   For example, a US population-based study 
(n=1507; non-autistic controls n=15,070) reported rates of 34% and 36% respectively 
for depression and anxiety amongst autistic women and 22% and 26% for autistic men:  
for the non-autistic controls (mixed sex results reported) the rates for depression and 
anxiety were 10% and 9% respectively (Croen et al, 2015). Furthermore, preliminary 
results from a yet to be published UK-based study suggest that as many as one in 
twenty individuals who are seen in adult mental health services are autistic (compared 
with an estimate of one in a hundred in the population as a whole) (Brugha, 2019).   
Botha and Frost (2018) propose that the minority stress model offers a helpful 
framework for understanding the elevated risk of mental health difficulties amongst 
autistic individuals.  First developed in relation to the mental health vulnerabilities 
found amongst sexual minority groups, this model addresses the effects on personal 
wellbeing of the “hostile and stressful” social environments that result from pervasive 
stigma, prejudice and discrimination towards minorities (Meyer, 2003, p.674):  as such, 
it offers a useful ‘corrective’ to the current tendency to locate mental health 
difficulties ‘within’ the individual and to overlook the social and systemic contexts in 
which distress develops (Smail, 2005; Prilleltensky, Prilleltensky and Voorhees, 2009; 
Verhaeghe, 2012; Cromby et al, 2013; Pilgrim, 2015; Johnstone and Boyle, 2018).   As 
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Botha and Frost (2018) argue, it is a particularly valuable perspective in the context of 
autism and mental health: it highlights the potential effects of stigmatising stereotypes 
and attitudes towards autism (Huws and Jones, 2010; John, Knott and Harvey, 2018) 
not only in terms of the ways that autistic individuals are viewed and treated by 
others, but also the potential effects on their mental health of being aware of – and 
internalising - such attitudes.  Indeed, a qualitative study (n=12, with 4 female 
participants) of autistic individuals’ views on autism stereotypes found that their 
perception is that such stereotypes are highly negative and homogenising, and that 
they are likely to contribute to the marginalisation and bullying of autistic people 
(Treweek, Wood, Martin and Freeth, 2019). 
For psychologists and therapists with an interest in the social and systemic context of 
mental health, the claims of the minority stress model are uncontentious and are 
borne out by the experiences that we hear described by our clients.  In terms of 
offering an evidence-based challenge to the medical model of mental health (Onyett, 
2007; Johnstone and Boyle, 2018), however, it is helpful that Botha and Frost (2018) 
accompanied their theorising with a survey-based study (n=111, with 82 female 
participants) which found a significant association between self-reported psychological 
distress and a range of potential stressors, such as internalised stigma, experiences of 
discrimination in everyday life and concealment of autistic status from others.  
Similarly, Cage, Di Monaco and Newell (201815) found associations between a lack of 
autism-related personal acceptance, perceptions of societal autism acceptance and 
higher levels of self-reported depression, while Cooper, Smith and Russell (201716) 
found that levels of self-reported anxiety and depression amongst autistic individuals 
were mediated by personal and autism-related self-esteem, leading them to suggest 
that a “positive autism social identity” may have a protective effect for personal 
wellbeing (Cooper et al, 2017, p. 844).  
The findings of the few studies in this area highlight the need for further research to 
improve understanding and awareness of the ways that the mental health of autistic 
individuals may be negatively affected by their social environments and by wider 
 
15 n=111, with 82 female participants 
16 n=539, with 272 autistic participants.  47% of autistic participants were female and 53% of non-
autistic controls.   
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societal factors, including stigmatising attitudes and beliefs about autism (Huws and 
Jones, 2010; John et al, 2018; Treweek et al, 2019).  In this respect, the current 
gendering of ‘knowledge’ about autism (Jack, 2011; Krahn and Fenton, 2012) may have 
specific implications for the identity and self-image of autistic girls and women.  
Furthermore, the experience of being autistic and female is accompanied by additional 
pressures in the form of specifically gendered expectations for ‘feminine’ social 
behaviours (Bargiela et al, 2016; Kanfiszer et al, 2017; Saxe, 2017; Milner et al, 2019).  
It is within this gendered societal context that autistic girls and women are especially 
likely to resort to camouflaging strategies in order to conform to social norms, with 
potentially negative effects for their emotional wellbeing and sense of self (Bargiela et 
al, 2016; Tierney et al, 2016; Kanfiszer et al, 2017; Hull et al, 2017; Lai et al, 2017; Cage 
et al, 2018; Cage and Troxell-Whitman, 2019; Milner et al, 2019; Leedham et al, 2020).  
In relation to this, it is of particular concern that a recent study found an association 
between self-reported camouflaging behaviours and suicidality (Cassidy et al, 2018).  
Furthermore, evidence that autistic girls may be at particular risk of sexual abuse 
before the age of eighteen (Ohlsson Gotby, Lichtenstein, Långström and Pettersson, 
2018) highlights another (gendered) area of concern, bearing in mind that childhood 
sexual abuse is itself associated with an elevated risk of subsequent mental health 
difficulties (Hailes, Yu, Danese and Fazel, 2019).    
2.3 Discursively constructing autism:  ‘disease’, ‘disability’ or (gendered) 
difference?  
Preliminary evidence that a “positive autism social identity” might have a protective 
effect for an individual’s mental health (Cooper et al, 2017, p.844; Cage at al, 2018) 
highlights the importance of exploring the effects of current constructions of 
‘knowledge’ about autism at the level of individual subjectivities (Elder-Vass, 2012; 
Marks and O’Mahoney, 2013; Bhaskar et al, 2018).   From a critical realist perspective, 
constructing a ‘positive autism identity’ is not a simple matter of choice for an 
individual: instead, critical realism views personal identity and meaning-making as 
socially and culturally-situated (Elder-Vass, 2012; Maxwell, 2012; Marks and 
O’Mahoney, 2013; Bhaskar et al, 2018).  As such, it shares with social constructionism 
the assumption that individual subjectivities are simultaneously influenced and 
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constrained by social practices and interactions, and by available cultural resources 
such as discourses, narratives, stereotypes and so on (Foucault, 1977; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; White and Epston, 1990; Parker, 1992; Weedon, 1997; Maxwell, 
2012; Marks and O’Mahoney, 2013; Burr, 2013; Gergen, 2015; Bhaskar et al, 2018; 
Johnstone and Boyle, 2018).  From this perspective, it is therefore significant that 
dominant discourses and narratives of autism are – at present – overwhelmingly 
negative and dehumanising (Huws and Jones, 2010; Milton and Moon, 2012; Yergeau, 
2013; Milton, 2014; O’Dell et al, 2016; Treweek et al, 2019) and are embedded in 
medicalised social practices, such as diagnosis by designated ‘experts’ (Foucault, 1972 
and 1973). 
From a critical realist perspective, the way that autism is currently classified as a 
‘disorder’ (APA, 2013; WHO, 2016) is not a neutral reflection of objectively knowable 
reality (Pilgrim, 2015), and is instead a socially constructed and value-laden 
classification of behaviours that are deemed to be non-normative relative to (implicit) 
‘ideals’ for social, communicative and other17 behaviours (Brownlow, 2010a).  Those 
behaviours could simply be referred to differences relative to the majority phenotype 
(or indeed to culturally sanctioned norms) but instead are variously described in 
pejorative terms as ‘impairments’, ‘deficits’ or ‘symptoms’:  terms which are typically 
associated with ‘disease’.  The formal framing of autism in ‘medicalised’ language – the 
‘medical’ discourse of autism – arguably has far-reaching implications for social and 
cultural practices, bearing in mind that it is likely to be assumed to be a transparent 
reflection of ‘reality’ (Pilgrim, 2015).  For example, if autism is presumed to be a 
‘disease’ (or akin to one), then it follows that it would be ‘logical’ to fund research 
aimed at understanding its genetic underpinning and environmental ‘risk factors’ 
(Pellicano et al, 2014; Chown and Leatherland, 2018):  research which is typically 
aimed at ‘fighting’18 or eliminating feared conditions such as cancer (Broderick and 
Ne’eman, 2008).  The inference of a ‘disease’ status is similarly evident in periodic 
 
17 Including behaviours that are defined as “repetitive and restrictive” according to the diagnostic 
criteria for autism and unusual sensory experiences (APA, 2013).  
18 Indeed, this pugilistic stance was reified for many years in the United States in the form of the 
Combating Autism Act18 of 2006) (Broderick and Ne’eman, 2008). This was renamed the Autism 
Collaboration, Accountability, Research, Education and Support (Autism CARES) Act in 2014, following 
lobbying by the autistic self-advocates (Ne’eman, 2016).  
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references in the mainstream media to an ‘epidemic’ of autism, and the fears that 
have been periodically  expressed about an alleged (and long discredited) link between 
childhood vaccination, which saw autism implicitly positioned as a ‘fate worse than 
death’ (Dahl, 1986; O’Dell and Brownlow, 2005; Milton, 2014; Silberman, 2015).   It 
also legitimises interventions aimed at ‘normalising’ behaviours which are deemed to 
be characteristic of autism (Milton and Moon, 2012).  
The ’medical’ discourse of autism thus depicts it as an unquestionably problematic 
phenomenon – a departure from idealised normalcy and wellbeing – which ‘scientists’ 
should strive to ameliorate, if not eradicate (Chown and Leatherland, 2018).   For many 
years, the main discursive alternative to this has been the ‘disability’ discourse of 
autism, which – in theoretical terms - can be seen as occupying the intersection 
between the medical and social models of disability (Oliver, 2009).  Thus, while this 
discourse foregrounds the disabling effect of society and of built environments for 
autistic individuals (National Autistic Society, 2016a), it nonetheless deploys 
medicalised terminology – such as ‘condition’ - and implicitly locates problems of social 
understanding within the autistic individual, rather than being a mutual ‘mis-
attunement’ between autistic and non-autistic subjectivities (Milton, 2012; Milton and 
Moon, 2012; Yergeau, 2013). It also serves to homogenise autistic experience in terms 
of ‘lack’; autistic individuals are reduced to what they can’t do or find difficult 
(Bagatell, 2007; Brownlow, 2010b; Baines, 2012; Limburg, 2016).   
The ‘eccentric scientist’ discourse of autism: autism as ‘relational impairment’ 
Mainstream research literature is unsurprisingly dominated by the ‘medical’ discourse 
of autism, with some evidence of the alternative (but still homogenising and negative) 
‘disability’ discourse.  However, a competing and highly gendered discourse is 
sometimes deployed, ostensibly to ‘re-brand’ autism as a ‘difference’ rather than a 
‘disorder/disease’ or ‘disability’ (Baron-Cohen, 2002b and 2003; Timimi et al, 2010; ).  
It is a construction of autism which is largely consistent with  – and serves to reinforce 
– the EMB theory, and it creates a subject position for the autistic individual as 
someone who is more interested in maths, science, technology or computers than in 
relating to other people.  Indeed, in an account of autism aimed at the general public, 
Baron-Cohen chose to illustrate it with a description of a Cambridge professor of 
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mathematics:  one who is mathematically gifted but who finds other people to be 
“mysterious beings who [are] hard to comprehend because they [do] not conform to 
the laws of physics or maths” (Baron-Cohen, 2003, p. 157).  
This ‘eccentric scientist’ discursive construction of autism is typically deployed (as by 
Baron-Cohen) to emphasise that it is a different way of being in the world:  one that – 
in the right environment – need not be disabling, nor a bar to professional 
achievement.  At the same time, it associates autism with profound relational 
impairment, such that the autistic individual is unable to relate to others in any 
meaningful way (Dinishak and Akhtar, 2013), and is instead absorbed in their world of 
numbers, science or computers (Quirici, 2015):  he (or, more rarely, she) is little more 
than an intellectually-capable version of Raymond Babbitt in the movie Rain Man 
(Johnson, 1988; Draaisma, 2009).  In all, it is a dehumanising construction of autism 
with tragic undertones (Duffy and Dorner, 2011), and it reduces the autistic individual 
to little more than an unfeeling ‘automaton’ (Milton, 2014).     
Autism from the inside: the neurodiversity discourse  
The ‘medical’, ‘disability’ and ‘eccentric scientist’ discourses construct autism from the 
perspective of the non-autistic “normalising gaze” (Foucault, 1977, p.), under which 
autistic people are scrutinised and evaluated according to the ways that their 
behaviours depart from implicit ‘neurotypical’ norms (Brownlow, 2010a).  This 
grounding in ‘outsider’ perspectives means that dominant discursive constructions of 
autism fail to recognise the inner lives of autistic individuals or the possibility that any 
behaviours deemed non-normative might have underlying meaning or significance to 
an individual (Milton and Moon, 2012; Milton and Bracher, 2013; Yergeau, 2013; 
Milton, 2014).  The hermeneutic landscapes they create are thus rigid and 
impoverished, and serve to reinforce currently pervasive stereotypes and 
misconceptions of autism (Draaisma, 2009; Huws and Jones, 2010; Milton, 2014; John 
et al, 2018; Treweek et al, 2019).   
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The alternative to this ‘outsider’ perspective is the neurodiversity19 (or 
neurodivergence) discourse of autism (Bagatell, 2010; Robertson, 2010; Milton and 
Moon, 2012; Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013; Kapp et al, 2013; Den Houting, 2019).  This is 
autism from the inside:  autism as a personal experience, where meaning is attached 
to supposedly unusual behaviours, or indeed where considerable efforts may be made 
by individuals to conform to normative societal expectations.  It is a discursive 
construction of autism which foregrounds the strengths, skills and individuality of 
autistic people and construes it as an enriching and valuable feature of human 
diversity, albeit one that is associated with difficulties in everyday life as a 
consequence of living in a world created by and for the neurotypical majority 
(Robertson, 2010; Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013; Kapp et al, 2013; Den Houting, 2019).  
Like the dominant ‘medical’ discourse, it typically deploys brain and neurobiology-
related terminology (Blume, 1998; Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013; Ortega, 2013), but does 
so in terms of differences compared to the majority phenotype, rather than ‘deficits’ or 
‘impairments’. 
Where the dominant discourses of autism are profoundly limiting for the ways that we 
talk and think about autistic people, constructing autism as a form of ‘neurodiversity’ 
means that it is inclusive of different experiences and perspectives.  As such, it has 
evolved and expanded over the years, as it absorbs and accommodates the disparate 
voices and perspectives of autistic individuals (Hacking, 2009).   In its early days it was 
deployed in a way that rendered autism synonymous with ‘geekdom’ (Blume, 1998; 
Nadesan, 2005), and which amounted to an insider perspective on – and reclaiming of 
- the ‘eccentric scientist’ discursive construction of autism.  More recently, however, it 
has been progressively transformed by the personal accounts of autistic women (see, 
for example, Miller, 2003; Simone, 2010; Rowe, 2013a and 2013b; Holliday Willey, 
2015; Kim, 2015; James, 2017; Uher, 2017; Cook and Garnett, 2018), which are 
overturning androcentric assumptions about what it means to be autistic, 
neurodiverse or neurodivergent.  
  
 
19 July Singer (2016) is widely credited with coining the term ‘neurodiversity’, and it was first used in a 
published article in 1998 (Blume, 1998; Silberman, 2015).  
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2.4  Research aims and questions  
The aim of this study is to explore the individual narratives of women who came to 
self-identify as autistic in adulthood.   By focusing on individual stories and 
experiences, I seek to add to the small body of existing qualitative research in the long-
neglected area of female autism (Bargiela et al, 2016; Tierney et al, 2016;  Kanfiszer et 
al, 2017; Webster and Garvis, 2018; Milner et al, 2019; Leedham et al, 2020), which 
have commonly deployed versions of thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2013).  In 
choosing to focus on individual narrative as the ‘unit’ of analysis, I share with Hacking 
(2009) the view that personal stories have a profoundly important role in transforming 
our understanding of autism.  Where mainstream research has generated ‘knowledge’ 
which homogenises – as well as silences – autistic individuals (Milton and Moon, 2012; 
Yergeau, 2013; Milton, 2014), narrative analysis foregrounds the personal and the 
specific (Bruner 1990 and 1991; Polkinghorne, 1998; Gergen, 2015; Schiff, 2017).  In 
‘giving voice’ to autistic women as individuals with rich and interesting stories to tell, 
my hope is to produce knowledge which challenges existing and impoverished 
stereotypes of autism (Milton and Moon, 2012; Yergeau, 2013; Milton, 2014; O’Dell et 
al, 2016).  Furthermore, where existing qualitative studies of the experiences of 
autistic women have (implicitly) treated ‘autism’ as a unitary construct, I seek to 
explore the ways that the participants’ personal meaning making is constituted (and 
potentially constrained) by cultural resources of autism, which – as discussed in the 
previous section - commonly depict it in negative, dehumanising or gendered terms.  
To date, little attention has been paid by researchers to the implications of this at the 
level of individual subjectivities, and the rare studies which have done so have focused 
on young male participants (Bagatell, 2007; Baines, 2012), as is all too common in 
autism research (Krahn and Fenton, 2012).  An additional aim of the study, therefore, 
is to  make a contribution to the developing field of critical autism studies (O’Dell et al, 
2016) by exploring the ways that culturally available discourses, narratives and 
representations of autism may be drawn on or resisted in personal narratives.  
As I discuss in the following section, my approach to narrative analysis is informed by 
the critical realist assumption that individual subjectivities are culturally situated and 
are mediated by social interactions and processes (Bhaskar et al,2018): a worldview 
which eschews and transcends the dichotomous view of individual and society which 
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(implicitly or otherwise) pervades mainstream research into autism.   Reflecting this 
critical approach to narrative analysis, my primary research question is: 
(i) How do women who have self-identified as autistic in adulthood 
discursively construct the epistemic category of ‘autism’ within their 
narratives?  
Related to this, my subsidiary research questions are as follows:  
(ii) How did the participants come to identify as autistic?  
(iii) What meaning did the participants attach to identifying as autistic?  
(iv) [If relevant] How do the participants’ personal narratives conform culturally 
available narrative types, ‘plots’ or themes?  (This is discussed further in the 
methodology section).  
Relevance of the study for the counselling psychology profession  
At present, despite the counselling psychology profession’s avowed commitment to 
social justice, and to working with ‘difference and diversity’, autism and neurodiversity 
are largely absent from the profession’s core texts20 (BPS, 2005; Milton, 2010; Woolfe, 
Strawbridge, Douglas and Dryden, 2010; Douglas, Woolfe, Strawbridge, Kasket and 
Galbraith, 2016; Ade-Serrano, Nkansa-Dwamena and McIntosh, 2017; Milton, 2018) 
and little research appears to have been carried out by counselling psychologists in this 
area to date (for a notable exception see Wilson, 2017).  Alongside this apparent 
oversight in the texts of the counselling psychology profession, concern has been 
periodically expressed about a lack of awareness of - or of potentially unhelpful 
misconceptions about – autism amongst therapists and other mental health 
professionals (Hodge, 2013; Hearst, 2014; Wilson, 2017; Au-Yeung et al, 2019; Camm-
Crosbie et al, 2019).  Bearing in mind our growing understanding about the 
vulnerability of autistic individuals to mental health difficulties (section 2.2.3 above), it 
is important that this current epistemic ‘gap’ is now addressed with research that is 
grounded in the profession’s core values of empathic engagement with individual 
subjectivities, relationality and social justice.  An additional aim of this study, 
 
20 With the notable exception of a recent chapter on counselling psychology with autistic clients (Rutten, 
2017).  
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therefore, is to add to the currently limited body of knowledge about female autism as 
a subjective and socially-contextualised experience, with a view to supporting 
counselling psychologists (and other therapists and mental health professionals) in our 
relationally-informed psychotherapeutic work.   
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction  
At the outset of my research, my interest in the ways that ‘autism’ is discursively 
produced as an epistemic category – and the implications of this for identity and 
subjectivity - meant that critical or Foucauldian discourse analysis (Braun and Clarke, 
2013; Willig, 2013) appeared to be the obvious choice for my methodology.  However, 
I soon became concerned that the complexity and individuality of the participants’ 
lives might be ‘lost’ within an analysis which foregrounded discourse at the expense of 
lived experience.  Bearing in mind counselling psychology’s core values of empathic 
engagement with first person accounts (BPS, 2005) together with the longstanding 
silencing of autistic individuals within mainstream research (Milton and Bracher, 2013; 
Yergeau, 2013), I identified a preference for a methodology that would allow me to 
explore personal experiences and perspectives, alongside a critical analytic or 
interpretative stance (Ricoeur, 1970; Josselson, 2004; Willig, 2012).  In principle, this 
preference could have been accommodated by a methodology that appears to be 
popular amongst counselling psychology researchers (Kasket, 2012):  interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (‘IPA’).  However, IPA’s grounding in phenomenological 
principles and relative neglect of the constitutive role of language for subjectivities and 
meaning making (Willig, 2013; Burr, 2015) meant that it was incompatible with my 
interest in the discursive production and construal of ‘autism’ as a socially-situated 
epistemic concept.   
These deliberations during the early stage of my research led me to explore a 
methodology – narrative inquiry – which rarely seems to be adopted by counselling 
psychology researchers, despite its evident fit with our core values and social justice 
principles (BPS, 2005; Cutts, 2013):  in particular, it is commonly seen as way of ‘giving 
voice’ to silenced or marginalised individuals (Smith and Sparkes, 2008; Gergen, 2015; 
Toolis and Hammack, 2015; Schiff, 2017).   At its heart is the assumption that 
narrativity is a uniquely human form of mental functioning through which we make 
sense of our experiences and which provides a sense of continuity to our lives (Fisher, 
1984; Sarbin, 1986; Polkinghorne, 1988; Bruner, 1990; Dennett, 1992; Schiff, 2017).  
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Beyond this claim, narrative inquiry is characterised by a considerable degree of 
flexibility.  There is little consensus as to what constitutes a ‘narrative’ and researchers 
are free to analyse their chosen mode of narrative – written, spoken or visual - in 
whichever way aligns with their epistemological or ontological interests; for example, 
they may focus on structural or performative features, or approach narratives as 
transparent representations of lived experience (Murray, 2000; Esin, 2011; Bell, 2013; 
Esin and Squire, 2013; Silver, 2013).   In my case, my personal and professional 
interests and values align with narrative researchers who are influenced by critical and 
social constructionist perspectives, and who view personal meaning making as taking 
place within the context – and confines - of the culturally-available narratives and 
discourses that we encounter during our lives (Somers, 1994; White and Epston, 1990; 
Frank, 1995; Hammack, 2008; Smith and Sparkes, 2008a; Verhaeghe, 2012; Hammack 
and Toolis, 2015; McLean and Syed, 2015; Johnstone and Boyle, 2018).   
My exploration of narrative theorising prompted me to reflect on the ways that my 
childhood and adolescence were permeated with narratives in the form of stories, 
whether heard, read, watched or written.  I recognised that - without me being aware 
that it was happening - this early immersion in narratives conveyed and reinforced 
powerful messages about social and cultural norms, including about personhood, 
morality, gender, family and so on (Somers, 1984; Hammack and Toolis, 2015; McLean 
and Syed, 2015).  This personal resonance with the claims of narrative inquiry was 
accompanied by a growing interest in narrative as a metaphor for selfhood and 
therapy (Sarbin, 1986; Polkinghorne, 1988) as I explored different approaches to 
psychotherapy during my counselling psychology training. In terms of my professional 
development as a practitioner psychologist, I found myself increasingly influenced by 
approaches that emphasise the social and cultural contexts of personal meaning 
making, including those that explicitly draw on narrative and social constructionist 
perspectives (White and Epston, 1990; Hedges, 2005; Dallos, 2006; Køster, 2017; 
Johnstone and Boyle, 2018)).  Over time, I concluded that narrativity is a key theme 
that brings together my research and psychotherapeutic interests: a similar view was 
expressed by Polkinghorne (1988) in one of the early key texts on narrative inquiry.   
An additional but important benefit of adopting a narrative methodology for my study 
is that narrative-based study is found across a broad range of disciplines, including 
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education, sociology, nursing and medicine (see, for example, Casey, 1995; Frank, 
1995; Charon, 2001; Polkinghorne, 2007; Lewis, 2011; Hurwitz and Charon, 2013; 
Souto-Manning, 2014; Wang and Geale, 2015).  This mirrors the multi-disciplinary 
nature of autism research itself.   
3.2 Exploring narratives within a critical realist framework   
My approach to narrative analysis is characterised by the assumption that personal 
meaning-making is embedded within a wider social, cultural and political context: that 
the ways that we make sense of our experiences are simultaneously shaped and 
limited by the concepts, discourses and narratives that we encounter in society (Souto-
Manning, 2014; Burr, 2015; Gergen, 2015; Johnstone and Boyle, 2018).  This began 
with an interest in the potentially stigmatising effects of mainstream discursive 
constructions and narratives of autism - which variously depict autistic individuals in 
dehumanising terms (Brownlow, 2010b; Duffy and Dorner, 2011; Dinishak and Akhtar, 
2013; Milton, 2014; Quirici, 2015; O’Dell et al, 2016) – and the implications of the 
growing influence of the brain-based neurodiversity discourse of autism as a potential 
means of resisting and challenging dominant discourses (Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013; 
Ortega, 2013).  This creates a potential discursive ‘battle ground’ between those 
occupying the biomedical mainstream – for whom autism is a ‘disorder’ which requires 
diagnosis and possible treatment – and those who construe it as a valuable feature of 
human diversity (and for some, a matter of personal identity rather than a diagnostic 
construct (Egner, 2019)).       
During the research process, I also became interested in claims that stories conform to 
a small number of plots or themes (Booker, 2007) which we are assumed to internalise 
through our lifelong exposure to the narratives that are prevalent in our culture, and 
which we then reproduce when telling our own stories (McAdams, 2005; Gergen, 
2015). Within psychology, research in this area has tended to focus on the apparent 
prevalence of redemption narratives in American culture (McAdams, 2005):  narratives 
in which the protagonist overcomes a difficult beginning to reach a “position of pride” 
(Gergen, 2015, p.73).  However, my interest was drawn in particular by a sociologist’s 
research into the stories told by individuals experiencing serious illness, which he 
claimed were comprised of elements of three narrative types: restitution, chaos and 
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quest narratives (Frank, 1995 and 2010).  Frank argues that the restitution narrative – 
characterised by a passive protagonist who is healed through the intervention of 
‘heroic’ experts - is dominant within mainstream medicine.  Where conventional 
recovery is not possible and an individual’s experience thus fails to conform to this 
narrative, she or he is left vulnerable to experiencing life as a ‘chaos narrative’, 
characterised by themes of helplessness, ‘stuckness’ and a lack of meaning or purpose.  
For Frank, the narrative alternative to this meaningless chaos is the ‘quest’ narrative in 
which the protagonist re-claims agency through personal meaning-making and action 
towards valued goals (even if they do not involve recovery to good physical health) 
(Frank, 1995 and 2010).     
As I explored the mainstream production of ‘knowledge’ about autism, I came to see 
Frank’s (1995 and 2010) restitution narrative as a metaphor for the current 
preoccupation with identifying aetiological and neurobiological explanations for autism 
(Pellicano et al, 2014), as though it is a disease that could be ‘cured’ if only researchers 
could identify the ‘science’ that underlies it.  From a neurodiversity perspective, 
however, autism is not a ‘condition’ which needs to be cured;  its cultural framing 
within an implicit restitution narrative is therefore not only incongruous but also 
doomed to fail.  For Frank, the failure of the restitution narrative is associated with 
potential narrative ‘chaos’, including an inability to make sense of difficulties.  Indeed, 
the distress and confusion commonly described by individuals before they came to 
acquire the epistemic and hermeneutic concept of ‘autism’ to explain their difficulties 
in everyday life seemed to me to hint at the emotional pain of a chaos narrative 
(Hearst, 2014; Hickey, Crabtree and Stott, 2018; Leedham et al, 2020).  Furthermore, 
the hermeneutic absence that underlies ‘chaos’ seems to have been occupied by 
another problematic narrative theme in the common storying of autism as a tragedy 
(Broderick and Ne’eman, 2008; Duffy and Dorner, 2011).  This left me curious about 
whether themes of chaos or tragedy (Frank, 2010) might be common features in the 
personal stories of autistic women, or whether this potential narrative ‘damage’ 
(Nelson, 2001) might be avoided through the deployment of redemptive, quest or 
other narrative types.  
The underlying theme in these influences on my approach to narrative analysis is the 
socially and culturally-embedded nature of narrative, and – as my research progressed 
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– this was increasingly accompanied by an interest in the processes by which 
individuals acquire new ways of understanding their experiences:  in particular, the 
possible ways that different epistemic and cultural resources (such as the 
neurodiversity discourse of autism) ‘travel’ and become available to construe and re-
interpret one’s experiences (Bagatell, 2007 and 2010; O’Dell et al, 2016).   These 
various interests converge under the ‘umbrella’ of critical realism, with its emphasis on 
the socially-mediated – and potentially transformative – nature of knowledge, 
together with its recognition of subjectivity as a distinctive form of reality which is 
produced through the complex and dynamic interaction of other aspects of reality: 
biological, social, cultural and so on (Elder-Vass, 2012; Marks and O’Mahoney, 2013; 
Bhaskar et al, 2018).  The critical realist view of the social world thus translates to an 
approach to research that involves the use of interpretative methodologies – such as 
narrative analysis – in conjunction with an interest in the social processes that 
contribute to changes in personal meaning making (Bhaskar et al, 2018).  
3.3 Research design 
3.3.1 Sample size 
The flexibility and heterogeneity of narrative-informed methodology means that there 
is little in the way of guidelines about practical matters such as sample size.  However, 
my intention to analyse individual narratives in depth meant that IPA was an obvious 
reference point, in terms of its similar concern with depth of analysis and case-focus 
(Braun and Clarke, 2013).  For IPA, Smith and Osborn (2008) advocate a small sample 
size - typically between one and six participants - in order to allow researchers to 
engage with the data in appropriate depth.  For the purpose of this narrative analysis, I 
therefore concluded that a small sample size of between four and six participants 
would be appropriate, depending on the richness of data produced.  Like Smith and 
Osborn (2008), I considered that this position was validated by the publication of rich 
and insightful narrative-based studies with small sample sizes from one (Sermijn, 
Devlieger and Loots, 2008; Smith and Sparkes, 2008; Papathomas and Lavallee, 2012) 
to four participants (Toolis and Hammack, 2015).  
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3.3.2 Recruitment and participants  
Purposive sampling was used, with the following broad inclusion criteria:  women who 
had identified as autistic after the age of eighteen.  It is typically the case that autism-
related research studies stipulate that participants must have a ‘formal’ diagnosis, 
even for studies with an experiential focus (e.g. Bargiela et al, 2016; Kanfiszer et al, 
2017).  In this case, my interest was in the participants’ personal meaning-making 
around the category of autism; for some individuals, this could be a neurodiversity-
informed approach in which the need for external validation of identity could 
reasonably be deemed inappropriate.  Moreover, sensitivity towards the “social 
contexts and discrimination” (BPS, 2005, p.2) faced by potential participants includes a 
recognition that it can be difficult and time-consuming to access autism assessments, 
especially as an adult (Bargiela et al, 2016; Milner et al, 2019; Zener, 2019).  I therefore 
specified in my recruitment material that a formal diagnosis was not required and that 
it was sufficient that participants ‘self-identified’ as autistic (or having Asperger’s 
syndrome or being on the autism spectrum).         
A Facebook page was created to advertise my search for participants (Appendix 2).  I 
shared this with my personal and professional contacts, and also used it to contact two 
other Facebook pages:  one described as an online support group for autistic women, 
and the other run by a woman who identifies as autistic and who posts information on 
female autism.  I also advertised for participants on a UK-based parenting website, 
which has a support and discussion thread for individuals who identify as autistic or 
otherwise neurodiverse.  Potential participants were invited to make contact via email 
or phone, at which point I sent them the participant information sheet (Appendix 3) 
and invited them to ask further questions about the study before deciding whether to 
take point.  
This resulted in the initial recruitment of six participants, aged between 31 and 47.  
Some months after the narrative interview took place, one of the participants 
subsequently decided that she no longer identified as autistic, and it was therefore 
agreed that her data would be withdrawn from the study.  The remaining five 
participants are all resident in the UK and recorded that they are either white 
British/white other according to the Office for National Statistics (n.d.) ethnic group 
categories.  They are also all university educated (three with postgraduate degrees); 
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four are currently employed or self-employed, while the fifth is taking a career break 
to be at home full-time with her young children).  In terms of relationship status, two 
are married (opposite-sex marriages), two are divorced (following opposite-sex 
marriages) and one is single.  Further information (albeit in an anonymised form) is 
provided about each participant in the analysis chapter.  
3.3.3 Data collection: narrative interviewing 
Participants were offered the choice of taking part via video-conferencing rather than 
face-to-face, to avoid excluding potential participants who might prefer not to meet in 
person due to sensory issues or other reasons (Bargiela et al, 2016).  In the event, this 
option was used with two participants due to the potential travel time rather than 
personal considerations.  The other four interviews were conducted in person:  three 
participants elected to meet at their own home, and I met with the fourth (whose data 
was subsequently withdrawn from the study, as discussed in section 3.3.2) at an office 
in a mutually convenient location.  As required by the university, I followed 
appropriate ‘safety’ guidelines when meeting the participants in person.   
Prior to the interview, I explained that I would be asking the participant to sign a 
consent form (Appendix 4) on the day of the interview, and I shared this with them in 
advance.  At the start of the interview, I gave the participants the opportunity to ask 
further questions before signing the consent form and proceeding.  
My aim was to encourage the participants to tell their individual stories, with minimal 
intervention from me (Schiff, 2017); however, I prepared a prompt sheet (Appendix 5) 
with optional questions to encourage the exploration of the meaning of an ‘autistic 
identity’ for the participant and her life if it seemed that it would be helpful during the 
session.   The starting point for the interview was to explain that I am interested in the 
events and experiences that lead to adult women realising that they are autistic, and 
to invite the participant to tell me about her experience(s) of this.  Depending on the 
participant’s story, I then asked open-ended follow up questions to encourage further 
exploration and elaboration of the meaning and significance of autism for her life. 
At the end of the interview, the participant was again given the opportunity to ask 
questions and offer feedback about the interview experience.   The interviews lasted 
between ninety minutes and two hours forty minutes, producing a total of ten hours of 
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interview data (excluding the participant whose data was subsequently withdrawn 
from the study). They were audio-recorded on a digital recording device, then 
immediately transferred to a password protected laptop following the interview.  I 
transcribed the interviews verbatim (other than anonymising names and other 
potentially identifying information) following the convention described by Malson 
(1998).   
3.3.4 Data analysis      
The aim of my analysis was to generate an individual ‘story’ for each participant, which 
reflected the events and experiences that had led to her identifying as autistic, 
contextualising this within my interpretations of: 
(i) the discursive and cultural resources deployed by the participants when 
making sense of their experiences;  
(ii) any experiences or processes that had led to the participant encountering a 
‘new’ way of constructing autism; and 
(iii) any changes that took place in their lives following their experience of self-
identifying as autistic.  
I carried out the analysis and interpretation of each interview separately, in order to 
focus on each individual story as a distinctive and unique entity.  This involved multiple 
close readings of each transcript, identifying the deployment of different discursive 
constructions of autism and other features of the participant’s narrative which were 
relevant to my research questions (see section 2.4).  I also prepared an informal 
‘timeline’ for each participant, summarising the key events and experiences that had 
led to them identifying as autistic, and any which followed the incorporation of this 
recognition into their narrative identity.  
I then drafted the individual ‘story’ for each participant and shared this draft with the 
participant and my supervisory team for their comments.  I explained to the 
participants that their draft ‘story’ included some inevitably subjective interpretation 
and analysis of the ways that they had talked about and made sense of autism as a 
concept during their interview, but that I wanted to check if they considered that I had 
represented their views, life events and experiences in a way that conveyed a 
meaningful sense of what they had hoped to communicate to me.  All five participants 
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confirmed that my interpretation reflected their views and experiences in a 
satisfactory way, and that their data had been appropriately anonymised (following 
minor changes requested by one participant).  
3.4 Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval was obtained from the UWE Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
before I started to recruit the participants (see Appendix 1).  Appropriate steps were 
taken to protect the participants’ anonymity and confidentiality:  the audio-recordings 
of the interviews were deleted after transcribing them, and their names and other 
potentially identifying details (age, location, family member details and so on) were 
changed in the transcript.  The transcript documents were password protected and 
only shared with my supervisory team via the university email system.  The 
participants’ signed consent forms were stored in a locked storage box.  Once the final 
thesis has been approved, the interview transcripts will be deleted, and paper copies 
of consent forms will be securely destroyed.   
As noted in the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 3), the participants were 
advised that they could withdraw their consent to participate at any point (including 
during the interview) up until the later stages of drafting this thesis without giving a 
reason.  They were provided with my draft interpretations of the stories they had 
given me during the interview and invited to provide feedback on the draft.  As 
discussed above, this led to the mutual decision to withdraw one of the participant’s 
story analysis from my thesis as she had concluded following further reflection that 
she no longer found autism a personally meaningful explanation for her lived 
experiences.    
Participants were asked to consider before the interviews whether there might be any 
experiences or events that might be distressing to disclose to me, and to only talk 
about experiences that they felt comfortable to share with me.  For those participants 
who had not indicated that they had access to a personal therapist, I provided details 
of local support services (such as counselling charities or NHS Talking Therapies 
services) in case they experienced distress after the interview.  
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3.5 Reflexivity  
“Strangely enough, I bring myself everywhere I go…” (Schiff, 2017, p.203). 
Researcher reflexivity in always important in qualitative research (Willig, 2013), and 
this is especially so for ‘double hermeneutic’ methodologies like narrative analysis, 
where the researcher is engaged in interpreting the participants’ own interpretations 
of the issue in question:  it is inevitable that my interpretations will have been shaped 
by my interests in social constructionism and critical realism, and my personal values 
of feminism and social justice (Silver, 2013; Schiff, 2017).  My interpretations and 
indeed my interactions with participants will also have been influenced by my personal 
stance towards autism.  In particular, by the time I conducted my participant 
interviews, my engagement with the personal accounts of autistic women (Miller, 
2003; Simone, 2010; Rowe, 2013a and 2013b; Hearst, 2014; Holliday Willey, 2015; Kim, 
2015; James, 2017; Uher, 2017) and with critical perspectives on autism research 
(Yergeau, 2013; Milton, 2014; O’Dell et al, 2016; Woods, Milton, Arnold and Graby, 
2018) meant that my construal of autism was informed not only by counselling 
psychology’s social justice agenda (Cutts, 2013), but also by neurodiversity-informed 
perspectives which foreground individuality and strengths (while not seeking to deny 
or minimise the difficulties faced in adapting to the neurotypical world) (Kapp et al, 
2013; Den Houten, 2019).  This neurodiversity-informed position was strengthened by 
personal and professional experiences relating to autism during the period of my 
research.  I reflected in depth on these experiences through the use of a research 
journal and discussions with a peer with expertise and experience in the field of autism 
and neurodiversity; I also shared my reflections on the implications of these 
experiences for my research with my supervisory team.  However, for reasons of 
privacy and confidentiality – for myself and for others – my reflections on these 
experiences are excluded from the thesis. 
As my study developed, it seemed to me that the most significant decision for a 
narrative researcher is whether to produce an interpretation of individual stories or a 
thematic analysis (Schiff, 2017).  Undoubtedly the latter has its attractions, not least 
that it is currently a more ‘conventional’ approach to qualitative research and – in 
particular – it lends itself more readily to producing an article for publication (bearing 
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in mind the usual word limits for publishing in journals).  However, I found myself 
resistant to the lure of the theme, sharing Schiff’s view that it would potentially 
detract from the distinctive nature of narrative analysis.  Instead, I remained 
committed to presenting my personal interpretation of my participants’ individual 
narratives, with the deliberate objective of challenging homogenising and 
dehumanising accounts of autism through the (re)telling of the participants’ rich and 
unique stories.  
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4. Analysis 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
My opening prompt to the participants in the interviews was to explain that I am 
interested in the event(s) or experience(s) that led to them identifying as autistic, and 
to invite them to tell me about this.  I then followed the participant’s lead in the story 
she told me, asking open-ended follow-up questions to elicit further information 
where it seemed appropriate but otherwise not seeking to impose any particular 
direction or expectations on their narratives: an approach which is characteristic of 
narrative interviews (Emerson and Frosh, 2004; Hollway and Jefferson, 2008; Frank, 
2010; Schiff, 2017; Stagg and Belcher, 2019).   
My objective of “letting stories breathe” (Frank, 2010) in the interview generated rich 
and extensive data, which was not neatly temporal in nature:  different episodes and 
experiences were recounted as they appeared to come to the participant’s mind (and 
doubtless in response to my expression of interest at different times).  As such, the 
stories were characteristic of the ‘rhizomatic’ narrative with its “multiple entryways” 
to the messy complexity of subjectivity and lived experience (Sermijn et al, 2008; 
Loots, Coppens and Sermijn, 2013):  closer to the tales we hear in social settings (or 
indeed in the therapy room) than a formally ‘edited’ and structured version of a story.  
However, when developing my own interpretations of those stories I introduced a 
more conventionally temporal structure to the participants’ narratives, and I also 
focused on key elements that I identified as relevant from the perspective of my 
research questions (section 2.4).   My interpretation of the participants’ deployment of 
discursive constructions, and the presence – or otherwise – of underlying narrative 
‘themes’ was also shaped and influenced by my own research into these areas during 
the period of this project, as discussed previously in sections 2.3 and 3.2.  The 
interpretation of each participant’s story was then shared with her for her feedback 
(see section 3.3.4); the resultant five individual stories are presented in the section 
that follows.    
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4.2  Charlie’s story: “I have been masking and camouflaging my whole life…” 
Charlie is thirty one years old; she is married and works as a social worker in a large city 
in the South West.  She self-identified as autistic at the age of 28, after hearing the 
story of another autistic woman at an autism conference; she was subsequently 
diagnosed by an NHS psychiatrist at the age of 29.   
Charlie’s narrative depicted an early awareness of ‘feeling different’ and of not fitting 
in with her peers.  Dean et al (2017) report that autistic girls are often on the periphery 
of social groups, and this is consistent with Charlie’s experience of being in a friendship 
group of “smart kids” at school:    
“…on the surface I had friends but (.) I didn’t always feel like I knew what was 
going on.  More often than not, I felt like I was included because I matched with 
these people [in terms of academics and extra-curricular interests] and we got on 
well enough but I always felt like I was on the periphery, like I was stood on the 
edge watching (.) the interactions, and I would sometimes get things (.) wrong 
and have (.) you know, periodic little (.) not full blown falling outs but like (.) you 
know, just misunderstandings and I would end up apologising and not necessarily 
knowing why...” 
Growing up, Charlie was able to make sense of this pervasive experience of ‘feeling 
different’ to some extent:  her parents moved from London to the small Scottish town 
where she grew up when she was a baby and their accents marked the family out as 
‘incomers’.  The family’s incomer status within their community did not, however, 
account for other difficulties Charlie experienced during her secondary school years, 
such as negotiating the school buildings between lessons: 
 ”…changing classes (.) into different parts of the building was an absolute 
fucking nightmare.  Noisy, chaotic (.) my locker was never anywhere near any of 
my classes (laughs) […] we were allowed to take our backpacks around with us, 
so I would end up loading up like four periods worth of (.) books and everything 
with me so I didn’t have to try to negotiate (.) dodging round [the school]” 
As an adult with insight into autism, Charlie came to understand these difficulties as a 
consequence of her sensory sensitivities, together with differences in executive 
functioning: at the time, however, she had no way of making sense of why she 
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struggled with aspects of everyday life at school that her peers seemed to take in their 
stride. 
Unexplained difficulties and social confusion became more frequent for Charlie when 
she reached her twenties and embarked on a career as a social worker.  She found 
herself struggling to cope with various aspects of working life:  for example, 
restructuring of teams was a common event, and something Charlie found “unsettling” 
and stressful.  Perhaps most problematic on a daily basis, however, was the physical 
challenge of open plan offices.  Charlie described how she often wore sunglasses and 
headphones to help her cope with the discomfort of fluorescent lighting and 
distracting noise, resulting in teasing from her colleagues: 
 “…my colleagues would joke and say I look like either Stevie Wonder or Ray 
Charles, and it’s like (laughs) ‘how this light is not painful for you I will never 
understand’, because it actually gives me a migraine, it makes my head hurt and I 
cannot concentrate with the noise.”        
In ‘joking’ about Charlie’s resemblance to famous people with known visual 
impairments, her colleagues acted as a “normalising gaze” (Foucault, 1977, p.184) that 
served to highlight her differences to implicit norms.  This type of experience 
reinforced her assessment of herself “a bit weird”; a “bit of an odd duck” who strugged 
with aspects of life that others seemed to take in their stride: 
“I always felt like I was (.) you know, just trying to (.) to jam myself into this 
round hole and was a, you know, not necessarily a square peg, maybe a hexagon 
(laughs) but, you know, just never never fitting in.” 
Without any way of making sense of these experiences, the story of this period of 
Charlie’s life was redolent of Frank’s (1995, p.97) concept of the chaos narrative, 
characterised by a sense of “vulnerability, futility and impotence” in the face of a 
seemingly endless series of problems:  in Charlie’s case, problems that centred in 
particular on the workplace.  Unsurprisingly, she experienced frequent episodes of 
work-related stress and anxiety during this period, and on two separate occasions was 
signed off work for several weeks at a time.   
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During this stage of her life, Charlie was learning about autism as part of her role as a 
social worker in a children and families team.  The cases of autism she encountered 
were often associated with intellectual disabilities, but she also became more familiar 
with Asperger-type presentations (Baron-Cohen, 2002b).  Her recollection of her 
knowledge about Asperger-type autism during that period was consistent with the 
gendered ’eccentric scientist’ discourse of autism (see p.25):   
“…like um, you know, the one that- the most famous undiagnosed character on 
TV, Sheldon Cooper on Big Bang Theory […] oh he’s textbook, clearly not 
understanding, you know, social niceties and that.  He just sees it as a waste of 
time. Um so yeah, I never even remotely considered it for myself.”   
The discursive construction of autistic individuals as aloof, socially awkward boys and 
men who are more interested in science (or similar pursuits) than in the people around 
them (Asperger, 1991; Baron-Cohen, 2003; Quirici, 2015) currently permeates popular 
culture and is reified within mainstream research literature in the form of the so-called 
‘extreme male brain’ theory of autism (Baron-Cohen, 2002).  It was irrelevant to 
Charlie’s experience of herself as a caring woman who worked hard to fit in socially 
and whose interest in other people had led to her studying psychology as an 
undergraduate and pursuing a career in social work.  For much of her twenties, this left 
her with hermeneutic ‘absence’ and a resulting inability to make sense of her feeling of 
being ‘different’ to others. 
Charlie’s lacuna in self-understanding finally changed in a dramatic episode when she 
attended a national autism event for work purposes. She was interested to note that 
there were female speakers talking about their experiences of autism, and she went to 
listen to a psychotherapist talk about her experience of being diagnosed as autistic in 
her thirties.   
“…her story resonated so much with me and (.) I just sat there absolutely 
gobsmacked (laughs) listening to her speak.  And it shook me for the rest of the 
day.” 
Charlie described how she heard key aspects of her own experiences ‘mirrored’ by the 
psychotherapist’s own story, from feeling on the ‘outside’ of groups to struggling in the 
loud and busy environment at school and work.  It was also an encounter with a new 
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way of construing autism, consistent with the ‘neurodiversity’ discourse, according to 
which it is possible – as embodied by the psychotherapist speaker – to be both autistic 
and a woman drawn to work in a caring profession.  It offered Charlie a single, 
coherent explanation for the seemingly disparate elements of Charlie’s life 
experiences: her difficulties coping with change and in ‘de-coding’ social norms, 
alongside her interest in other people and her capacity to pursue a career as a social 
worker.   Perhaps most significantly, the encounter provided her with a new 
understanding about the way that light and sound often seem to painfully assault her; 
she could now construe these sensory experiences as integral features of autism that 
are largely problematic because of the disabling effects of educational and work 
environments designed by and for the neurotypical majority.  
Charlie subsequently carried out her own research into female autism21 before 
concluding that her difficulties and experiences “[made sense] under the lens of 
autism”.   She then experienced a stage of wondering:  
“…is a self-diagnosis sufficient or should I pursue an official diagnosis, and […] I’d 
felt like I really had no choice but to pursue a formal diagnosis because I didn’t 
feel like I would be believed (.) you know ‘you can’t be autistic, you can make eye 
contact’, ‘you can’t be autistic, you’re holding down a job, you’re married’…” 
Charlie’s comments here illustrate the potentially ambiguous and fragile nature of an 
‘autistic identity’.  When discursively constructed as a form of ‘neurodiversity’, autism 
may be construed as a matter of personal identity and self-knowledge, for which 
‘diagnosis’ is no more appropriate than it would be for any other facet of one’s 
identity.  In contrast, within the dominant medical discursive framework, formal 
diagnosis is unequivocally essential and designated healthcare professionals (such as 
psychiatrists) act as “authorities of delimitation” (Foucault, 1972, p.46) who determine 
who may – and may not – be termed autistic.  In the extract above, Charlie conveyed a 
sense that “self-diagnosis” might be sufficient for the purpose of her own identity, but 
the lack of a “formal diagnosis” would potentially damage the credibility of her claim 
to be autistic in the eyes of (unstated) others.  
 
2121 Charlie noted that she found Aspergirls (Simone, 2010) – which draws on the personal experiences 
of autistic women - particularly helpful when carrying out her own research into female autism.  
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Charlie’s quest for medically-sanctioned validation led to a ‘regressive’ phase (that is, 
one characterised by moving away from a valued endpoint (Gergen, 2015)) within her 
narrative as she described her struggle to obtain ‘confirmation’ of her new autistic 
identity in the form of a diagnosis via her local NHS trust.  She was required to undergo 
the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) (Hus and Lord, 2014), in which she 
was faced with a series of tasks, such as being handed a picture book with no words in 
it and being asked to describe what was happening: 
“It was a story about flying frogs and (.) this is the thing, like (.) how is this 
appropriate for (.) an adult? […] I thought it was insulting.  And they said that I 
was too creative in that particular thing because um (.) I was able to infer the 
emotions on the faces of the frogs.  But it was (.) a quite exaggerated illustration 
and I was read to a lot as a child.” 
Charlie was subsequently told that a diagnosis would not be forthcoming, on the 
grounds that she had been assessed as “too sociable and creative” to be autistic.  Her 
narrative conveyed an implicit recognition that autism is constituted within the 
‘medical’ discourse as something that cannot be concealed from others, and that she 
had been unable to perform this version of ‘autism’ satisfactorily after years of striving 
to conform to neurotypical norms:   
“I have been masking and camouflaging my entire life, trying to (.) feel normal, to 
fit in, you know […] when you wear these masks for so much of your life they 
become your face.  So it’s really hard (.) it’s really hard to separate that […] I can’t 
just dial up the autism (laughs) you know, to be able to (.) to get them to see 
what I actually am dealing with, because then I don’t want [the assessment 
team] turning round and saying ‘well it just seemed like you were performing’…” 
Charlie described herself as “absolutely floored and devastated” at the news that a 
diagnosis would not be forthcoming, a response that conveys the importance of the 
external validation of medical professionals and the potential fragility of her new 
‘autistic identity’ if it is withheld.  Her attempt to obtain a diagnosis could have ended 
at this point, but her previous research into female autism had left Charlie convinced 
that it was the correct explanation for her disparate difficulties with social situations; 
with change and transitions; and – above all – with overwhelming and often painful 
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sensory stimulation.  She subsequently wrote a long letter to the assessment team, 
explaining the effects of a lifetime of “masking and camouflaging” any potentially non-
normative social responses and why she therefore disagreed with their conclusion.  For 
example, she highlighted that her training and experience as a social worker had 
helped her develop skills and compensatory strategies which enabled her to “infer the 
emotions” of the frogs in the ADOS picture task; a performance that had contributed 
to her being assessed as not autistic:  
“[I explained to them that] it’s hard to unpick (.) what is learned and what is 
inherent (.) how in the hell do you expect me to (.) you know, say ‘oh I-(.) I’m 
able to just recognise these emotions, also I studied social work, I was trained 
effectively (laughs) to be able to- to pick up on these subtle expressions if I’m in a 
one to one situation with a client and be like ‘you seem a bit upset, do you want 
to tell me more about how you’re feeling?’.  You know, this is stuff that I’ve 
learnt, I can’t just (.) switch that off […] it’s not like you can (.) you know, re-wind 
to a stage when I was younger.” 
In response to her letter, Charlie was offered a second opinion with a psychiatrist.  This 
was a very different experience; instead of being asked to perform infantilising tasks, 
the psychiatrist spent over four hours exploring her life experiences with her (and with 
her husband and parents) before agreeing that a diagnosis of autism spectrum 
condition “made sense” for Charlie.  
Charlie described her “massive, massive relief” when she received confirmation of the 
diagnosis.  For Charlie, diagnosis constituted ‘expert’ confirmation that the difficulties 
she had experienced in life – such as in conforming to social norms and in coping with 
sensory stimulation in the workplace – could be explained in terms of her “neurology”:     
“I do not believe [autism] is a disorder, you know, it’s (.) it’s a neurodivergence, a 
difference (.) yes, some are disordered by it (.) you know, that’s not to say that (.) 
you know, none of us suffer with autism because some do, some genuinely do (.) 
but (.) if anything it is a condition, it is a type of neurology, and it shouldn’t try to 
be corrected, as some people try to do.” 
Brownlow and O’Dell (2013) describe how the ‘neurodiversity’ discourse typically 
deploys and subverts the neurobiological claims of the dominant ‘medical’ discourse of 
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autism (in which autistic ‘behaviours’ are deemed evidence of underlying ‘deficits’ in 
neurocognitive functioning):  this is evident in Charlie’s description of autism as a “type 
of neurology” that should not be corrected.  Being able to construct autism in this way 
had transformative consequences for Charlie, and meant that she herself no longer 
tries to “correct” her way of being in the world in an attempt to adhere to neurotypical 
norms.  She described how she has experienced the diagnosis as “permission to be 
kinder to [herself]”, in the form of lifestyle changes that accommodate her social and 
sensory needs.  For example, she has sought and obtained ‘reasonable adjustments’ in 
the workplace, such as a quieter office space and permission to work part-time from 
home.  She has also joined an online community of autistic women, which in turn has 
led to rewarding and mutually supportive ‘real life’ friendships with women with 
whom Charlie does not feel the need to “mask and camouflage” her ‘authentic self’.  
With these new friends “there’s no pretence , you know, you can just (.) say what’s on 
your mind.  They get you, they understand you”; an implicit contrast with Charlie’s 
social experiences with the neurotypical majority.   
Despite Charlie’s engagement with the ‘neurodiversity’ discourse of autism, the 
dominance of the ‘medical’ discourse was evident in the power and significance of her 
diagnosis within her narrative:  it was constructed as an essential step in the 
transformation of her personal identity from “strange” to autistic:   
“if I hadn’t gotten the diagnosis, if it- if it never came to fruition and I just kind (.) 
you know (.) almost became a catatonic version of myself, and just continued (.) 
you know, existing like an automaton and- and like just thinking ‘OK, I’m just a bit 
strange’ (.) you know.  I- I can’t (.) if I had- if I had to forecast my life (.) you know, 
without diagnosis I can only just see it as being very very grey […] [now] it’s so 
fucking colourful.” 
Charlie’s description of her “colourful” life post-diagnosis was redolent of Booker’s 
description of the classic ‘rebirth’ narrative in which the protagonist is liberated from 
the “depths of darkness [and] brought up into glorious light” (Booker, 2007, p.194). He 
notes that this liberation typically involves a significant figure who ‘awakens’ the 
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protagonist22 and indeed this was the case in Charlie’s narrative with the autistic 
female psychotherapist serving this key role, setting in train the sequence of events 
which rescued her from a potentially “grey” and “catatonic” future.  Her encounter 
with the psychotherapist’s story resulted in a new and personally meaningful subject 
position for Charlie to adopt: that of a caring and sensitive autistic woman who is 
creative and resourceful in finding ways to compensate for the difficulties she 
experiences as she negotiates ‘neurotypical’ life. 
4.3  Gemma’s story: “I don’t fight to stay normal any more.” 
Gemma is a thirty eight year old married mother of two young children, who lives in the 
South West.  After working as a financial analyst in her twenties, she is currently at 
home full-time bringing up her children, and is actively engaged in local charities and 
support groups for families with autistic children (her son is autistic).  She was 
diagnosed as autistic three years ago via her local NHS adult autism service.     
Gemma’s description of her childhood was characterised by two key themes:  her 
father’s autism, and her exceptional academic abilities.   Her father – who had been 
diagnosed as autistic before Gemma was born – worked successfully in the 
construction sector where his perfectionism was prized, and his difficult interpersonal 
style tolerated.  At home, however, he required considerable support in day-to-day life 
from Gemma’s mother, and he was prone to “spectacular meltdowns”: Gemma 
described her childhood with him as being like “living with Vesuvius”.  She chose to 
escape this at the age of eleven when she won a place at a highly academic girls’ 
boarding school.   
Gemma enjoyed the first few years of boarding school life.  From her vantage point as 
an adult with insight into autism she described how its rules and regulations, and small 
class sizes were “perfect for an autistic person”:  in this environment, she formed close 
friendships with two girls who remain friends to this day.   A gifted musician, Gemma 
also enjoyed the unlimited access to musical instruments at the school, and she went 
on to play no fewer than six different instruments to a high level.  In sixth form, 
 
22 Booker (2007, p.193) cites Sleeping Beauty as a classic example of the rebirth narrative, with the 
sleeping princess being awoken from the “dark spell” by the prince.   
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however, she recalled finding the relative lack of structure problematic and – at the 
age of seventeen - she developed depression for the first time.  At that point, she had 
no way of making sense of this episode, but she speculates now that it was a response 
to the girls being given more freedom in sixth form:  
 “I wasn’t used to that lack of direction (.) didn’t like that really.  Because before 
[sixth form] you had the full teaching timetable with no breaks (.) then suddenly 
you’ve got a load of breaks.  That’s really odd.”   
Gemma noticed that other girls tended to use their free time to socialise, while she 
“struggled” to adapt to the lack of structure.  Despite this – and her difficulties with 
depression during sixth form - she excelled at A levels and went on to university to 
study history.  She found university life very different to the structure of boarding 
school, and she chose to live alone rather than endure the “racket” of university 
accommodation.  Nonetheless, her studies continued to go well and she graduated 
with a first; she also met her partner during this period and they married soon after 
graduation.   
Life subsequently took a significant downturn for Gemma in her twenties; she 
described how she found herself struggling to adapt to working life despite her 
exceptional achievements at school and at university.  She excelled at the analytic and 
technical aspects of her role, but experienced considerable difficulties with the noise 
and distractions of open plan offices, and with the unwritten social “rules” of the 
workplace: 
“…they seem to expect you to go for lunch with them and things.  Why would 
you have to do that?  I work with you, I’m not your friend.  I don’t want to be 
your friend.  There was quite a strong element of that and they had quite a lot of 
evening things that you were kind of viewed as expected to attend.  I couldn’t 
see why you should (.) but it was kind of seen as you were a bit miserable if you 
didn’t.” 
Many years later – following her diagnosis of autism – Gemma was able to construe 
her difficulties in the workplace as a consequence of struggling to conform to 
neurotypical social norms and the sensory stimulation of open plan offices: “too many 
people, too much noise (.) constant phones”.  At the time, however, she had no way of 
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understanding why she seemed unable to cope with office life and she struggled with 
seemingly intractable depression throughout her twenties, resulting in recurrent 
episodes of being signed off work for long periods.  Gemma was also diagnosed with 
anxiety and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) during this period, which – as with 
her depression – were not helped by psychological therapies.  For a decade, she was 
prescribed increasing levels of psychotropic medications, and suffered a range of side 
effects as a result:   
“That level of drugs just made me bloody ill.  And then you take more of them 
because that’s what you get told to do.  Then you take meds to help you with the 
side effects from the previous meds (.) and the next thing you know you’ve got a 
whole cupboard full.  But you keep taking them because you’re convinced you’re 
ill […] It stops your brain working.  I’ve got a really quick brain and- and for it to 
be dulled down to that point actually is really scary.  I thought I was losing my 
mind.  But I wasn’t, I was just heavily medicated.” 
Gemma eventually decided to stop taking psychotropic medication due to the 
unpleasant side effects she experienced.  She remained under the care of the 
community mental health team, however, and it was at a review meeting with a 
recently qualified psychologist that autism was first suggested as a possibility.  By this 
point in her early thirties, Gemma had two children, the younger of whom had been 
diagnosed as autistic.  As a result of this, she was involved in a support group for 
parents with autistic children where she had noticed that it was not unusual for 
parents to identify autistic traits in themselves – and sometimes to seek diagnosis – as 
they learnt about autism in relation to their child.  That had not happened in Gemma’s 
case, however:  her young son was largely ‘non-verbal’ at the time, and she did not 
recognise herself in his behaviours.  Furthermore, she explained that her knowledge 
about autism in adults at that point was largely informed by her experiences with her 
father. 
“I didn’t have a very good understanding of [autism] because my dad is low 
functioning autistic so I kind of thought of most people with autism as being on 
the lower end. (.) He needs full time care (.) pretty much.  He’d say he’s 
independent but he’s not.  He couldn’t organise his own meals.  He’d sit hungry 
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rather than go and find something.  He can’t answer the phone. (.) He couldn’t 
be left for any length of time on his own because he just doesn’t function.” 
Her father’s need for a high level of day-to-day support, and his propensity for angry 
“meltdowns” bore no relation to her own experiences as a capable mother of young 
children.  Gemma therefore appears to have given little credence to the psychologist’s 
suggestion at the time, and she recalled giving the matter no further thought until the 
assessment itself, at which – like Charlie – she was taken aback and annoyed to be 
faced with a series of infantilising tasks including being asked to create stories in 
response to a picture book and a bag of toys.  She refused to engage with these story-
telling tasks: “What a stupid bloody thing to make an adult do […] It’s completely 
inappropriate for adult diagnosis”.  Nonetheless, Gemma subsequently received a 
diagnosis of ‘autism spectrum disorder’ from the local adult autism service.    
Gemma’s initial response to the diagnosis appeared to be one of indifference: “all right 
then (laughs) (.) add it to the list of diagnoses” (i.e. her longstanding diagnoses of 
depression, anxiety and OCD).  However, she subsequently carried out her own 
research into autism in women and discovered that it was a single explanation that 
appeared to account for her difficulties with various aspects of day-to-day life - such as 
experiencing noise and bright lights as overwhelmingly uncomfortable, and her 
frequent confusion in social situations  – alongside her strengths, such as her capacity 
to “hyper-focus” which had stood her in good stead in her academic studies.  She 
recounted her initial response of anger that it had taken her mental health team so 
long to identify the possibility that there might be an underlying reason for her 
apparent depression and anxiety (that is, an emotional response to the stress of 
dealing with the demands of the neurotypical world) and that she had endured many 
years of being unnecessarily medicated as a consequence:  
“I phoned the psychiatrist and told him I wasn’t seeing him again (.) I wasn’t that 
polite to him to him to be honest (.) I said you’re obviously not very bloody 
competent if you’ve been treating something [i.e. OCD, anxiety and depression] 
that hasn’t existed for the last ten years (.) I was really angry at that point 
because of the bloody meds. Anyway, I haven’t seen him since.” 
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Gemma described the psychiatrist’s “surprise” at her autism diagnosis and inferred 
that he appeared to be unaware of the different ways that autism can ‘present’ in 
women.   For her part, the new epistemic framework of autism helped her make sense 
of the difficulties she had encountered over the years with psychological therapies 
which had failed to take into account the different ways that she experiences the 
world.  For example, she was now able to re-frame her apparently ‘obsessive’ 
behaviours as ‘repetitive’ behaviours associated with autism and this provided an 
explanation as to why CBT for OCD had been unsuccessful in her case: “OCD is simply 
repetitive behaviours connected to autism, it’s not OCD (.) but you won’t treat OCD 
because it isn’t OCD.” She also recalled the “hell” of sessions with a psychotherapist 
who was a “horrible eye contact seeker”; she could now construe this experience as an 
inappropriate (and potentially shaming) attempt to impose neurotypical social norms 
on her. 
Being able to reinterpret her experiences in this way was transformative for Gemma’s 
identity, and she described how she made immediate changes in her life to reflect this:  
“I don’t fight to stay normal any more.  I immediately dropped the mask.  
Completely dropped it.  If I don’t want to go to a social situation that I don’t like I 
just say I’m not going. […]  Whereas I would have forced myself to go (.) which 
obviously added to the anxiety and then the low mood and everything else came 
with it.  I don’t do any of those things now.  If it’s noisy I leave.” 
Gemma identified that “[fighting] to stay normal” had included struggling to adhere to 
implicit social norms that she had previously found baffling, for example:    
“Like some people ask what you think about what they’re wearing.  Why ask me? 
(.) Don’t ask me (.) you might not like the answer (laughs).  No, that- those sort of 
things I still find quite tricky.  I’ve learnt that you do not give the honest answer 
(laughs) but it is a learnt thing not to do it.” 
Whereas pre-diagnosis Gemma had no way of making sense of this type of experience, 
afterwards she could construe such episodes of social confusion as evidence of 
fundamental moral differences between autistic and neurotypical people: 
55 
 
“It appears neurotypicals prefer lies” [whereas] “…I actually think most people 
with autism are more honest (.) better levels of integrity […]  I find less 
judgemental in general too.” 
This description of the shortcomings of neurotypical people is consistent with a 
‘strong’ version of the ‘neurodiversity’ discourse which constructs the neurotypical 
majority as impaired relative to autistic people, including from a moral perspective 
(Brownlow, 2010a; Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013).   Gemma’s engagement with this 
discursive construction of ‘neurotypicality’ was especially powerful in her narrative 
because it was grounded in the personal experience of being the mother of an autistic 
child whose behaviour in public often differs from normative expectations, and 
attracts judgement and intolerance from (neurotypical) others.   It was unsurprising to 
hear, therefore, that a significant part of the lifestyle changes she made post-diagnosis 
was to retreat from the judgemental “normalising gaze” (Foucault, 1977, p.184) of the 
neurotypical world as far as possible:   
“[now] I only have people around me that are either autistic or have autistic 
family members.  I don’t mix with NTs23 at all […] unless they have really strong 
autism links.  No, I don’t mess about with NTs (.) it doesn’t work for me so I don’t 
do it.  (Laughs) If they’re not autism friendly I don’t bother with them.”  
Gemma explained that she found that ‘NT’ parents with autistic children often became 
knowledgeable about autism as a result of their family experiences, and if so would 
not judge her ‘unmasked’ behaviours from a normative frame of reference:  
“If you’re a bit on the blunt side well that’s OK [“autism friendly NTs”] don’t think 
anything of that (.) they don’t misinterpret that as you’re grumpy or anything, it’s 
just (.) OK, that’s how it is (laughs) er and they know if it gets too loud you’ll 
leave but you’re not being rude, you just can’t cope with the noise and you’ve 
left. But they don’t misinterpret that whereas NTs who think you’ve (.) got 
stroppy over something and left (.) and they wouldn’t realise it’s actually 
intolerable.  They would view you as intolerant rather than the situation isn’t 
tolerable to you.”   
 
23 i.e. neurotypical or non-autistic individuals.  
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With her new understanding of the diversity of autism, Gemma placed new 
significance on similarities between aspects of her father’s experiences and her own, 
such as their shared sensory sensitivities and difficulties with executive function 
relating to planning and organisation.  Furthermore, where previously his tendency to 
outbursts of anger had seemed so different to her own long periods of depression, she 
could now construe both as emotional responses – in her case internalised rather than 
externalised - to the stress of struggling to adapt to the neurotypical world: 
“I’ve got some intolerances that dad’s got.  Like noise and people (.) excessive 
bright light […] but I don’t have the spectacular meltdowns that my dad has 
where things get thrown, there’s a lot of shouting and swearing going on.  I don’t 
have that (.) that’s why I got mentally ill of course, isn’t it, cos it was all internal.  
Whereas the men I think are more explosive (.) and probably better for them.  
It’s not perhaps better for everybody around them but it’s perhaps better for 
them.”  
Despite drawing parallels with aspects of her father’s experiences, Gemma also drew a 
clear distinction between his need for full-time support in his life and her capacity to 
live independently (and, indeed, to provide support to her young son).  She did so by 
creatively deploying the ‘disability’ discourse to define autism as a disability for some 
autistic individuals – like her father - but not for her: 
“Do I consider [autism] a disability in me?  No (.) but I do in other people 
depending at what level they are.  My dad is disabled by his autism because he 
couldn’t manage his own life without support.  So for him it’s a disability (.) and 
the cut off for me is, can you manage your own life without support?  If you can, 
it’s not a disability.  If you can’t, it is.” 
Gemma’s overall story took the form of a subversive take on a classic restitution 
narrative.  Whereas this type of narrative typically involves recovery to health as a 
result of medical interventions administered by ‘expert’ professionals (Frank, 2013), 
Gemma’s mental health was transformed when she chose to reject the normative 
expectations of society, including those of the healthcare professionals she had 
encountered in the community mental health team:   
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 “…I was pushing for [‘normality’] because I thought well why can’t I do it?  This is 
stupid, I should be able to do it.  Well now there’s a proper reason for not being 
able to, that’s OK.  And the stress just disappears with that (.) yeah, the diagnosis 
has solved what five psychiatrists and about twenty therapists couldn’t (laughs).  
And half the NHS pharmaceutical bill (laughs).” 
Within Gemma’s narrative, her recovery from her mental health difficulties has given 
her the opportunity to direct her emotional resources in productive and creative ways:  
in “fighting” to secure appropriate support for her young son and his education, and in 
supporting other families with autistic children through involvement in local groups 
and charities.   For Gemma, therefore, her new ‘autistic identity’ has been 
accompanied by an enhanced sense of agency and community, in the form of a 
powerful commitment to her local autistic community.  
4.4 Jane’s story: “I started realising that I had more in common with the [autistic] 
kids I was teaching than with the staff…” 
Jane is a forty five year old teacher who works in a comprehensive school in the South 
West.  Divorced, she lives with her teenaged son and daughter:  her son, now fifteen, 
was diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome at the age of seven.  Jane subsequently self-
identified as autistic at the age of 40; she was formally diagnosed via her local NHS 
adult autism service two years ago.  
From the outset, Jane’s story was characteristic of a redemption narrative in which a 
protagonist overcomes setbacks to reach a “position of pride” in life (McAdams and 
McLean, 2013; McAdams and Guo, 2015; Gergen, 2015, p.73); she described her 
experiences as a “difficult” child and adolescent from the vantage point of an 
experienced ‘special educational needs’ (SEN) teacher who is now responsible for 
supporting young people with their struggles.  She recounted her “rigidity” around 
routines when she was growing up, and the uncomfortable feelings she experienced 
when these were interrupted for any reason.  Jane was eventually able to identify 
those feelings as anxiety, but she had no such insight as a child.  Instead, she 
experienced physical responses such as vomiting, and a confusing sense of “dread” at 
the prospect of events like Christmas or family holidays:  ostensibly happy events, but 
ones which involved a change in her normal routines.  This response to change was 
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especially debilitating when Jane moved to secondary school24 at the age of eleven.   
The distress which this transition evoked in her led to a period of ‘school refusal’, and 
she was diagnosed with anxiety and depression during this time.         
Jane recalled few overt social difficulties when she was young, describing herself as a 
“stellar actress” and “social chameleon” who became one of the “cool kids” at 
secondary school.   From her current perspective as an adult with insight into autism 
she attributed this to her ability to imitate her peers, and identified its negative effect 
on her emotional wellbeing:   
“I was a very very good people watcher from a very early age.  So copy, absorb, 
do the same (.) um and I would say that it was exhausting, yeah, and my anxiety 
was at peak levels [as a teenager].” 
At the time, Jane had no way of making sense of her growing difficulties with anxiety, 
but she found that alcohol helped her feel more relaxed in social situations.  She 
described how she developed a “high functioning” alcohol addiction as a result of this: 
“…[alcohol] enabled me to socialise (.) you know, to go out and be in busy pubs 
and stuff […] it was the thing that stopped the anxiety, well temporarily 
obviously.  Obviously it was still there the next day, and worse obviously.  But at 
that time, it stopped the anxiety.  It allowed me to relax, it stopped me 
overthinking, it stopped me analysing every conversation I’d had that day and 
what I’d got wrong…” 
Jane continued to struggle with anxiety, alcohol addiction and intermittent bouts of 
depression throughout her early adulthood, but alongside these difficulties she 
embarked on a career as a maths teacher; she also married and was able to overcome 
her alcohol dependency before starting a family.  She recalled recognising that 
“developmentally something was askew” with her first child early in his life and 
described her subsequent efforts to understand this and to obtain appropriate support 
 
24 In Tierney et al’s (2016) IPA study of the experiences of ten adolescent autistic girls, they found that 
the transition to secondary school was a common trigger for an increase in difficulties which led to a 
diagnosis of autism.  They cited the larger size (and accompanying increase in sensory stimulation) of 
secondary schools as potentially problematic, alongside the need to make new friends.   
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for him at school.  This culminated in a diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome for him at the 
age of seven.    
Within Jane’s narrative, the story of her experiences of successfully obtaining 
educational support for her son was itself redemptive:  she described how she decided 
to use her experience with her son to help other families facing similar difficulties, and 
therefore undertook further training as a special educational needs (SEN) teacher.   
Once working in that field, Jane came to realise that she was particularly skilled at 
relating to autistic children and adolescents, and experienced an “epiphany” that this 
was because their difficulties in the school environment mirrored her own 
experiences:   
“I started realising that I had more in common with the kids I was teaching than 
with the staff in the school (laughs) a lot of the time […] [Other teachers] just 
kept commenting about the fact (.) that they’d come to me and say ‘this kid’s 
having a meltdown, this kid’s having a problem […]’ and I instinctively always 
knew (.) what the problem was, and I knew how to communicate very well with 
them.  And it was- there was just an epiphany of (.) you know because you’ve 
experienced it…”  
In Jane’s narrative, the significance of her ‘epiphany’ was that it resulted in a radical 
shift in her identity; she could finally draw on a coherent explanation for her years of 
unexplained mental health and addiction issues.  This epiphany occurred when she 
already had substantial ‘knowledge’ of autism as a potentially limiting disability 
through her experiences with her young son and her work as an SEN teacher; however, 
deficit-focused constructions of autism had not appeared relevant to Jane’s experience 
of herself as a professional woman and accomplished (albeit secretly anxious) “social 
chameleon”.   Instead, it was direct interpersonal encounters with her pupils’ 
embodiment of social and sensory overstimulation in the form of ‘meltdowns’ that 
provided Jane with an alternative way of construing her previously inexplicable 
vulnerabilities.   She went on carry out her own research into autism in women, which 
confirmed her view of herself as autistic.   
Jane described her response to identifying as autistic as follows:  
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“It was quite a watershed moment, [I remember] having an instant sense of 
relief (.) a very big sense of relief.  It really felt like a missing piece (.) had come 
together.  And for a long long time I didn’t share it with anyone, I didn’t really 
feel the need to.  I was very very happy (.) um with that realisation.  I started 
doing some research on the internet, which kind of confirmed (.) what I knew, 
started looking more at women on the spectrum (.) and reading their 
experiences, read some books and things like that.  Um and for a quite a long 
time being quite happy just to know and not really feeling the need to talk to 
anybody about it.  Er because (.) um (.) it was probably the first time in my life I 
actually felt comfortable in my own skin.” 
Within the hermeneutic framework of autism, Jane finally encountered a meaningful 
explanation for her need for routine and predictability; the anxiety she experiences in 
response to change and transitions; and her difficulties with overwhelming sensory 
stimulation (such as noise, bright lights and so on).  It also accounted for potentially 
problematic aspects of self, such as her “reputation for being a bit abrupt and blunt” 
with colleagues which she now construed as a consequence of features of autism such 
as “rigidity” towards the behaviour of others: 
“…the autism in me wants to go ‘for the love of God, are you stupid?’ (.) you 
know, I want to be blunt, I want to just say it like it is […] um but I know that 
that’s not socially acceptable…” 
Here, autism is constructed as something disruptive within the self; a source of 
potentially transgressive behaviours.  However, in Jane’s narrative it was also a source 
of considerable strength, in the form of her high professional standards and her 
longstanding interest in other people.  Within a neurodiversity-informed 
understanding of ‘autism’, the latter could now be construed as an (autistic) ‘special 
interest’ which had had significant benefits for her personal and professional 
development:  
“…[my special interest as a child] was watching other people […] and I think I’m 
probably, from that point of view, far far better than most (.) you know, 
neurotypical people.  Er I’m far more observant of very small changes in people.  
61 
 
I probably read body language and facial expressions (.) and tone far far better 
than most neurotypical people.  Which is a huge benefit in work.” 
Jane’s new ‘autistic identity’ thereby provided a coherent explanation for disparate 
strengths and difficulties.  For over two years, this insight remained a largely private 
matter, although she eventually shared it with close family members such as her 
mother and sister.  She described how helpful this proved to be for their relationships 
as they could now make sense of her “rigid” need for routine; something which had 
sometimes led to conflict in the past.  Now that family members could understand this 
to be an integral feature of autism, Jane found that they were more accepting of her 
needs in this area.    
Jane eventually decided to seek a diagnosis via the NHS, describing the decision 
underlying this as follows: 
 “I felt I deserved the validation almost, the (.) um you know the validation from 
other professionals and people that I wasn’t kind of like (.) I dunno, making 
excuses for problems I’ve had in the past and my behaviour sometimes.  Um [..] I 
didn’t even suspect it, I knew, I knew that I was right (.) but I wanted the 
validation of someone confirming that…” 
Like Charlie, Jane’s stance towards diagnosis illustrates the conflict between the 
competing neurodiversity and ‘medical’ discourses of autism, and the core issue of 
whether the individual has agency in determining her autistic/neurodiverse status.  
Her narrative conveyed an unsettling uncertainty resulting from this:  she could 
experience herself as ‘knowing’ that her difficulties could be understood within a 
(neurodiversity-informed) framework of autism and yet designated experts would 
have the power to deny her self-knowledge and deem her to be “making excuses” for 
the ways in which her behaviour and mental health had sometimes failed to conform 
to normative expectations. 
In fact, for Jane the diagnostic process25 proceeded relatively smoothly, although she 
recalled objecting to the “male-centric” autism screening questionnaire used by the 
 
25 From Jane’s description, it appeared that the diagnostic process took the form of the interview based 
DISCO  (Diagnostic Interview for Social and Communication Disorders) procedure  (National Autistic 
Society, 2017)  
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GP.  However, it also resulted in a surprising discovery:  her GP reviewed her medical 
notes since childhood for evidence to support a referral, and found that autism had 
been recorded as a possibility on two separate occasions.  The first was when Jane was 
diagnosed with ‘depression and anxiety’ at the age of eleven; the possibility of autism 
being the underlying explanation for this episode was noted in her medical records but 
was not communicated to Jane’s family.  The second occasion was more recent; 
following a course of CBT for anxiety in her late thirties, Jane’s therapist had written to 
her GP to suggest that she might be autistic.   The therapist had not, however, 
suggested this to Jane herself and she was not copied in on the letter.   
The reason for excluding Jane (or her parents, when she was a child) from speculation 
about autism was not recorded in her notes, but – irrespective of their underlying 
intent – the professionals’ silence constituted acts of hermeneutic injustice in which 
knowledge that may help an individual understand their experience is withheld by 
individuals in positions of epistemic power (Fricker, 2007).  The effect of the resulting 
lacuna in Jane’s understanding of her difficulties was apparent in her description of her 
complex emotional response to receiving a diagnosis from her local adult autism 
service:    
“I was (.) very happy and very sad at the same time […] um and then I was quite 
overwhelmed, I was quite upset […] I think I just felt very sad for that little girl.  
Not me now, because (.) you know (.) I’ve made a really good life for myself.  I’ve 
been successful, I have beautiful children (.) I was very sad for that kid, really […] 
I think all the years of not knowing.  Knowing something was wrong, especially 
when I was a teenager and a young adult and always being told it was mental 
health.” 
This was a poignant moment in Jane’s story, but her narrative quickly reverted to a 
redemption theme, in which earlier struggles are construed as essential in shaping the 
“successful” person she has become:   
“…would [an earlier diagnosis of autism] have held me back? Would I have tried 
(.) less?  Would I have avoided situations that actually I eventually overcame?  
[…] I did put myself in lots of what you would think now were ridiculous 
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situations for someone on the spectrum. But- but I managed to, even though 
sometimes it was very hard, I managed to be successful in those situations.” 
Jane’s comments display a concern about the psychological effects of internalising 
dominant negative discourses of autism which depict it as disabling impairment which 
places inevitable constraints on an individual’s life.  Her awareness of the pervasive 
effects of conventional ‘tragedy’ narratives of disability in which the individual is 
portrayed as incapable of living a fulfilling life was grounded in her personal 
experiences of encountering prejudice towards autism in her working life, even 
amongst colleagues working in the SEN field.  As a result of this, she decided to inform 
very few colleagues about her diagnosis:  
“There’s only two people in my team that are aware of [my diagnosis], and they 
are by far the most competent people, like by a country mile (.) um are probably 
the people I’m closest to on that team, you know.  So they’re aware of it, but the 
others don’t know (.) it would colour the way they looked at me, they wouldn’t- 
they struggle with the young people they support, to differentiate between 
them.” 
Davidson and Henderson (2010) explored the issue of disclosure of one’s ‘autistic 
identity’ through a discourse analysis of published autobiographies of autistic 
individuals.  They concluded that it is a highly complex process which entails a careful 
weighing up of the potential responses of others, and a recognition that they may be 
influenced (consciously or otherwise) by deficit-focused and stigmatising stereotypes 
and representations of autism.  Consistent with this, Jane described her concern about 
the potential responses of colleagues, commenting that “they’d start to talk to me in a 
slow voice”.  Implicit in this comment was the assumption that her colleagues’ 
stereotypical views of autism would result in them treating Jane differently – as 
somehow ‘lesser’ - if she were to tell them about her diagnosis.  As a result, she was 
highly selective about the colleagues to whom she disclosed her new ‘autistic identity’, 
confining it to those she trusted not to treat her differently (and – for practical 
purposes – the school’s headteacher In order to arrange a ‘reasonable adjustment’ in 
the form of a quiet office space).  
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The redemption theme of Jane’s narrative was especially notable in her description of 
her present day professional life and her role as a dedicated SEN teacher, in which she 
is committed to providing excellent support to the young people in her care, and to 
helping them achieve their full potential.   For Jane, an integral part of the latter 
includes changing societal attitudes towards autism:      
“…we need to find a way as a community, to make an autistic diagnosis (.) 
actually not negative.  You know, more as a just- you know, the whole 
neurotribes, just a different tribe as opposed to a disability.  And I know that’s 
not useful when you’re not high functioning (.) it’s got to be classed as a 
disability.   But I think for high functioning (.) we almost need a different script.” 
Within Jane’s story, her call for a “different script” had particular resonance bearing in 
mind her experiences of healthcare professionals withholding the suggestion of autism 
from her and thereby implicitly constructing it as something too awful or tragic to 
speak of.  Discovering a different way of understanding autism has allowed her to 
develop a new ‘script’ for her own life, in which her personal struggles have been 
integral to her development as a successful ‘autism professional’ who is now in a 
position to help and educate others.   
4.5 Rowan’s story: “[I’m] a social justice warrior and a feminist and I don’t play by, 
you know, gendered rules.”   
Rowan is a forty two year old communications consultant; she is divorced and lives in 
London with her children.  She self-identified as autistic (with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder ‘ADHD’) two years ago and subsequently sought a formal 
diagnosis; however, her general practitioner refused to refer her for an autism 
assessment on the grounds that Rowan does not need “support” in her everyday life.   
Rowan’s description of her early life was characterised by a clear sense of ‘difference’ 
but her response to this was not to adopt a ‘mask’ in an attempt to fit in socially: 
instead, her narrative was characterised by themes of self-acceptance and pride in not 
conforming to social norms.  She attributed her response to her sense of ‘difference’ to 
her parents, who prized originality over mundane ‘normality’:  
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“My mother and my father used to call me weird […] and if anybody ever would 
object to that my parents would be like ‘well no-one ever wrote a book about 
someone who was normal, why would you want to be normal?’” 
Rowan explained that – within her family – the term “weird” was understood to be “a 
statement of fact and a good thing” and that she experienced it as a “mark of pride”.  
The encouragement Rowan encountered at home for her originality, however, was 
very different to her time at school where she experienced social isolation and 
frequent attempts to bully her.  She described how her parents’ acceptance and 
understanding, combined with two very different ‘coping strategies’ – creative writing 
and a willingness to fight back against potential bullies – helped her weather these 
challenges: 
“[my parents’ acceptance] provided me with a very very very solid foundation, it 
was like the fortress that I could retreat to (.) when I felt under siege.  And, you 
know, I had this incredibly (.) um elaborate interior life with the writing which 
always gave me somewhere to go in my head to retreat to, so I had that 
protection […] I had that coping strategy internally [….] [then] whenever 
somebody picked a fight or tried to bully me (.) because I’m naturally a pugilist I 
always fought back, I never was cowed.” 
Rowan’s descriptions of episodes of ‘pugilism’ throughout her life were a notable 
feature of her narrative, subverting traditional discourses of femininity which construct 
women as helpless and fearful victims of violence:  instead, her story was reminiscent 
of a traditional narrative -  the ‘heroic saga’ – which is typically associated with a male 
protagonist who overcomes foes and setbacks before emerging victorious (Gergen, 
2001; Gergen, 2015).  Within Rowan’s personal story, this implicitly gendered narrative 
type was accompanied by an explicit rejection of gendered social norms for her sex, 
which she construed as a response to being raised alongside two brothers: 
“…I’ve been raised with the entitlement of a straight white man which means I 
behave a lot of the time with the entitlement of a straight white man so so (.) er I 
have a lot of quite masculine- (.) traditionally masculine, I’m going to put that in 
quotes (.) traits.” 
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For Rowan, this stereotypically (straight white) male “entitlement” – alongside her 
“pugilistic” nature - was protective for her sense of self as she negotiated the 
challenges of social and working life in her early adulthood.  After university – including 
a master’s degree in law - she embarked on a career in media analysis and 
communications, and soon found that office life was incompatible with her working 
style of periods of procrastination followed by a short burst of intense activity to 
complete assignments on time.  Rowan discovered that – irrespective of the quality of 
her work – her lack of compliance with the implicit ‘rules’ for workplace life was 
deemed problematic by employers, and for many years she was unable to hold down a 
job for more than a year before being fired.  Alongside this difficulty with adhering to 
normative workplace expectations, Rowan had identified by early adulthood that there 
were aspects of everyday life which made no sense to her, rendering her an 
“outsider”:   
“[I’ve] always been an outsider, always been fucking odd.  Never been able to 
work it out either.  I mean, I’m not stupid by any stretch of the imagination and I 
would watch these people who have the IQ of toasters being able to hold a 
perfectly normal conversation with somebody and not make them spit their 
drink.  And I’d be thinking ‘how come that [person] can do it and I can’t?’ (.) And I 
assumed at some point I was going to get the hang of it.”      
As this extract illustrates, at this stage of life Rowan lacked any meaningful epistemic 
resource for making sense of her apparent difficulties in normative social interactions; 
something that was all the more difficult to understand bearing in mind her intellectual 
capabilities.  However, this experience of ‘difference’ was mediated by her self-
acceptance: 
“It never occurred to me that I was the problem, it was always the rest of the 
world. So like, you know, this is my place, I will occupy it, I will own it and if you 
don’t let me then fine, we pick a fight […]  So that’s the reason I think I don’t 
have anxiety or depression now.”  
This interpretation of difference was an evident source of strength for Rowan, and one 
that was construed as protective for her emotional wellbeing.  Rather than submit to 
employers’ demands that she comply with their ‘rules’, she worked as a self-employed 
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communications consultant for over a decade and established a reputation in her field 
based on the merits of her work.   During this period, Rowan also married and had two 
children, but this episode of conformity to societal expectations for ‘compulsory’ 
heteronomativity (Rich, 1980; Hammack and Cohler, 2011) did not last long:  her 
husband became physically abusive towards her when their children were small.  
Rowan was faced with another battle with a ‘foe’ in the form of her violent husband, 
and she described her sense of pride as a result of successfully re-building her life in 
the aftermath of their divorce: 
“I know what I’m made of.  I know I’ve been tested.  I know what is left when you 
take away all the artifice so it gave me a really really really decent sense of self.  
So having, you know, climbed back from (.) you know the absolute bottom rung 
of society frankly as a single parent on benefits with fuck all [.] umm and 
managed to climb out of that pit […] it’s given me the- er a very very very strong 
sense of who I am.”   
It was with this strong sense of self that Rowan’s career flourished after the divorce.  
Describing herself as a “social justice warrior and a feminist” she focused on working in 
the not-for-profit sector on projects that aligned with her personal values.  One such 
project involved working alongside a psychiatrist to prepare reports and applications 
for asylum seekers, and this led to Rowan’s first encounter with ‘autism’ as a potential 
explanation for her longstanding sense of ‘difference’: 
“[my colleague said] ‘Christ you’re the highest functioning person with ADHD and 
Asperger’s I’ve ever met’.  And I went (.) ‘that would make a lot of sense’.  And 
that was the first time it ever occurred to me.  Like I’ve been- (.) I’ve been so 
weird all my life.  Like so weird, never fitted in anywhere, never occur- never 
occurred to me that it would be autism.” 
This was a dramatic episode in Rowan’s story:  the comment was made in an informal 
social setting when the colleagues attended a conference overseas together, but the 
power inherent in the psychiatrist’s professional status imbued it with medical 
authority.  For Rowan, it was a wholly unexpected ‘evaluation’, but one that 
immediately made sense to her.  She explained that, at the time, her understanding of 
autism was largely informed by the television series Sherlock Holmes (Vertue and 
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Cameron, 2010) and that its portrayal of the (assumed) autistic Holmes as a brilliant 
non-conformist meant that it had no negative connotations for her: 
“I didn’t think holy shit I’m disabled (.) umm this is terrible.  What I thought was 
(.) ah OK yeah, no that would explain […] the fact that I’ve never fitted in in my 
life.” 
The new epistemic resource of autism did not catalyse a process of radical identity 
reappraisal within Rowan’s narrative:  instead, it acted as an “explanation” and 
“context” for her longstanding and accepted sense of ‘difference’, and could therefore 
be “incorporated  into [her existing] identity”.  In the aftermath of the encounter with 
her colleague, Rowan went on to read several books and articles about autism, and her 
response to this was ambivalent.  She disliked the “clinical” stance that characterised 
some publications – “I don’t really need to be reduced to a diagnosis” – but discovered 
that autism offered a coherent explanation for seemingly disparate aspects of her life, 
including embodied experiences such as the high pain threshold which had proved 
helpful when faced with physical aggression and her tendency to fidget or ‘fiddle’ with 
objects.  Within the epistemic framework of autism, these experiences could now be 
construed respectively as examples of sensory hypo-sensitivity and of ‘stimming’26.   
Similarly, Rowan now discovered a useful explanation for her erratic working style:  
 “…I always thought I was lazy.  Umm cos you know like when you’re not 
depressed but you don’t really want to do anything you think ‘am I depressed?  
Hang on a minute, I haven’t gotten out of bed for the last four days.  Am I 
depressed? Is that depression?  I don’t feel sad, is that depression?’ Turns out 
that it’s just shit executive functioning so I’m like wahoo [now I’ve got a] name 
for it.” 
While Rowan recognised certain key aspects of her experiences within published 
descriptions of autism that she read, she found that she did not identify with the 
 
26 The term ‘stimming’ is widely used within the autistic community to refer to “self-stimulating 
repetitive movements” of various types (Belek, 2019, p.33).  Within the ‘medical’ discourse of autism 
these are framed as ‘symptoms’ which are often the focus of behavioural interventions (Milton and 
Moon, 2012), and included with the formal diagnostic criteria as forms of ‘restricted, repetitive patterns 
of behaviour” (APA, 2013).  In contrast, within the neurodiversity epistemic community, these 
behaviours have meaning or purpose for individuals; they may, for example, relieve stress or they may 
simply be enjoyable (Zamzow, 2019).   
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pervasive theme of ‘masking’ within the accounts of autistic women, leading her to 
conclude that she “[presents] more as an autistic man than an autistic woman”.  She 
attributed her lack of ‘masking’ to her parents’ encouragement of ‘difference’, 
together with her subversive stance towards gendered norms – “gender’s always been 
a bit of a toy for me […] I don’t play by, you know, gendered rules” – which meant that 
she had never been drawn to conform to societal expectations for female social 
behaviours.  
Although autism had never occurred to Rowan herself as an explanation for her sense 
of difference, she discovered that her longstanding therapist was unsurprised when 
she raised this with her:   
“…I’ve been seeing a psychologist for years and years now, the same one (.) and 
umm er cos again weird (.) don’t fit in, bit odd and umm (.) er I went to her and 
I’m like ‘So I had this conversation [with my psychiatrist colleague] […] what do 
you think about it?’.  And she was like (.) yeah.  And I’m like ‘why haven’t you 
said anything?’.  She’s like ‘Cos I’m a psychologist, I can’t diagnose.’” 
The reference to ‘diagnosis’ within this extract is consistent with the dominant 
‘medical’ discursive construction of autism, according to which autism is defined and 
categorised within diagnostic manuals such as the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) (APA, 2013).  Within this discursive 
framework, autism is assumed to be characterised by overt behavioural idiosyncracies 
which can be identified and evaluated by designated ‘autism experts’27.  This 
reification of ‘autistic behaviours’ was challenged by Rowan within her narrative:   
“I think that (.) er reducing autism to diagnostic criteria is troublesome and I’ve 
never been comfortable with the whole DSM criteria anyway.  The idea that you 
can put the whole of humanity into a book that big really it does not sit well with 
me.”  
 
27 In the UK, the NICE (2012) guidelines stipulate that autism assessment should be carried out by 
members of multidisciplinary teams which draw on “a range of professions and skills”.  In relation to 
this, the guidelines recommend that such teams should include clinical psychologists (alongside 
psychiatrists, occupational therapists, speech and language therapists and social workers); there is no 
reference to counselling psychologists.    
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Despite her scepticism about the classificatory paradigm of the DSM (APA, 2013), 
Rowan nonetheless spoke to her GP about a potential referral for an autism 
assessment: a request that was refused on the grounds that she does not require 
“support” to cope with daily life.  This stance is arguably consistent with the UK’s 
‘clinical excellence’ guidelines, which recommend that autism assessment should be 
considered where an individual’s seemingly ‘autistic’ qualities28 result in problems in 
their daily life (such as with relationships or in “obtaining or sustaining employment”) 
or are accompanied by a history of mental health difficulties (NICE, 2012).  It is a stance 
that does not recognise that it may be helpful for an individual’s wellbeing to have 
their identity confirmed via a diagnosis by a healthcare professional (Hearst, 2014; 
Stark, 2018).  Furthermore, in Rowan’s case, the GP failed to take into account her 
history of difficulties with “sustaining employment” (NICE, 2012) and in interpersonal 
situations:  difficulties that she had been able to overcome through her intellectual 
abilities and resourcefulness, for example by becoming self-employed and by learning 
to apply logic29 to make sense of social situations.    
Within the ‘medical’ discursive construction of autism, an individual seeking an autism 
assessment must submit to the scrutinising ‘gaze’ of healthcare professionals (NICE, 
2012) who serve as “authorities of delimitation” in determining who is to be 
designated autistic or otherwise (Foucault, 1972, p.46; Foucault, 1973).   This was 
challenged within Rowan’s narrative, with her description of the way that she 
evaluated her own ‘autistic’ qualities with reference to the relevant diagnostic criteria:  
“I look at the diagnostic criteria, I’m bright enough to be able to look at those (.) 
to say how many I identify with, on balance (.) yes.  I don’t think that there is any 
reason to get a specialist in to do exactly the same checklist that I’ve just done.” 
The lack of professional ‘validation’ in the form of a diagnosis thus did not detract from 
Rowan’s sense that autism is a meaningful way of interpreting important aspects of 
 
28 These are specified in the NICE (2012) guidelines as one or more of the following: 
- persistent difficulties in social interaction; 
- persistent difficulties in social communication; 
- stereotypic (rigid and repetitive) behaviours, resistance to change or restricted interests. 
 
29 Rowan commented: “With human beings all of their actions are A plus B equals C.  And there is a 
formula, you’ve just got to work it out.” 
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her experience and selfhood.  Within her narrative, her identity as an autistic individual 
was constructed as a consequence of distinctive neurobiological functioning:   
“I am autistic, it is the- the absolute root of who I am as a human being.   We are 
only ever our neurological function and this is my neurological function.” 
Within Rowan’s narrative, this neurobiologically-based ‘autistic identity’ intersected 
with her identity as a ‘social justice warrior’ and feminist:  a personal viewpoint that 
was consistent with a politically-informed variant of the ‘neurodiversity’ discourse of 
autism (Ortega, 2013).  Within this discursive framework, autism is constructed as a 
distinctive minority identity: autistic individuals are oppressed by expectations that 
they should conform to neurotypical social norms (Milton and Moon, 2012; ).  
Furthermore, their identity may be threatened and minimised by neurotypical claims 
that “’everyone’s a bit autistic’“: 
“I think that the experience of autistic people is unnecessarily difficult [.] and 
made difficult by neurotypicals.  I think that there is increasingly as we um get 
together online and find each other and find our communities and our places 
within our communities (.) umm there is increasingly an us and them mentality 
developing. [...] I think that there is an increasing amount of anger in the [autistic 
community] that until now has been turned inwards and I think that it is 
beginning to turn outwards.”  
Within her narrative, Rowan’s view of the potentially emancipatory effects of ‘turning 
anger outwards’ mirrored her personal coping strategies of “fighting back” against the 
bullies at school.  It was a personal viewpoint that was strengthened by joining an 
online community of autistic women, and finding that her strong sense of self and 
emotional health were unusual:  in contrast, many women described mental health 
difficulties, and a lack of agency in responding to experiences of being ‘othered’ and 
ostracised, including within their own families.  She interpreted these women’s 
accounts through the ‘lens’ of social justice and feminism, identifying that their 
vulnerabilities to mental health difficulties mirrored those associated with other 
minority groups (Cromby et al, 2013) who are similarly “forced to mask and code-shift 
and pretend to be something that they are not” in order to conform to hegemonic 
cultural norms:   
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“Transgender people and gay people [suffer] disproportionately from mental ill 
health and anxiety and depression I think for the exact same reasons autistic 
people do as well.  I think that when you are told that you are wrong or when 
you are called weird and it’s a bad thing and you don’t know how to make sense 
of things and you don’t know how to do things that other people can do (.) I 
think that- and you pretend to be somebody that you’re not […] you are going to 
be anxious and depressed after 20 years of that.” 
Rowan’s response to the high levels of anxiety and depression she encountered 
amongst the online community was to adopt an informal ‘mentoring’ and leadership 
role, organising social events and workshops with the personal objective of helping 
other autistic women develop their confidence and learn how to cast aside their 
‘masks’.  She combined these personal efforts, however, with an awareness of the 
importance of change at a societal level, highlighting the need for a move away from 
the current preoccupation with ‘deficits’ in functioning amongst researchers:  
“…more research [is needed] and more interest- but more positive research […] 
[researchers] only tend to look at the people who are (.) you know, really 
suffering with it. Umm and then it becomes a tragedy and then it’s- they don’t 
look at it in terms of its positive aspects.  They don’t look at the [things] you can 
do, it always focuses on the things that you can’t.” 
At the time of telling her story, then, Rowan was still engaged in a ‘heroic’ struggle 
(Booker, 2007; Gergen, 2015), but with a wider focus on ways of potentially 
transforming societal attitudes towards autism and on supporting other autistic 
women in developing their own strong sense of self and emotional wellbeing.   
4.6  Laura’s story: “[I’ve] spent so many years building up that mask it’s extremely 
difficult to just drop it…” 
Laura is a thirty six year old radiographer who lives in the South West; she has been 
“very happily single” for several years after a series of “disastrous” relationships in her 
twenties, including one in which she was emotionally and financially abused.  She self-
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identified as having Asperger’s30 [syndrome] four years ago, and subsequently obtained 
a formal diagnosis through her local NHS adult autism service.  
The story of Laura’s early life was one of academic and musical achievement, marred 
by seemingly inexplicable social difficulties which damaged her confidence when she 
was growing up.  Laura described her growing awareness by early adolescence that it 
was difficult for her to fit in with her peers and for two years (from the age of twelve to 
fourteen) she recalled that “nobody wanted to be my friend”.  From her vantage point 
as an adult with Asperger’s, she can now identity that her response to this was to try 
to conform to social norms by observing other girls and “mimicking” their behaviours, 
without being fully aware at the time what she was doing:  
“I spent years and years (.) um observing other girls in my peer group and every 
so often I would find a- a hand gesture that one of them would do and I would- I 
never did it consciously (.) I was vaguely aware of it but it was never a conscious 
thing (.) I would copy it and it became something I did.” 
Her social experiences gradually improved through her mid to late teens; perhaps in 
part as a result of these ‘camouflaging’ behaviours but also through her participation 
in music-related activities and groups, where she met young people with whom she ad 
more in common:   
“…I still found [social interactions] very difficult but I think because we all had the 
music in common and we were all […] I think there were a lot of people there like 
me who possibly even had undiagnosed Asperger’s for all I know.  So I tended to 
get on quite well with [musical] people.”   
Laura’s social situation took a downturn, however, when she went to university to 
study radiography.  The course was female-dominated and – in the absence of the 
shared interest in classical music that had previously helped her develop friendships - 
she recalled that she often found herself sitting in silence as the other students 
chatted about “handbags and parties and drinking”.  Such experiences exacerbated her 
sense that she was “definitely different” to her peers, and this continued after she 
 
30 Laura’s preferred way of talking about autism was ‘having Aspergers’, so this is used throughout her 
story.  
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graduated and moved to London to begin work as a radiographer: she described how 
effortful she found it to make ‘small talk’ with patients and colleagues, and how she 
struggled to understand the unofficial ‘social rules’ in her workplace, such as the 
apparent expectation that staff in her department should have lunch together.  In 
Laura’s case, she preferred to go for a walk at lunchtime to have a break from 
interacting with others; however, she recalled being criticised for her lack of 
engagement with colleagues at lunchtime in more than one performance review.  
Within Laura’s narrative, it was evident that she had lacked a meaningful way of 
making sense of difficult aspects of her life during her twenties.  She recounted how 
she had assumed at the time that her social difficulties were a result of ‘social anxiety’, 
but this failed to account for other struggles in her daily life, such a difficulty in 
processing and remembering sequences of instructions given to her verbally.  This was 
potentially anxiety provoking for Laura in her professional role, and it seemed 
inexplicable bearing in mind her otherwise good memory.  She also experienced 
frequent migraines and found it difficult to tolerate loud or busy environments.  These 
difficulties contributed to her leaving London in her late twenties to live in a rural area 
and work in a smaller hospital.   Alongside this, she made other adaptations to help her 
cope with aspects of everyday life which she found stressful; for example, she started 
going to the supermarket late at night to avoid noise and crowds. 
The greatest challenge for Laura in her twenties, however, was her romantic life:  she 
described how she all too often placed her trust in men who ended up treating her 
poorly.  The resulting “trail of disastrous relationships” culminated in a two year 
relationship with a man who proved to be a “con man” and who deceived, 
manipulated and financially exploited Laura.  She described how her mother and 
friends had expressed concern to her about her then partner’s motives and 
behaviours, and yet he had always been able to convince Laura that “the sky was pink 
rather than blue” before leaving her with a string of debts when he abruptly moved 
abroad.  In addition to debts, however, he left her with another legacy that ultimately 
had a positive outcome in Laura’s narrative:  he was the first person to reference 
‘autism’ in relation to her, doing so in a characteristically disruptive fashion the first 
time he met her parents:   
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“…he had never discussed [autism] with me prior to meeting my parents and 
when he met my parents he announced that he thought that I was autistic.  So 
that was a bit of a shock […] I heard the word autistic and I didn’t relate it to 
Asperger’s.  I didn’t know they were even connected, I had no idea.  If he’d said 
Asperger’s I probably would’ve twigged (.) and maybe I would’ve followed up 
and done some research myself but he said autism and I- I just completely 
dismissed it because I thought- I thought autism was a learning disability and I 
thought clearly I’m not learning disabled (laughs).  So I just thought it was really 
really weird...” 
In this episode, Laura’s partner’s behaviour contravened social norms, but it appears 
that it was the use of his term ‘autistic’ – rather than Asperger’s – that rendered his 
announcement impossible to assimilate.  As Laura explains, at the time she understood 
Asperger’s and autism to be discrete ‘entities’, with the former having some potential 
relevance to her sense of herself as “different” to the majority of her female peers, 
with her “nerdy” interests in science, nature and classical music:      
“I knew vaguely about Asperger’s being sort of nerdy type boys (.) geeky type 
boys with, you know [.] um [.] but I didn’t link that with autism at all.  I didn’t 
know they were connected.” 
For Laura, then, the association between Asperger’s and ‘geekiness’ – consistent with 
the ‘eccentric scientist’ discursive construction of autism (see p.25) – might have led 
her to explore its possible relevance for her own experiences despite its gendered 
connotations.  Instead, her interpretation of her boyfriend’s pronouncement was 
informed by the disability discourse of autism, illustrating the way that it can be 
subject to discursive ‘slippage’ in which autism is subsumed within a broader – and 
potentially misleading – epistemic category of disability.  In Laura’s case, the resulting 
misconception that autism is synonymous with a learning disability meant that it 
appeared to be irrelevant for making sense of her life and sense of self. 
The story of Laura’s relationship with her “con man” former partner had tragic 
potential, with its themes of betrayal and loss.  Within Laura’s narrative, however, it 
was an episode with redemptive characteristics as she described how it contributed to 
an active decision to eschew romantic relationships and instead focus on other areas 
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of life, such as hobbies, friendships and pets.  As part of this, she started volunteering 
at a local wildlife charity, and here she found others with whom she felt comfortable; a 
community of people – mainly retired men – who shared her interests in nature and 
photography.  As was the case earlier in her life in music groups, she found that these 
shared interests helped her feel more relaxed socially:    
“…I even manage to do the small talk a little bit with them because (.) I just feel 
quite relaxed.  I can be myself with them and I don’t feel any judgement […] I just 
fit in.  I’ve never fitted in to a team of people in my life but that’s the first time (.) 
and er the fact that it’s a group of retired men and I’m a [much younger] female 
is a bit odd, I suppose.” 
As well as catalysing the ultimately redemptive process of turning away from romantic 
relationships, Laura’s ex-boyfriend had another key role in her narrative:  the strange 
episode of his meeting with her parents indirectly paved the way to a more personally 
meaningful engagement with Asperger’s as a potential hermeneutic resource.  This 
took place during a country walk with a friend four years ago:   
“[the friend] said she thought I was autistic because her brother had Asperger’s 
and she noticed a lot of similar traits in me.  And at that point I was like ‘this is 
the second time this has happened, this is not normal! (laughs) Why are people 
saying this to me?’  Um so that was when I- I thought right, I’m going to research 
it now.  And I did, I googled it, and I- everything I read about females with 
Asperger’s- […] every single thing I read I thought ‘ooh, that’s me!’ (laughs).  And 
I mean literally it was as if the people writing the articles had known me all my 
life.  It was so weird.” 
Laura discovered from her research online that Asperger’s in women can be very 
different to the male-focused stereotypes, and she encountered personal descriptions 
of female autism in which she recognised her own experiences and qualities:   
 “[qualities like] asking loads of questions about everything, being very curious 
about everything (.) life, the universe, everything, why we’re here […] Liking 
Harry Potter, you know, fantasy literature, being- having a good vocabulary sort 
of ahead of my peer group and um (.) almost everything.  I mean obviously music 
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(.) er having certain talents but being terrible at other things like social 
situations.” 
This is a view of Asperger’s which is consistent with the neurodiversity discourse of 
autism and is in stark contrast with the deficit-focus of the biomedical discourse: 
instead, it foregrounds qualities and capacities such as tendency to be a ‘deep thinker’; 
to have an excellent and detailed long term memory31; and to have interests in areas 
like fantasy literature or music.  Laura also identified through her online research that 
Asperger’s offered a coherent explanation for other apparently disparate aspects of 
her experiences, including her sensitivity to noise; her difficulty assimilating 
information given verbally32; and her tendency to form friendships which transcend 
conventional gendered and age-related cultural norms.  She described her 
immediately positive response to this  
“…I was (.) quite excited because I’d finally- I always knew that I was different 
and I didn’t know why and that really frustrated me.  And [.] I knew that other 
people could see it but I couldn’t pinpoint why […] So to find that my difference 
had a name was (.) er quite amazing.” 
Laura’s next response to identifying a “name” for her sense of difference was to share 
this information with her mother: something that she did tentatively by giving her 
copies of the salient articles and leaving her to draw her own conclusion.   Her 
mother’s response validated her own: “she took [the articles] away, she gave it a lot of 
thought […] and she came back and she said ‘yeah, this is you’”.   This shared 
interpretation of Laura’s experiences proved to be reparative for their relationship, 
which had been strained at the time due to her mother’s frustration with what she 
perceived to be Laura’s poor judgement in her romantic life.  Laura and her mother 
could now re-frame these experiences as an inevitable consequence of being unable to 
identify potentially untrustworthy (neurotypical) men, and their relationship improved 
as a result.  
 
31 For example, Laura described how she can remember all the number plates for the cars her family has 
owned since she was four years old.  
32 The widely reported difficulties amongst autistic individuals with assimilating verbal instructions can 
be explained within the framework of the monotropism model of autism (Murray et al, 2005) or may be 
attributed to differences in executive function; sensory processing differences or difficulties inferring the 
motives/intentions of neurotypical others may also contribute to such experiences. 
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As Laura subsequently deliberated over whether to pursue a formal autism 
assessment, she sought the advice of a friend who is a psychiatrist.  She discovered 
that he had only a “vague” awareness of autism and that she needed to explain her 
new insight into Asperger’s, especially in relation to women.  His response surprised 
her:  he expressed concern that her new ‘identity’ as a woman with Asperger’s 
constituted a “pathologisation” of her interests in science, philosophy and so on, and 
questioned the relevance of a diagnosis for her.  This is a position that suggests the 
intersection of two competing discourses of autism:  the dominant biomedical 
discourse that construes it as ‘pathological’ and the ‘eccentric scientist’ discourse, 
which associates autism with scientific abilities and social idiosyncrasies (see p.25).  For 
Laura, this was an unexpected challenge but it helped to reinforce her view that her 
sense of ‘difference’ was not simply a matter of her interests and strengths:  it also 
included features which have a “negative impact on [her] life”, not least her notable 
difficulties in inferring the motives and interpretations of others, which she could now 
identify had left her vulnerable to her manipulative former partner:  
“…I can see [people’s] facial expressions and their hand movements, I can hear 
what they’re saying but beyond that I have no idea of their intentions, no idea of 
their motivations, I’ve no idea what they’re thinking (.) um (.) I am constantly 
surprised by people’s reactions…” 
Following the challenge of her psychiatrist friend, Laura decided to pursue the 
“validation” of a professional diagnosis, explaining that this was for her mother’s 
benefit as well as her own.  In practical terms, the diagnostic process proceeded 
smoothly for Laura – she described the assessing team of an occupational therapist 
and a clinical psychologist as “brilliant” - although like Charlie and Gemma she noted 
that she found the story-telling elements of the assessment “very strange”.   It also led 
to a pivotal moment in her narrative, when the occupational therapist asked Laura a 
question about how often she feels able to ‘be herself’: 
“I genuinely didn’t understand the question. I couldn’t answer it. […] I said 
something- ‘do you mean by myself?’ and she said no, be yourself.  I just sat 
there in silence, I couldn’t answer the question.  And she said ‘you’re struggling 
to understand the question, aren’t you?’ and I said yeah.” 
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After the diagnosis, this exchange prompted a period of reflection about the ways in 
which Laura has engaged in ‘camouflaging’ behaviours in an attempt to comply with 
the social norms, and the consequences of this for her sense of self.    She described 
her efforts to conform to stereotypical female social behaviours, and the effects of 
that for her wellbeing:   
“…that constant vigilance and constant monitoring of my facial expressions and 
tone of voice (.) my body language, my hand gestures is completely exhausting 
and after interaction with other people it takes me a long time to de-compress 
and unwind and- (.) and de-stress.  And often I do get a migraine afterwards as 
well.” 
Laura’s new insight into the personal cost of camouflaging was accompanied by an 
overall ‘quest’ theme within her narrative of her life post-diagnosis.  The traditional 
quest narrative involves the search for a valued goal (Booker, 2007), and at the time of 
telling her story, Laura’s quest was to uncover a ‘true self’ that had been concealed by 
years of camouflaging.  She has received help in this quest from an unexpected source 
after disclosing her diagnosis to a doctor colleague, who then revealed that he too 
considers himself to have Asperger’s (but has not felt a need to pursue a diagnosis).  
Laura discussed with him the difficulties she experiences in trying to adapt to social 
norms in the workplace: 
“I explained to [my colleague], you know, I’m so exhausted at the end of the 
working day cos I’m trying so hard to get a rapport with my patients and (.) talk 
to them and constantly be smiley and bubbly and I really don’t feel like it (.) and 
it’s completely draining and exhausting and awful.  And he just said- and he 
wasn’t being funny he was just genuinely trying to help and it’s a- it’s a point I 
actually did take to heart (.) he said well don’t try so hard.”  
Laura described how – in the aftermath of this encounter – she has been striving to 
reduce her efforts to conform to implicit expectations that women should be “smiley 
and bubbly” in social situations.  This has been helped by forming a close friendship 
with Emma, another woman with Asperger’s, who Laura met on a post-diagnosis 
support course run by her local NHS autism service.   Like Laura, Emma works in a 
demanding professional role (teaching) which involves a high degree of interpersonal 
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contact, and the two women can therefore provide each other with ‘mirroring’ (Kohut, 
1977) about the challenges they face in the workplace and in social situations.  
Nonetheless, Laura noted that:  
“[even with Emma] I think it’s very difficult to completely (.) take the mask off (.) 
because I don’t know how much of it is the mask and how much of it is really me 
any more.” 
At the time of telling her story to me, Laura’s quest to uncover a ‘true self’ – the self 
who is “really me” behind the “mask” - therefore remained an unresolved ‘identity 
project’, but one in which she is being supported and encouraged within a trusting 
friendship with another woman with Asperger’s.   
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5. Discussion 
 
5.1 Summary of key research findings 
The focus of my analysis was the meaning and construction of ‘autism’ in the 
participants’ narratives and the significance for them of identifying as autistic.  The fact 
that they had come to identify as autistic in adulthood indicates that at some point 
there was a transformation – whether gradual or sudden - in their personal 
subjectivity, and I was interested in exploring how this had come about.  
Like other researchers, I found that ‘autism’ acted as an explanation for a longstanding 
sense of ‘difference’, including struggling with some aspects of everyday life which 
seem to come naturally to others (Bargiela et al, 2016; Kanfiszer et al, 2017; Stagg and 
Belcher, 2019; Leedham et al, 2020).   The participants’ individual stories highlighted 
the socially mediated nature of this experience and provided insight into the process 
by which the epistemic construct of autism had become available as a personally 
meaningful way of interpreting it.  This involved a process of transformation of their 
personal knowledge (Bhaskar et al, 2018) which took place in response to 
encountering a discursive construction of autism which was broadly consistent with 
the ‘neurodiversity’ discourse (Bagatell, 2010; Robertson, 2010; Brownlow and O’Dell, 
2013; Ortega, 2013; Kapp et al, 2013; O’Dell et al, 2016).  For the participants, this 
‘new’ way of construing autism had personal significance because it was a way of 
making sense of disparate elements of their experiences, including strengths and 
accomplishments as well as vulnerabilities and difficulties.   As I discuss below, this 
transformation of the participants’ knowledge was followed by ‘real life’ changes, 
which were typically associated with an improvement in their wellbeing.    
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5.1.1 The discursive construction of autism and the hermeneutic possibilities of 
neurodiversity 
“If we all classified ourselves in terms of what we were not able to do 
then you know (.) we’d all be disabled.” Rowan. 
The participants’ stories of how they came to identify as autistic included descriptions 
of the various ways that they had experienced themselves as ‘different’ to others.  
These experiences were heterogeneous and individual to each participant but 
nonetheless clustered into the various themes that characterise the diagnostic criteria 
for autism, such as differences in social communication and behaviours; difficulties 
with change and a tendency to be inflexible; and sensory sensitivities (APA, 2013; 
WHO, 2016).  Charlie, Rowan and Gemma also described issues relating to executive 
function – such as planning and organising – which had caused various difficulties for 
them at school or in the workplace:  although executive function differences are not 
formally included as ‘diagnostic criteria’ they appear to be common in autism and are 
thought to underlie or contribute to other differences associated with it ((Geurts, 
Verté, Oosterlan, Royers and Sargeant, 2004; Hill, 2004; Chown, 2016; Fletcher-Watson 
and Happé, 2019).  For all the participants except Rowan, a particularly notable feature 
of the ‘differences’ they described was their sensory sensitivities and the difficulties 
they could cause in everyday life, especially at school, in the workplace or other public 
spaces such as shops.   Issues with noise and light (such as fluorescent lighting at work) 
were common themes.  Other examples were more idiosyncratic; for example, Gemma 
recounted a difficult period at work due to the overwhelming smell of a new carpet, 
and the problems she experienced due to an unbearably “scratchy” woollen jumper 
that was part of her school uniform.    
Bearing in mind the participants had already reinterpreted their lives through the 
discursive ‘lens’ of autism by the time they told their stories to me, it is possible that 
the emphasis the participants placed on these various differences was at least in part 
evidence of Hacking’s ‘looping effect’, according to which behaviour – as well as 
personal meaning making – may change in response to receiving or identifying with a 
diagnostic classification (Hacking, 1999).  Nonetheless, it was evident from all five 
stories that – before they came to understand it through the ‘lens’ of autism – the 
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participants experienced seemingly inexplicable difficulties in their everyday lives:  
difficulties that were all the more perplexing bearing in mind their accomplishments 
and intellectual capacities.   
At the heart of narrative inquiry is the assumption that we instinctively seek to make 
sense of our lives and our experiences – giving meaning and shape to them where 
there might otherwise be none – and it was apparent from the participants’ stories 
that it was difficult for them not to have access to meaningful hermeneutic 
frameworks for understanding their perceived differences from an implicit norm.  
Indeed, three of the participants described how they deployed ‘partial’ explanations 
for their experiences of not fitting in socially.  Charlie, for example, was able to 
construe her tendency at school to be on the periphery of social groups and to 
experience episodes of unexplained social confusion and misunderstanding as being a 
result of her family being ‘incomers’ in their small Scottish community.  Rowan, on the 
other hand, interpreted her social ‘differences’ through a gendered lens, and 
understood it as a result of being brought up with brothers and refusing to “play by 
gendered rules”.  Laura lacked ‘external’ explanations of this type, and instead 
assumed that her sense of being socially ‘different’ was evidence of social anxiety.  
None of these explanations, however, accounted for other key aspects of the women’s 
experiences, such as their problematic sensory sensitivities (Charlie and Laura) or 
issues relating to executive function (Rowan and Charlie).   
Feeling different under the “normalising gaze” of others 
The participants’ narratives highlighted the ways that ‘feeling different’ is a socially 
mediated experience.  For Laura, Rowan and Charlie, this began in the school years, in 
the form of peer rejection or – in Charlie’s narrative – an awareness that she had to 
behave in ways that did not necessarily make sense to her (such as apologising for 
misunderstandings without understanding how they had arisen (see p.43)) in order to 
avoid the risk of rejection.  Rowan was also regularly targeted by bullies during her 
school years.  
In Jane and Gemma’s case, an awareness of social difference emerged later in their 
narrativized life, when they embarked on their careers:  Jane found that she was often 
perceived as “blunt” by her colleagues, while Gemma was perplexed by the apparent 
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expectation that she should be sociable with hers.  Laura encountered similar 
difficulties in the workplace to Gemma and recalled being criticised for not taking 
lunch with colleagues; meanwhile, Charlie was ‘teased’ by her colleagues for taking 
steps (such as wearing headphones) to mitigate the sensory challenges of an open plan 
office.  Rowan encountered perhaps the most significant problems during her early 
career; her ‘boom bust’ working style was viewed as distracting for others and resulted 
in her getting sacked on a number of occasions (an issue she resolved by becoming 
successfully self-employed).   
In the participants’ narratives, then, peers, colleagues and managers served as a 
“normalising gaze” (Foucault, 1977, p.184), according to which they were judged, 
criticised or rejected if they failed to adhere to societal norms.  It was in the context of 
such experiences that the participants came to perceive themselves as ‘different’ and 
(with the exception of Rowan) to engage in various camouflaging strategies in an 
attempt to conform.  Bruner (1996) claims that school acts as a key site of 
enculturation in which children ‘learn’ societal (and gender specific) norms and values, 
alongside the explicit curriculum itself: in the participants’ narratives, this role was 
then taken up by their workplace.  The normative values that were being ‘policed’ in 
the workplace were implicitly those associated with neoliberal economic principles and 
an untrammelled drive for profitability (see Verhaeghe, 2014; Monbiot, 2016; 
Johnstone and Boyle, 2018).  These underlying principles typically equate to highly 
competitive work cultures in which employees are expected to be willing to change 
jobs, teams or roles frequently in order to enhance employers’ (and shareholders’) 
profits; to be (superficially) sociable; and to be able to work effectively despite the 
potential noise and distractions of open plan offices (Senechal, 2011; Verhaeghe, 2012 
and 2014).  Such workplaces do not favour those who prefer routine and predictability; 
need time to adapt to change; have sensory sensitivities; or who are already working 
hard to conform to normative social expectations.  From this perspective, then, the 
participants’ narratives give insight into the wider cultural context in which the 
experience of being autistic in the workplace may be more problematic for many 
individuals than it would have been in the past, when long term commitment to 
employers would have been valued, and small offices were the norm. 
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For Gemma, Laura and Rowan, the “normalising gaze” led to a neurotypical other 
suggesting that they may be autistic:  this constituted their first encounter with autism 
as a possible explanation for their experiences.  It was only in Gemma’s case that this 
occurred in a conventional ‘medical’ setting (during a mental health review); for the 
other two, it took place in informal or social settings and took the form of a suggestion 
or assumption by a friend, partner or colleague (as discussed in Laura and Rowan’s 
stories).  Such experiences are consistent with Foucault’s (1977) claim that we 
internalise normative behavioural standards, and then ‘police’ our own and others’ 
behaviours according to those norms (Davy, 2010).       
Constructing ‘old’ autism: ‘disability’, Sherlock and Sheldon Cooper 
In exploring the meaning-making around the participants’ sense of ‘difference’ I had 
wanted to understand why autism had not been available to them as a hermeneutic 
resource before they identified as autistic.  It turned out that – aside from my opening 
question – this was the one question I needed to explicitly ask the participants as 
otherwise it seemed unlikely to be addressed, indicating perhaps the extent to which 
autism had previously been irrelevant to them as a way of making sense of their lives.  
I found that each participant had been aware of autism to some extent before they 
identified as autistic:  however, it had been discursively constructed in a way that had 
made it seem irrelevant to her personal experiences and qualities.    
For Jane, Gemma and Laura, their ‘old’ understanding of autism was largely consistent 
with the ‘disability’ discourse of autism, with its emphasis on ‘impairments’ and the 
need for support from others in order to cope with everyday life.  In Jane’s case, this 
had reflected her ‘formal’ knowledge of autism in her capacity as a special educational 
needs teacher focusing on supporting pupils with considerable social difficulties at 
school: very different from her own experience at school where she had been one of 
the “cool kids” (although she subsequently came to attribute that to her ability to 
‘people watch’ and to mask potential differences).  For Gemma, on the other hand, her 
previous knowledge of autism had been constructed through personal rather than 
professional experience, and was informed by her father’s extensive needs for support 
from her mother: this epistemic ‘version’ of autism had seemed irrelevant to Gemma’s 
own life, bearing in mind her ability to live independently and to act as carer for her 
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young son.  Conversely, Laura’s ‘old’ understanding of autism was grounded in lay 
knowledge rather than either professional or personal experience, but it was similarly 
consistent with the ‘disability’ discourse.  For Laura, this led to an assumption that 
autism was characterised by learning difficulties, illustrating how the ‘disability’ 
discourse of autism might lead to it being conflated with a different discursive category 
of disability:  in this case, intellectual disability.  Discursive ‘slippage’ of this type might 
contribute to some of the negative misconceptions and ‘myths’ that are commonly 
associated with autism (Huws and Jones, 2010; John et al, 2018; Treweek et al, 2019).  
At the level of individual subjectivity, it meant that autism was for many years 
unavailable to Laura as a personal hermeneutic resource, as she herself does not have 
learning disabilities.   
In Charlie’s case, she was also familiar with the discursive construction of autism as a 
‘disability’:  her role as a social worker includes working with families with autistic 
children with accompanying learning disabilities who are, indeed, considerably 
disabled by autism (at least in the context of modern society and its expectations 
around formal education and working life).  However, she had also encountered an 
alternative construction of autism in the form of the character Sheldon Cooper on the 
TV show The Big Bang Theory (Belyeu, 2007).  Sheldon is an adult version of the ‘little 
professors’ originally described by Hans Asperger (1991) and the character embodies 
the gendered ‘eccentric scientist’ discourse of autism deployed and reified within the 
EMB theory:  an aloof, socially awkward man who is more interested in science (or 
similar pursuits) than in the people around him (Baron-Cohen, 2002b and 2003).  As 
Charlie explained (see p. 45), this was a construction of autism that seemed wholly 
irrelevant to her bearing in mind the importance of close relationships to her (she is 
happily married) and her career as a social worker.  
Rowan’s ‘old’ construction of autism was similar to Charlie’s but in her case it was 
embodied by the recent TV incarnation of Sherlock Holmes (Vertue and Cameron, 
2010), with his social non-conformity and exceptional capacity to identify patterns and 
connections (Dixon, 2013).   As she noted, this understanding of autism had no 
negative connotations for her and meant that it immediately ‘made sense’ to her when 
a colleague assumed that she is autistic:  nonetheless, it had not – for whatever reason 
– become personally relevant until that happened.  She had, instead, been content to 
87 
 
consider herself gender non-conforming and “weird”, with weird being construed in 
positive terms as preferable to the mundanity of the majority.  In this respect, Rowan’s 
creative usage of ‘weird’ was redolent of the deployment of the term queer33 in 
relation to gender and sexuality (Eliason and Beemyn, 1996).        
For each of the participants, then, their previous understanding of autism was 
informed by mainstream discursive constructions and tropes of autism that seemed 
irrelevant to their individual experiences and sense of self.  Other than the ‘partial’ 
explanations of ‘differences’ noted above, this left them with hermeneutic ‘absence’:  
a lack of any way to make sense of their disparate experiences in a coherent or 
personally meaningful way (Fricker, 2007; Bhaskar et al, 2018).        
Transforming personal understanding: discovering the ‘neurodiversity’ discourse of 
autism  
For all five participants, their lack of a meaningful and coherent hermeneutic resource 
for making sense of their ‘differences’ was resolved by encountering a new discursive 
construct of autism:  one which was broadly consistent with the ‘neurodiversity’ 
discourse of autism (Bagatell, 2010; Robertson, 2010; Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013; 
Ortega, 2013; Kapp et al, 2013; O’Dell et al, 2013).  From a critical realist perspective, 
an important area of interest is the way that changes in subjectivity are socially 
mediated (Elder-Vass, 2012; Bhaskar et al, 2018) and for Charlie and Jane this took 
place within the context of moving and dramatic episodes of intersubjectivity in which 
they encountered important aspects of their experiences mirrored by an autistic 
individual, thus prompting the sudden recognition that they themselves are autistic 
too.  In Charlie’s case, her “moment of realisation” took place as she listened to the 
personal story of another autistic woman who described clear parallels with Charlie’s 
own life, including previously inexplicable episodes of social confusion and 
misunderstandings and of sensory overwhelm, alongside marriage and a career in a 
people-oriented profession (in the other woman’s case, as a psychotherapist).  For 
Jane, on the other hand, her “epiphany” took place in an embodied rather than 
narrativized moment of intersubjectivity, which involved the sudden recognition that 
 
33 The term ‘neuroqueer’ is also becoming more widely used online as a variant on neurodiverse or 
neurodivergent (Egner, 2019).  
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the deep empathy she experiences towards her students’ sensory and emotional 
overwhelm is rooted in personal experience: “ you know [how to help them] because 
you’ve experienced it”.   
For Charlie and Jane, then, hermeneutic transformation took place through a powerful 
experience of ‘twinship’ (Kohut, 1977) with another autistic individual.   In contrast, for 
the other participants, their initial encounter with autism took the form of an 
‘evaluation’ by a non-autistic other, as discussed above.  This prompted an intense 
process of personal research34 through which they discovered accounts of the diversity 
of autism, especially in relation to girls and women.  The internet has provided an 
important opportunity for autistic individuals to share their stories and form 
communities (Bagatell, 2010; Bertilsdotter Rosqvist, Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013; 
Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013; Parsloe, 2015), and unsurprisingly it was an important 
source of information (especially about female autism) for all the participants.  In 
terms of obtaining information from books, Rowan described her dislike of the 
“clinical” tone she encountered in some publication; in general, the participants 
tended to report a preference for books by other autistic individuals, which provide a 
rich and personal insight into autism which is anything but ‘clinical’ (see, for example, 
Simone, 2010; Rowe, 2013a; Cook and Garnett, 2018).  
Whether in person or online, these encounters with a different discursive construct of 
autism acted as a gateway to a new ‘epistemic community’ (O’Dell et al, 2016):  one 
which is characterised by a neurodiversity-informed understanding of autism (Bagatell, 
2010; Brownlow, 2010a and b; Parsloe, 2015; Den Houting, 2019).  Epistemic 
communities were originally defined as “[networks] of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
[knowledge] within that domain” (Haas, 1992, p.3).  However, within the 
neurodiversity epistemic community, expertise by lived experience determines 
epistemic authority, rather than ‘professional’ status.  This grounding in ‘insider’ 
perspectives means that it is inclusive of diversity and heterogeneity of subjectivities 
and experiences (Strand, 2017), and its construction of autism is correspondingly 
 
34 Charlie and Jane also described their engagement in a similarly intense period of personal research 
following their respective real life ‘epiphanies’, in order to learn more about female autism and confirm 
their new ‘autistic identity’.  
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expansive and fluid.   In contrast with the rigidity of mainstream discursive 
constructions of autism, then, the neurodiversity discourse is rich with possibility as a 
hermeneutic resource for an autistic individual, and especially for autistic women. The 
growing number of online and published accounts of life as an autistic woman 
contribute to a discursive landscape in which it is possible to be autistic and 
professionally accomplished (including in a caring profession); to be autistic and value 
close personal relationships; and – above all – to be autistic and female (Simone, 2010; 
Rowe, 2013; Hendrickx, 2014 and 2015; Halliday-Willey, 2015; Kim, 2015; James, 2017; 
Uher, 2017; Cook and Garnett, 2018).  Thus, the neurodiversity discourse encompasses 
the full range of human experience and individuality, inextricably linked with the 
experience of being autistic (Strand, 2017).   
For the participants, discovering autism as a personally meaningful hermeneutic 
resource provided them with a coherent way of making sense of seemingly disparate 
strengths and vulnerabilities.  It was notable that this was typically associated with a 
recognition of the ways that ‘neurotypical’ norms and expectations create problems 
for their daily lives.  For example, a common theme in the participants’ narratives was 
the reinterpretation of mental health difficulties as an understandable response to the 
experience of being autistic in the neurotypical world, rather than a problem that is 
‘internal’ to them.  The potentially self-limiting or distressing effects of societal norms 
and values is a cornerstone of narrative therapy and underpins its key intervention of 
‘externalising’ problems rather than locating them ‘within’ the individual (White and 
Epston, 1990; Davy, 2010).  The participants’ descriptions of construing their 
difficulties within a neurodiversity-informed epistemic framework were consistent 
with this process of ‘externalising’ difficulties, and – as discussed in section 5.2.2 below 
– were associated with changes in their everyday lives to mitigate the potentially 
negative effects on them of social and sensory aspects of the neurotypical world.  
Going into discursive battle:  defining and defending neurodiversity 
As the term neurodiversity implies, it is a way of discursively constructing autism which 
– like the ‘medical’ discourse – often foregrounds the neurobiological and the brain 
(Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013; Ortega, 2013; Singer, 2016).  As such, it is a way of 
resisting the dominant ‘medical’ discourse by occupying its ‘scientific’ territory and 
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challenging or undermining it with an emphasis on difference rather than ‘deficits’ or 
‘impairments’ (Meyerding, 2014; Singer, 2016).  Of the participants, Rowan and Charlie 
both deployed ‘neuroterminology’ within their narratives.  Rowan termed autism a 
“neurodivergence” and depicted her relationship with her ‘different’ brain as one of 
affection and fascination: 
“I love my brain.  My brain and I have a very separate relationship where it does 
stuff and I stand there and go ‘wow, that was really clever!’”. 
Here the brain-based neurodiversity discourse of autism is deployed in a way which 
subverts the traditionally judgemental ‘gaze’ of researchers on the autistic brain:  
instead of classifying ‘deficits’ and ‘impairments’, Rowan’s ‘gaze’ is one of enjoyment 
and admiration. 
Like Rowan, Charlie described autism as a “neurodivergence” and also as “a type of 
neurology” that should not be “corrected”.  She explicitly challenged its classification 
as a ‘disorder’, a stance which was given extra weight by her professional status as a 
social worker whose role involves a statutory responsibility for the care and support of 
autistic children:  
“All the reports that I get for work say autism spectrum disorder (.) and I just 
write it as autism in the EHCP35s because I do not believe it is a disorder, you 
know it’s (.) it’s a neurodivergence, a difference (.) yes, some are disordered by it 
(.) that’s not to say that (.) you know, none of us suffer with autism because 
some do, some genuinely do.” 
This extract illustrates the discursive ‘work’ that needs to be accomplished with the 
neurodiversity discourse in order that it encompasses all autistic individuals - including 
those who have lifelong care needs - without conflating autism with dependency and 
limitations.  In Gemma and Jane’s narratives (quoted on pages 56 and 64 respectively), 
this involved deploying the ‘disability’ discourse of autism to define some individuals – 
those needing support to cope with everyday life – as a sub-set within the wider 
 
35 EHCP:  Education, health and care plan for children and young people with additional educational or 
other care needs under the Children and Families Act 2014.  
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“neurotribe” (Jane, p.63, referencing Silberman, 2015) of ‘neurodiverse’ autistic 
individuals.   
An additional and interesting feature of the neurodiversity discourse of autism is that it 
may be deployed either in a way to construct neurodiversity as a continuum (according 
to which everyone is ‘neurodiverse’ to some degree), or as a dichotomy36 in which one 
is either autistic or neurotypical/non-autistic (Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013).  All the 
participants constructed autism in the latter sense, making a clear distinction in their 
narratives between the autistic and the non-autistic or neurotypical (‘NT’) mainstream.  
This stance was particularly overt in Gemma and Rowan’s narrative.  In Gemma’s case, 
her narrative constructed neurotypicality in terms of a tendency to be judgemental 
(especially of autism) and dishonest (as illustrated, for example, by the use of ‘white 
lies’ in social situations).  From this discursive position it follows that it would be 
helpful for her as an autistic individual to minimise social contact with ‘NTs’, unless 
they have become ‘autism friendly’ through lived experience with autistic family 
members.   
In Rowan’s narrative, the dichotomous construction of neurodiversity was used to 
challenge the increasingly common trope that “we’re all a bit autistic”.  While this 
comment may be framed as a humorous or otherwise well-intentioned deployment of 
the ‘neurodiversity continuum’ discourse, within the ‘dichotomy’ discursive 
framework37 it is typically construed as a potentially undermining and disrespectful 
appropriation of a minority identity which serves to minimise the challenges faced by 
autistic individuals in the neurotypical world (Bonnello, 2017; Hirschberg, 2017; Lynch, 
2019).  Rowan described an incident in which she challenged an acquaintance who 
claimed that “we’re all on the spectrum somewhere”:   
 
36 Within the ‘dichotomy’ construction of neurodiversity, there may still be a continuum but with a very 
clear distinction between those who are autistic and those who are not.  The term ‘neurodivergent’ may 
be associated with this dichotomous construction, as it carries the implication of divergence from the 
(mainstream) ‘other’.   
37 Concern about the ways that the concept of the autism ‘spectrum’ may be misappropriated or 
otherwise misunderstood (for example, assumed to mean that autistic individuals have identical 
characteristics to varying degrees, from ‘mild’ to ‘severe’) has led to creative suggestions from members 
of the autistic community online for alternative ways of visualising autism that emphasise its distinctive 
and heterogeneous nature:  see, for example, Hearst’s (n.d.) model of the autism ‘constellation’ or 
Burgess’s (2019) ‘comic strip’ representation of the non-linearity of autistic experiences.     
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“[I told her] ‘no way, no that’s an outright lie’ […] you saying that is like me 
saying well, you know, I get pins and needles sometimes so everyone’s (.) I’m a 
bit paraplegic on that basis’. [The concept of the autism spectrum] doesn’t work 
like that. Um it’s a fundamental misunderstanding of the fact that I do not see 
the world the same way that you do.” 
This extract illustrates another instance of creative ‘discursive work’ that needs to be 
done in order to delineate and defend a personally meaningful ‘autistic identity’:  in 
this case one that is characterised by a distinctive way of “seeing the world” compared 
with the neurotypical majority, rather than a ‘disability’ or a medicalised ‘condition’.      
5.1.2 Life with an ‘autistic identity’:  self-acceptance, self-compassion and social 
connections 
From a critical realist perspective, an important area of interest is the transformative 
potential of a change in subjectivity for the life and wellbeing of the individual (Bhaskar 
et al, 2018): a view that is of particular relevance and interest in the context of my 
psychotherapeutic practice as a practitioner psychologist in training.   I found it 
interesting to note, then, that the participants all reported that they made changes in 
their lives after they identified as autistic, and that these were variously depicted as 
positive for their wellbeing.  While such changes were specific to each participant and 
her life, they commonly included experimentation with reducing camouflaging 
behaviours and with making more adaptations in everyday life to mitigate the effects 
of sensory hypersensitivities.  The participants also described different ways in which 
they have made or increased social connections (online or in person) with other 
autistic individuals, and the positive effects of this for their lives.       
“Dropping the mask” and coping with sensory sensitivities  
For all the participants other than Rowan, a key theme in their descriptions of life after 
identifying as autistic was that they no longer struggle to the same extent to conform 
to societal norms, especially for social behaviours.  For example, Gemma noted that 
she “immediately dropped the mask” after her diagnosis, while Laura described how 
she has been “trying not to try so hard” to conform to gendered normative social 
expectations, such as her previous assumption that she should be “smiley and bubbly” 
with her patients at work.  Similarly, Charlie described how her new understanding of 
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herself as autistic “gives me permission to be kinder to myself”; for example, she is 
now more selective about which social events to attend, preferring to socialise with 
smaller numbers of people and in quieter settings.  In Jane’s case, she has been able to 
explain to close family members about her need for routines and predictability, and 
they can now take this into account, for example when organising social events.     
Rowan was the notable exception to this theme of ‘dropping the mask’.  Within her 
narrative, she highlighted that she had never sought to conform to societal 
behavioural norms (especially gendered ones), attributing this to her family’s 
celebration of ‘difference’ and her resulting strong sense of self.  Furthermore, long 
before she identified as autistic she had already made significant changes to her 
working life by becoming self-employed and had therefore already identified a 
successful solution to problems that she had previously experienced as a result of not 
conforming to the ‘invisible’ social rules of the workplace. Nonetheless, she described 
her realisation that she would never “get the hang of” neurotypical social situations as 
“liberating”, suggesting that her new ‘autistic identity’ was associated with some 
benefits to her sense of self, however marginal.   
In addition to ‘dropping the mask’ in relation to normative social behaviours, all but 
Rowan38 explained how they had made more adaptations in their lives to ameliorate 
the effects of sensory sensitivities – such as to lighting, sounds and smells – after being 
able to construe them as common features of autism (Leekam, Nieto, Libby, Wing and 
Gould, 2007; Ben-Sasson et al, 2009; Smith and Sharp, 2013; Ross, Elcheson and Cook, 
2018; Belek, 2019; Fletcher-Watson and Happé, 2019) rather than something to be 
ignored or struggled with.  For Charlie, this built on her previous attempts to 
ameliorate the effects of an open plan office by wearing sunglasses and headphones:  
she now feels more comfortable about doing so if needed, and she has also been able 
to negotiate a quieter workspace and permission to work from home part-time. 
Following Jane’s diagnosis, she has also been able to negotiate a ‘reasonable 
adjustment’ (in line with the Equality Act 2010) in the form of an individual office 
space, and she has made other changes in her everyday life, such as going to the 
supermarket in the late evening when it is quieter.   Similarly, Laura now recognises 
 
38 Rowan explained that she is hypo- rather than hyper-sensitivity to sensory stimulation, including in 
relation to physical pain.  
94 
 
that taking a walk alone at lunchtime is an essential way of looking after her wellbeing 
in a busy clinical workplace, rather than an ‘unsociable’ eccentricity.  
Joining an ‘autistic community’ 
For three of the participants – Charlie, Rowan and Laura – an important change that 
followed their autistic self-identity was to develop new friendships with other autistic 
women.  For Charlie and Rowan, this started by joining online communities of autistic 
women; over time, this has resulted in ‘real life’ get-togethers and friendships forming.  
In Laura’s case, she attended a post-diagnostic course organised by her local NHS trust, 
where she met another autistic woman with whom she had much in common:  they 
have subsequently forged a close and mutually supportive friendship.  Social 
interaction with other autistic adults was a new experience for Charlie, Rowan and 
Laura.  Gemma, on the other hand, was already well integrated into an ‘autistic 
community’ in the form of charities and support groups for families39 of autistic 
children but her engagement with this further increased after identifying as autistic 
and choosing to reduce her contact with ‘neurotypicals’.  In Jane’s case, her ‘autistic 
community’ is currently home-based; she described her close relationship with her 
autistic teenaged son, and the peaceful, routine-based home life they have created 
together.      
The participants typically depicted social contact with other autistic individuals as an 
opportunity to be oneself, rather than to struggle to conform to neuronormative social 
expectations. Kohut (1971) argued that recognising one’s  own qualities in another 
person – experiencing ‘twinship’ - is an important element of developing a robust 
sense of self and emotional wellbeing.  Experiences of ‘twinship’ were notably absent 
from the participants’ stories of their early lives, but evident in their descriptions of 
friendships with other autistic women.  For example, Charlie commented of her (online 
and ‘real life’) friendships with other autistic women: 
“You know that you’re coming from the same place and that they just get you (.) 
you know, and- and I feel like (.) they perhaps get me better than anyone else.” 
 
39 Gemma explained that it was not unusual for parents to identify that they too are autistic or have 
autistic qualities after recognising similarities with their children.  
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In terms of emotional wellbeing, this experience of other people “getting me” is 
undoubtedly important to anyone, but especially so for women who grew up with a 
pervasive sense of ‘difference’ from others (Campbell, 2018). 
In Rowan’s case, the benefits of engagement with an ‘autistic community’ was 
depicted rather differently as she has never engaged in camouflaging-type strategies.  
Instead, she described how she draws on her own strong sense of self in order to 
mentor and support other autistic women, in the hope that they too may develop a 
positive self-image.   She also noted that social media is providing an important 
opportunity for autistic individuals to share their experiences (Bagatell, 2010; 
Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013) of marginalisation, rejection and bullying, in a way that is 
helping them identify neuronormative society as problematic, rather than themselves 
as individuals: 
“Social media with all of its problems (.) has enabled [autistic people] to get 
together and it will er increasingly mobilise us as we start to realise- you know, 
the Me Too kind of phenomenon […] I think that the autistic community are 
increasingly defiant against (.) um what has been unbelievably unfair treatment 
most of their lives.” 
Rowan’s social justice stance was shared by the other participants, who variously 
expressed a wish to ‘change the narrative’ of autism to a neurodiversity-informed 
position, and to improve awareness of the experiences of autistic girls and women.   
For the participants, self-identifying as autistic was thus typically accompanied by a 
wider objective of improving life for autistic people in general.  Indeed, in Jane’s case, 
this is an important and integral part of her professional role as a special educational 
needs teacher in a large secondary school.  She described her efforts to frame autism 
in positive terms when explaining it to non-autistic pupils, and to depict autistic 
children as “kind of like superheroes”.  Unbeknownst to the autistic pupils themselves, 
she draws on her own experiences to support them; for example, helping them 
develop their “emotional articulacy” in the hope that this will reduce the risk of them 
developing mental health difficulties of the type that were so problematic for her in 
late adolescence and early adulthood.   
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5.1.3 Personal stories as counter-narratives  
At the outset of my research, my hope was that the study would generate data which 
would serve as counter-narratives (Bamberg and Andrews, 2004), resisting and 
challenging the prevailing tendency to story autism as a tragedy, and the autistic 
individual as profoundly isolated from others (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Broderick and 
Ne’eman, 2008; Duffy and Dorner, 2011; Yergeau, 2013; Milton, 2014; Quirici, 2015).  
Only minutes into the first interview I was confident that this was going to be so, and 
this continued to be the case throughout the subsequent interviews.  The participants 
were open and generous with what they told me, sharing experiences of vulnerabilities 
and setbacks, alongside stories of achievements, resourcefulness and fulfilment.  
Contrary to depictions of the autistic individual as tragically alone (Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Duffy and Dorner, 2011) these were richly populated narratives:  parents, siblings, 
partners, children and friends variously played significant ‘roles’ in their stories.   
In my own interpretations of the participants’ stories I have highlighted themes that 
seemed to me apparent as I listened to their stories on the day of the interview and 
subsequently, as I transcribed the interviews and then immersed myself in the 
transcripts:  themes of redemption (Jane) (Gergen, 2015; McAdams and Guo, 2015) 
and rebirth (Charlie) (Booker, 2007); heroic struggles (Rowan) (Gergen, 2015) and 
quest for one’s ‘true self’ (Laura) (Frank, 1995; Booker, 2007); and Gemma’s 
subversion of the classic restitution narrative (Frank, 1995) in which she returned to 
good health by disengaging from the medicalisation of her distress.  These are 
inevitable simplifications of the complexities of the narratives I heard and reflect my 
idiosyncratic interpretations which might not have been shared by anyone else.  
Nonetheless, they are intended to capture something of the intersubjective experience 
of listening to those particular stories on those particular days, and to highlight above 
all that the participants’ narratives were anything but tragic.  Instead, they were 
characterised by resilience, relationality and a generous hope that by sharing their 
stories with me they would improve awareness and understanding of female autism.    
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5.2 Implications of the study for counselling psychologists 
“[Counselling psychologists will] make themselves knowledgeable about the diverse life 
experiences of the clients they work with [and] challenge the views of people who pathologise 
on the basis of such aspects as sexual orientation, disability, class origin or racial identity and 
religious and spiritual views.” (BPS, 2005, p.7) 
The participants’ narratives illustrate the ways that neurodiversity-informed discursive 
constructs of autism may be creatively deployed as personally meaningful hermeneutic 
resources by individuals to make sense of seemingly disparate experiences and aspects 
of ‘self’.   Prior to this, they had faced hermeneutic ‘absence’, with gendered or 
disability-focused constructions of autism appearing irrelevant to their lives.  Fricker 
(2007, p.154) writes of the injustice that results from having important aspects of 
one’s experience “obscured from collective understanding owing to persistent and 
wide-ranging hermeneutical marginalisation”; a description which encapsulates the 
consequences of the longstanding neglect of female autism by researchers and 
clinicians.  Indeed, it was striking that the participants’ discovery of personally relevant 
and meaningful ways of construing autism was largely informed by the experience and 
knowledge of other autistic individuals (whether encountered in person, online or in 
published accounts) rather than the “clinical” and dehumanising accounts of autism 
produced by mainstream research and currently reified in diagnostic manuals (APA, 
2013; WHO, 2016; Chown and Leatherland, 2018).  
During my research, it has been hard to avoid the conclusion that the counselling 
psychology profession has been inadvertently complicit in the ‘hermeneutical 
marginalisation’ of autistic women (and autistic individuals in general), and therefore 
in the wider implications of that for individual lives (Robertson, 2010; Milton and 
Moon, 2012; Yergeau, 2013; Milton, 2014).   With rare exceptions (Murphy, 2017; 
Rutten, 2017; Wilson, 2017), the profession has been largely silent on the subjects of 
autism and neurodiversity, and there are currently no requirements to include these 
important areas during our training.  Instead, any discussion of working with 
‘difference and diversity’ in the profession’s core texts40 typically centres on the 
 
40 It was concerning to see that the sole reference to autism in the latest edition of the Handbook of 
Counselling Psychology (Douglas et al, 2016) relates to its prevalence in forensic settings, in the form of 
this comment: “…a large proportion of prisoners have a recognised learning disability or a 
neurodevelopmental disorder such as autism.” (Sims, 2016, p.468).  
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‘traditional’ themes referred to in the above quotation from our professional practice 
guidelines (BPS, 2005; Milton, 2010; Woolfe, Strawbridge, Douglas and Dryden, 2010; 
BPS, 2013; Douglas, Woolfe, Strawbridge, Kasket and Galbraith, 2016; Ade-Serrano, 
Nkansa-Dwamena and McIntosh, 2017; Milton, 2018).  In terms of deconstructing 
(Parker, 1999) this ‘absence’, my impression is that autism is often perceived as a 
specialist area by counselling psychologists and other mental health professionals, and 
therefore assumed to be of little relevance to those working outside autism services.  
In addition, it may be also be implicitly conflated with an amorphous category of 
‘disability’ (Olkin, 2011; Parritt, 2016; Milton, 2018) in a way that obscures the 
heterogeneity (and strengths) associated with autism (Orsini and Davidson, 2013; 
Egner, 2019; Russell et al, 2019).  If so, this is a deeply problematic (implicit) stance, 
bearing in mind the findings of this study and others (Bagatell, 2007; Brownlow, 2010; 
Baines, 2012), which demonstrate that autistic individuals may engage in ‘discursive 
work’ in order to avoid, resist or challenge the ‘disability’ discursive construction of 
autism.   If psychologists or other therapists overlook this and conflate autism with 
disability, they may mis-attune to their client and re-produce in the therapy room the 
negative hegemonic discourses that she or he is seeking to resist: a profound 
misrecognition of an individual’s experience and subjectivity that Moon (2011) 
describes as epistemically-based ‘violence’ within the therapeutic relationship.     
Whatever the reason(s) for the counselling psychology profession’s current neglect of 
autism and neurodiversity, evidence of high levels of distress and secondary mental 
health difficulties amongst autistic individuals (see section 2.2.3) highlight that this is 
not a niche issue, and is instead relevant for all practitioners, irrespective of the 
settings in which they work (Hearst, 2014;  Botha and Frost, 2018; Au-Yeung et al, 
2019; Brugha, 2019; Camm-Crosbie et al, 2019).  Alongside this, there has been an 
important shift within autism studies towards prioritising the production of knowledge 
which reflects the needs and priorities of autistic individuals, rather than the 
preoccupations of researchers to elucidate aetiological and neurobiological 
explanations. Unsurprisingly, this typically includes a preference for research which 
focuses on quality of life and wellbeing-related areas (including the difficulties faced in 
relation to employment (NAS, 2016b); which improves awareness and understanding 
amongst relevant professionals and the general public; and which challenges 
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stigmatising stereotypes and misconceptions about autism (Pellicano et al, 2014).  On 
the face of it, the counselling psychology profession’s focus on subjectivities, 
relationality and wellbeing (BPS, 2005; Strawbridge and Woolfe, 2010) means that 
practitioners are well-placed to engage with research and therapeutic practice which 
aligns with such priorities.  However, this requires a significant change from the 
current position of non-engagement and neglect of this area.   
In order to highlight autism and neurodiversity as an important area for counselling 
psychologists, I would recommend that the development of awareness and knowledge 
in this area should become a formal requirement of our training.  To support us in our 
stated commitment to “challenge the views of people who pathologise” (BPS, 2005, 
p7) in the context of autism, such training should be grounded in critical perspectives 
on the continuing ‘pathologisation’ of autism and of autistic individuals (Milton and 
Moon, 2012; Kapp et al, 2013; Orsini and Davidson, 2013; Yergeau, 2013; Milton, 2014; 
O’Dell et al, 2016; Woods et al, 2018) and address the wider implications of this, 
including (i) the continuing dominance of deficit-focused discourses of autism, (ii) the 
longstanding neglect of autistic subjectivities and experiences, and (iii) the 
‘hermeneutic injustice’ which has resulted from (ii), including in specific areas such as 
female autism and sensory sensitivities.   In relation to our practice, it also important 
that such training addresses the differences associated with female autism, in 
particular the prevalence of camouflaging amongst autistic girls and women and the 
potential implications of this for ‘selfhood’ and mental health (Bargiela et al, 2016; 
Tierney et al, 2016; Hull et al, 2017; Lai et al, 2017; Hull et al, 2019; Lai et al, 2019; 
Livingston, Shah and Happé, 2019; Mandy, 2019).   
5.3 Limitations of the study 
The main potential limitations of the study are its individual case focus (and 
corresponding small sample size) and the ‘narrow’ demographic profile of its 
participants:  characteristics that typically attract criticism for lack of potential 
generalisability from those who adhere to a positivist worldview (Braun and Clarke, 
2013; Willig, 2013; Carminati, 2018; Smith, 2018).  Critical realism, however, embraces 
both positivist and hermeneutic/relativist methodologies as needed to explore 
different facets of reality, provided that the chosen methodology is compatible with 
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the mode of reality under inquiry (Bhaskar et al, 2018; Wiltshire, 2018).  From this 
perspective, issues of universality and statistical generalisability are irrelevant to the 
study of human subjectivity; it is of necessity an endeavour that requires a focus on 
the particular and on contextualised meaning making (Bhaskar et al, 2018).  The merit 
of the individual ‘story’ focus of my study is therefore that it seeks to make transparent 
– as much as is possible within the confines of the word limit of a professional 
doctorate thesis – the social and cultural context of each participant’s interpretation of 
what it means to be ‘autistic’.          
It should first be noted that all of the participants recorded their ethnic identity as 
white British/other.  Concern has recently been expressed about a lack of research into 
the experience of being autistic amongst non-white ethnic groups (Burkett, 2020); an 
absence which has taken place within an epistemic landscape which – as previously 
discussed – has tended to (implicitly or otherwise) position autistic individuals as 
somehow outside of or oblivious to usual social or cultural influences.  The ethnic 
profile of the participants meant that this study unintentionally contributed to this 
omission, so it is important to highlight the need for future research with the aim of 
addressing this oversight by conceptualising autism through the lens of 
intersectionality (Strand, 2017), considering its effect as one of multiple intersecting 
identities including not only gender (Saxe, 2017) but also ethnicity (Burkett, 2020), 
sexuality (George and Stokes, 2018), class and so on.  
In terms of the educational and employment status of the participants, they 
undoubtedly constituted an ‘atypical’ group when compared with UK demographic 
data and employment statistics for autistic individuals.  The participants were all highly 
educated (all were university graduates, and three had postgraduate qualifications) 
and all are working in professional roles on an employed or self-employed basis (with 
the exception of Gemma who is currently raising her family but was previously 
employed in a professional role).   This stands in contrast with the UK’s population:  
the most recent data available on education (Office of National Statistic, 2017) indicate 
that around 42% of the population aged between 21 and 64 are university graduates.  
The participants’ employment status is particularly notable bearing in mind current 
estimates that only 32% of autistic individuals are in paid work (16% in full-time paid 
work):  indeed, the National Autistic Society reports that four in ten autistic individuals 
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have “never worked” (NAS, 2016b).  It remains to be seen how these employment 
figures change in future if more women are diagnosed as autistic in adulthood after a 
lifetime of ‘masking’:  nonetheless, the participants’ employment status stands in stark 
contrast with the current (and deeply concerning) employment data for autistic people 
as a group (NAS, 2016b). 
In addition to their ‘explicit’ demographic characteristics, the participants were also a 
self-selected group who were willing to talk to me – either in person or via Skype – 
about their experiences of and perspectives on autism.  The social communication 
differences associated with autism mean that autistic individuals all too often 
experience interpersonal interactions with non-autistic others that are characterised 
by a lack of empathy and understanding on the part of the latter (Milton, 2012; Milton 
and Moon, 2012; Yergeau, 2013; Milton, 2014): participating in an interview-based 
study therefore required taking a ‘leap of faith’ that it would not involve another 
potentially distressing or invalidating interpersonal interaction with me as a non-
autistic researcher.  It is undoubtedly the case, therefore, that my study will have 
‘ruled out’ potential participants who would be put off by the interview format, leaving 
a potentially unrepresentative sample (in the context of autistic people as a group or 
class).   
The study can therefore be criticised on the grounds that the participant demographics 
are in no way representative of UK-based autistic adults:  at the same time, I would 
argue that this is a strength as well as a potential limitation.  As Rowan observed, 
mainstream research has tended focus on autistic individuals who are “really 
suffering” in their daily lives.  In doing so, it has served to reproduce and reify the 
dominant biomedical discourse which constructs autism in terms of ‘impairments’ and 
‘deficits’, in turn reinforcing an implicitly ‘tragic’ cultural narrative of what it means to 
be autistic (Duffy and Dorner, 2011).  In contrast, the data generated by my study is 
consistent with the neurodiversity perspective on autism:  the participants’ stories 
illustrate the ways in which their vulnerabilities are accompanied by strengths, 
resilience and resourcefulness. 
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5.4 Post-analysis reflexivity  
Since I embarked on this study in 2015, there has been an important development in 
the field of autism studies, in the form of a growing awareness and acknowledgement 
of the ethical importance and epistemic benefits of including autistic individuals in the 
process of production of knowledge about autism, ideally as partners throughout the 
research process (Gillespie-Lynch et al, 2017; Woods et al, 2018; Fletcher-Watson et al, 
2019; Milton, 2019).  This has highlighted for me the discomfort I experienced at times 
during the research process when I have questioned whether I have any ‘right’ as a 
non-autistic researcher to attempt to represent the experiences and perspectives of 
autistic women.  There was no easy answer to this bearing in mind the need for my 
doctoral research project and thesis to be wholly ‘mine’, but I sought to address my 
concerns as best I could by sharing the participants’ stories at a draft stage and inviting 
their feedback.  From a position of hindsight, however, it would arguably have been 
‘better practice’ in terms of participatory research (Fletcher-Watson et al, 2019) to 
have incorporated an initial consultative stage – perhaps in the form of a focus group 
or qualitative survey – to get feedback from members of the autistic community about 
the proposed direction of my research.      
Alongside my experience of ethical considerations, another important feature of the 
research process was my shift to critical realism as a philosophical ‘framework’ for my 
study, from a starting point of ‘moderate’ social constructionism (Burr, 2015; 
Johnstone and Boyle, 2018).  This change took place during the interview, transcription 
and analysis phase, as my understanding of autism as an embodied and systemically-
embedded experience developed.  Although the social constructionism that originally 
informed my research – such as Ussher’s (2000) material-discursive-intrapsychic 
approach - recognises the significance of non-discursive forms of reality for individual 
subjectivities (Burr, 2015; Johnstone and Boyle, 2018), I was increasingly drawn to the 
more extensive ontological theorising that characterises critical realism.  I found that 
the critical realist view of reality as complex and systemic (Bhaskar et al, 2018; 
Wiltshire, 2018) not only aligned with another personal area of interest – in systems 
theory and its influence on psychotherapeutic practice (Hedges, 2005; Capra and Luisi, 
2014) – which had developed during the early stages of my counselling psychology 
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training, but also served as a useful framework for reflecting on the phenomenon (or 
phenomena) of autism.  Furthermore, I found other principles of critical realism -such 
as the transformational model of social activity (‘TMSA’) and judgemental rationality 
(Bhaskar et al, 2018; Wiltshire, 2018) – helpful for situating my research as a 
counselling psychologist in training.  For example, I would argue that the TMSA offers a 
useful conceptual framework for exploring the social processes that contribute to 
change at the level of individual subjectivities, while I see judgemental rationality as 
justifying and informing a wellbeing and social justice-oriented approach to autism 
research.   
Aside from these aspects of critical realism, as my research proceeded it became 
important to be able to delineate my view on the ontological status of autism bearing 
in mind controversial (Milton, 2016) speculation that it is a ‘mere’ social construct 
(Timimi et al, 2010;  Timimi and McCabe, 2016).  This came to my attention because it 
is couched in gendered language, with the assertion that an alleged ‘feminisation’ of 
education and working environments has led to an increase in the behaviours of boys 
and men being deemed problematic and in some cases classified as autistic.  While I 
share the authors’ interest in the effects of social and cultural contexts on individual 
lives, I was concerned by their construction of autism as a ‘medicalisation’ of the 
“social and emotional competence” of boys and men, and view this as an 
unequivocally retrograde step in terms of the identities and wellbeing of autistic girls 
and women.   Aside from its other ‘attractions’, critical realism thus seemed to me to 
serve as an important way of distancing myself from this regressive re-gendering of 
autism, by highlighting that I view it as having some underlying biological ‘reality’ 
(Hacking, 2009), no matter how poorly understood at present (Fletcher-Watson and 
Happé, 2019).   
5.5 Recommendations for further research 
Research which focuses on the needs and quality of life of autistic individuals is barely 
in its infancy (Robertson, 2010; Milton and Bracher, 2013; Pellicano et al, 2014; 
Fletcher-Watson et al, 2019) and this study – with its focus on the narratives of autistic 
women – highlighted a number of potential research directions, including the 
importance of continuing research into the ways that autistic individuals’ lives and 
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wellbeing are affected by the neurotypical norms and values that pervade 
‘institutional’ settings such as schools, universities and workplaces.  In particular, 
difficulties in work-related settings were a significant theme across the participants’ 
narratives and such experiences have received little attention to date from researchers 
(Pellicano et al, 2014), despite the concerning levels of unemployment amongst 
autistic individuals (National Autistic Society, 2016b).  As previously discussed, the 
participants of this study were unrepresentative in that they are highly educated 
compared to the population as a whole and they are all (or have been) employed or 
self-employed in professional fields.   However, they have achieved in this way despite 
experiencing a range of difficulties due to neuronormative expectations relating to 
social communication and interaction; sensory processing; executive function and so 
on.  While concerns have been expressed that cognitively able individuals who can find 
ways of adapting to or coping with societal norms may not be representative of autistic 
people in general (Fletcher-Watson et al, 2019), nonetheless I would argue that  – if we 
are to take the ‘double empathy problem’ (Milton, 2012) perspective as seriously as I 
believe we should – they constitute experts in ‘autistic experience’ (Hacking, 2009; 
Milton, 2014; Gillespie-Lynch, 2017; Milton, 2019) in a way that non-autistic 
researchers and professionals can never hope to, no matter how well-intentioned.  As 
such, their participation in research into work and career related areas would be an 
important and productive development.   
The participants’ stories also highlighted the need for research into the effects on 
individual lives of sensory sensitivities of various kinds.  Sensory sensitivities are known 
to be common amongst autistic individuals (Leekam et al, 2007; Ben-Sasson et al, 
2009; Smith and Sharp, 2013; Ross, Elcheson and Cook, 2018; Fletcher-Watson and 
Happé, 2019) but appear to have been another ‘casualty’ in the widespread 
marginalisation of autistic voices and subjectivities within mainstream research:  such 
experiences and their effects need to be self-reported – and to be listened to by 
clinicians and researchers - if they are to be explored in any meaningful way (Belek, 
2019).  For the participants of this study, the effects of their heterogeneous sensory 
sensitivities were widespread and particularly relevant in the context of ‘public’ spaces 
– such as schools, workplaces, shops and social spaces – which are currently 
constructed to suit the sensory tolerances of the neurotypical majority.   Despite their 
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resourcefulness in coping with such experiences, it was evident that sensory features 
of the environment could constitute an effective barrier towards – for example – 
participation in certain social events or being able to concentrate fully in the 
workplace:  Laura and Charlie also identified excessive sensory stimulation as potential 
migraine triggers for them.  From a social justice perspective, then, an important (and 
of necessity participatory) research direction would be to explore ways of making 
public environments more comfortable and accessible for those who experience 
sensory sensitivities (Milton, Martin and Melham, 2016; Bölte, 2019), rather than 
expecting them to cope with unpleasant side-effects or exclude themselves altogether.   
Bearing in mind the heterogeneity of such experiences, there are inevitable limitations 
on the extent to which individual needs can be met, but nonetheless research in this 
area is likely to identify some commonly problematic issues around lighting, lack of 
sound insulation in open plan offices and so on.   
Previous studies have identified concerningly high levels of sexual abuse amongst 
adolescent girls and women (Bargiela et al, 2016; Ohlsson Gotby et al, 2018).  I did not 
ask the participants about experiences of abuse, but two volunteered stories of 
relationship-based experiences of physical, emotional and/or financial abuse.  I 
subsequently discussed the question of increased vulnerability to abuse when I 
presented the preliminary findings of my study at the 2019 BPS Division of Counselling 
Psychology conference, and a number of members of the audience confirmed that 
they too have observed this amongst their female autistic clients.  This therefore 
appears to be another key area for further research, perhaps using a qualitative survey 
as a starting point bearing in mind the sensitivity of the issues involved (Braun and 
Clarke, 2013), and aimed not only at improving awareness and understanding of this 
issue, but also at developing appropriate training and educational materials for autistic 
girls and women, and all relevant professionals.  
Counselling psychology-focused research  
The above recommendations for further research relate to the wellbeing and quality of 
life of autistic individuals, but this study has also highlighted an apparent epistemic 
‘gap’ in relation to how counselling psychologists view and understand autism and 
neurodiversity.  This is of particular importance in light of the findings of studies which 
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suggest that negative constructions of autism may have potentially detrimental effects 
for the mental health of autistic individuals, whereas neurodiversity-informed 
constructions of autism may have protective effects for wellbeing and promote self-
acceptance (Kapp et al, 2013; Cooper et al, 2017; Botha and Frost, 2018; Cage et al, 
2018).  This raises the question of how individual practitioners construct 
autism/neurodiversity and the potential implications of this for their work with autistic 
clients:  whether, for example, they may unintentionally reproduce and reinforce 
negative and stigmatising dominant discursive constructions of autism in the therapy 
room (Hare-Mustin, 1994; Sinclair, 2007).   A useful starting point for further research 
in this area would be a study of the ways that counselling psychologists and other 
therapists discursively construct autism, perhaps employing a story completion-based 
approach (Walsh and Malson, 2010; Shah-Beckley, 2016; Braun et al, 2019) bearing in 
mind the likelihood of social desirability bias amongst this participant group.   
5.6 Conclusions 
This study contributes to a ‘new’ way of understanding autism that is grounded in the 
lived experiences and subjectivities of autistic individuals.  It is not unusual for 
mainstream research articles to make an initial explicit reference to the heterogeneity 
of autism, but this is then implicitly undermined by what follows:  a focus on 
homogeneous behavioural characteristics or biological features.  In carrying out a 
narrative-based study, I sought to demonstrate the importance of understanding 
autism (whatever its biological underpinning may be) as a personal experience within 
the social and cultural contexts of a specific life; I also hoped that my participants’ 
stories would serve to challenge prevailing stereotypes of autism.  Indeed, this proved 
to be the case:  the participants’ stories were characterised by relationality, resilience 
and self-awareness, standing in stark contrast to the tendency to ‘story’ autism in 
tragic terms, and to caricature autistic individuals as socially-disengaged and oblivious.  
Furthermore, their narratives illustrate the creative ways in which autistic individuals 
may deploy the neurodiversity discursive construction of autism as a means of 
resisting negative and dehumanising discourses.  In doing so, they are actively engaged 
in a wider process of reclaiming and transforming the epistemic landscape of autism.   
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For the counselling psychology profession, there is now a pressing need for us to 
recognise and acknowledge the social justice implications of our current neglect of 
autism and neurodiversity.  Our core values of relationality and empathic engagement 
with subjectivities mean that we are well-placed as a profession to contribute to the 
production and dissemination of knowledge grounded in ‘insider’ perspectives, both in 
the form of further research and through the incorporation of formal training 
requirements for neurodiversity-informed awareness and understanding for 
counselling psychologists.  The deeply concerning levels of mental health difficulties 
amongst autistic individuals highlight that autism/neurodiversity can no longer be 
positioned (implicitly or otherwise) as a specialist area; it is instead an important issue 
for all counselling psychologists and other mental health professionals, irrespective of 
the settings in which we work.   
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Will my taking part in this study be confidential?  
Yes - your name and any other potentially identifying information (eg age, family 
details etc) will be changed in my thesis and any articles based on the study in order to 
protect your anonymity.  You’ll be welcome to check that you are happy with the way 
that this has been done. 
All personal information collected in this research project will be processed by the 
University in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 1998 Data Protection 
Act.  Your data will be held securely and will not be made available to any third party 
unless required to do so by law.  Your contact details will be stored securely and 
separately to the anonymised research data; they will only be accessible by the 
researcher and her supervisor.  
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the research study will be written up for my thesis for a professional 
doctorate in counselling psychology.  In addition, I’m intending to submit at least one 
article to a professional journal for publication, and may also present the findings of 
my research at professional conferences (eg the annual conference for the Division of 
Counselling Psychology of the British Psychological Society).   
If I am interested in taking part in the study, what happens next? 
If you decide you wish to take part, please contact me, either via email or phone 
(contact details: jacqueline2.pearse@live.uwe.ac.uk  or [NUMBER]).   We can then 
arrange a suitable time and place for meeting up.  
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet.  
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Appendix 4: Participant Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Exploring the lives of women on the autism spectrum 
Name of researcher:  Jacqui Pearse (jacqueline2.pearse@live.uwe.ac.uk) 
  Please 
initial 
box 
1. I confirm that (i) I have read and understand the participant information sheet 
for the above study and (ii) I have had the opportunity to ask questions about 
the study which have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
from the study at any stage before, during or after the interview with the 
researcher (up until 31 January 201941).    
 
 
3.  I agree to take part in the above research study.   
  
 
4. I agree to my interview with the researcher being audiotaped and transcribed 
by the researcher.   
 
 
5. I agree to anonymised42 material from my interview being used and discussed 
in the researcher’s thesis. 
 
 
6. I agree to the use of anonymised material from my interview being used in 
publications (eg articles in professional journals) and in presentations at 
conferences.  
 
 
 
 
 
41 As explained in the Participant Information Sheet (see attached), the researcher’s thesis will be in the 
final stages of completion after 31 January 2019 and it may be difficult to remove analysis and 
discussion that draws on your anonymised interview.  However, you are still welcome to contact the 
researcher at this point, and all reasonable efforts will be made to modify the thesis accordingly.  
 
42 As explained in the Participant Information Sheet, your name and any other potentially identifying 
information will be changed by the researcher to protect your anonymity.  You will be able to check that 
you are happy with the way this had been done.  
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________________  _____________  ______________ 
Name of participant   Date    Signature 
 
___________________  ________________  ____________________ 
Researcher    Date    Signature 
     
One copy to be retained by the participant and one copy to be retained by the researcher.  
 
The personal information collected in this research project (e.g., on any 
form/questionnaire/survey) will be processed by the University in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the 1998 Data Protection Act. We will hold your data securely and not 
make it available to any third party unless required to do so by law. Your personal 
information will be used/processed as described on the participant information sheet. 
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Appendix 5:  Optional prompt questions for the narrative interviews  
 
1. As you know, I’m interested in the experiences of women who only 
realised or identified that they’re on the autism spectrum in adulthood.  
Can you tell me about the events or experiences that led to this 
realisation about yourself?  
− What was your understanding of autism at this point?  Had/has it changed 
over time? 
− Did you see yourself differently after you started to view yourself as being 
on the autism spectrum?  
− Did you seek a diagnosis for autism?  What were your reasons for deciding 
to/not to? 
− [if relevant] what was the diagnostic process like for you?   
− [If relevant] do you think the diagnosis has been helpful in any ways? 
 
2. Do you think it would have made much difference for you and your life 
had you been identified as autistic when you were a child or teenager?  If 
so, in what sorts of ways? 
 
3. Can we talk a bit now about what life is like for you now as an adult… 
− working life – has being on the autism spectrum had any impact on your 
job/career do you think? 
− What about relationships and friendships – can you tell me a bit about 
these? 
− Do you have friendships/contact with others on the autism spectrum?  Has 
this been helpful? [if so/if not] in what ways? 
− women on the autism spectrum often talk about hiding their difficulties 
from others – would you say you do this?  [if so] what affect does this have 
on you? 
− How about healthcare professionals, eg your GP – do you find they 
understand what autism is like for you and the way it affects your life? [if 
not] how does that affect you? 
− Did things change at all after identifying that you’re on the autism 
spectrum? 
 
4. I’m interested in the strengths associated with the autism spectrum as 
well as the difficulties people experience – are there specific features of 
autism that you experience as assets/strengths?   
5. What’s your view of the support and resources available for autistic girls 
and women at the moment?  Have you got any suggestions for how things 
146 
 
could be improved based on your personal experiences of existing 
support? 
6. Is there anything else you’d like to share with me about your experiences?  
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Appendix 6: Article   
Behind the mask: a critical narrative analysis of a woman’s story of identifying as autistic 
in adulthood 
 
Abstract 
Until recently, autism was assumed to be a predominantly male phenomenon, but a 
growing number of women are now being diagnosed as autistic in adulthood after 
many years of unexplained difficulties in their everyday lives.  Their longstanding 
‘invisibility’ challenges the prevailing epistemic landscape which characterises autistic 
individuals as unreflective performers of non-normative behaviours and raises 
questions about the effects of gendered and dehumanising discursive constructions of 
autism for the subjectivities and identities of autistic women.   The aim of the present 
study was to explore this through a critical narrative analysis of the personal story of a 
young woman, Charlie, who was diagnosed as autistic in her late twenties.  It was 
found that Charlie only came to view herself as autistic after discovering the 
neurodiversity discourse of autism, which construes it as a valuable facet of human 
diversity.  This discursive construction was deployed to construct a narrative identity of 
a sociable, creative and caring autistic woman, whose difficulties in everyday life are a 
consequence of being autistic in a world created by and for the ‘neurotypical’ majority.  
Charlie’s story thus serves to challenge and potentially transform the existing deficit-
focused conceptualisation of autism.  
 
Introduction 
The focus of this study is the personal narrative of a 31 year old woman, Charlie, who 
came to identify (and was subsequently diagnosed) as autistic in her late twenties.  For 
many years, experiences like Charlie’s were all but absent from the research literature, 
reflecting a longstanding assumption that autism was characterised by overtly unusual 
social behaviours and interests that would typically be identified early in life by non-
autistic ‘experts’ such as psychiatrists and paediatricians.  This assumption is now 
being over-turned by a growing understanding that these behavioural characteristics 
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were gleaned from studies with predominantly young male participants, and that 
autism in girls and women may be expressed rather differently (Krahn and Fenton, 
2012; Kreiser and White, 2014): in particular, they appear more able (or are more 
motivated) than their male counterparts to conceal or compensate for the difficulties 
they experience in everyday life (Dean, Harwood and Kasari, 2017; Lai et al, 2017; Hull 
et al, 2019).  As a result of this, autistic girls and women were largely ‘invisible’ to 
researchers and clinicians for many years (Gould and Ashton-Smith, 2011, Krahn and 
Fenton, 2012; Hearst, 2014).   
The recognition of the longstanding neglect of female autism has served to highlight 
the epistemological – as well as ethical - consequences of the inherent power 
imbalance within academic research that has led to the exclusion of autistic individuals 
from the processes of production of ‘knowledge’ about autism (Milton and Bracher, 
2013; Yergeau, 2013; Pellicano, Dinsmore and Charman, 2014; O’Dell, Woods, Milton, 
Arnold and Graby, 2018).  As a result of this, autistic ‘voices’ and subjectivities have 
been marginalised for many years, thereby limiting and distorting ‘knowledge’ in this 
area, especially in relation to female autism.  This has started to change in recent 
years, with the publication of a small but growing body of qualitative research with the 
aim of exploring female autism as a lived experience (Baldwin and Costley, 2016; 
Bargiela, Steward and Mandy, 2016; Tierney, Kilbey and Burns, 2016;  Kanfiszer, Davies 
and Collins, 2017; Milner, McIntosh, Colvert and Happé, 2019; Leedham, Thompson, 
Smith and Freeth, 2020).  A common finding of such studies is that being autistic and 
female is typically accompanied by a pervasive sense of ‘difference’, together with 
considerable efforts to fit in socially by ‘camouflaging’ perceived differences from 
others.  Mental  health difficulties are also reported to be common amongst 
participants (Baldwin and Costley, 2016; Bargiela et al, 2016; Leedham et al, 2020): a 
finding that is consistent with a large scale population-based study which reported 
rates of 34% and 36% respectively for depression and anxiety amongst autistic women 
(compared with 22% and 26% respectively for autistic men, and 10% and 9% for the 
mixed sex control group) (Croen et al, 2015).  More recently, self-reported 
camouflaging behaviours have been identified as a risk factor for increased levels of 
mental health difficulties (Cassidy, Bradley, Shaw and Baron-Cohen, 2018; Cage and 
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Troxell-Whitman, 2019):  a concerning finding, bearing in mind the reported 
prevalence of camouflaging amongst autistic women (Lai et al, 2017; Hull et al, 2019).    
Such findings highlight the importance of further research into the experiences and 
wellbeing of autistic women, and this study sought to add to the small body of existing 
qualitative research in this area – which is largely characterised by thematic 
approaches to analysis – by exploring the individual narrative of a woman who came to 
identify as autistic in adulthood.  This approach is informed by the principles of 
narrative inquiry, and its central claim that narrative is an expression of socially 
mediated and culturally embedded subjectivity through which individuals make sense 
of their experiences and lives (Bruner, 1990; Somers,1994; Gergen, 2015; Hammack 
and Toolis, 2015; McLean and Syed, 2015; Schieff, 2017).  It is an approach which is 
often used to explore and illuminate the experiences of the “unheard and 
marginalised” (Gergen, 2015, p.73), a description that encapsulates the status of 
autistic women within mainstream research until very recently.   
Narrative-based research is characterised by a considerable degree of flexibility as to 
its underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions (Esin, 2011; Silver, 2013).  
The present study was informed by critical and constructionist perspectives which 
assume that personal meaning-making is embedded within a wider social, cultural and 
political context: that the ways in which we make sense of our personal experiences 
are simultaneously shaped and limited by the concepts, discourses and narratives that 
we encounter in society (Emerson and Frosh, 2004; Souto-Manning, 2014; Burr, 2015; 
Gergen, 2015; Bhaskar, Danermark and Price, 2018; Boyle and Johnstone, 2018).  From 
a critical perspective, the current dominance of deficit-focused discursive 
constructions and ‘tragedy’ narratives of autism (Broderick and Ne’eman, 2008; 
Brownlow, 2010; Duffy and Dorner, 2011; Kapp, Gillespie-Lynch, Sherman and 
Hutman, 2013; Milton, 2014; Quirici, 2015) is not a neutral or transparent reflection of 
its ontological status, and is instead a value-laden consequence of inherent power 
imbalances in knowledge production (O’Dell, Bertilsdotter, Ortega, Brownlow and 
Orsini, 2016).   It raises important questions about the implications of this ‘discursive 
negativity’ at the level of individual subjectivities and especially for autistic women, 
bearing in mind the current association between autism and ‘masculinity’ (Baron-
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Cohen, 2002; Jack, 2011; Krahn and Fenton, 2012).  To date, little attention has been 
paid to this in the research literature (for notable exceptions see Bagatell, 2007; 
Baines, 2012), although there is recent evidence of a potential link between 
stigmatising constructions of autism and increased vulnerability to mental health 
difficulties in autistic individuals (Cooper, Smith and Russell, 2017; Botha and Frost, 
2018; Cage, Di Monaco and Newell, 2018).  This highlights the need for further 
research into personal meaning making by autistic individuals, and the present study 
sought to explore this by asking how a woman who self-identified (and was 
subsequently diagnosed) as autistic in adulthood discursively constructs ‘autism’ as an 
epistemic category within her narrative.  A subsidiary aim was to consider how the 
participant’s personal narrative conformed to culturally available narrative types, 
‘plots’ or themes.   
Method 
Following approval from the University Ethics Committee, contact was made with a 
number of online communities for autistic women, explaining that participants were 
being sought for a study aimed at improving understanding of autism amongst women 
who had identified as autistic in adulthood.  After making contact, Charlie was 
provided with written information about the purpose and scope of the study and was 
given the opportunity to ask further questions before deciding whether or not to 
participate.  She chose to be interviewed at her home, and was reminded before the 
interview that she was free to end the interview or withdraw from the study at any 
time without needing to provide a reason.  
The aim of the narrative interview was to encourage Charlie to tell her individual story, 
with minimal direction or intervention (Emerson and Frosh, 2004; Schiff, 2017).   It 
began with an invitation to talk about the events and/or experiences that had led to 
her realising that she is autistic;  follow up questions were asked in response to this in 
order to encourage an exploration of the meaning and significance of her ‘autistic 
identity’ for her life.  The interview lasted one hour and forty five minutes and was 
audio-recorded on a digital recording device.  It was then transcribed verbatim (other 
than anonymising names and other potentially identifying information) by the 
researcher, following the convention outlined by Malson (1998).   
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The analysis of the interview data involved multiple close readings of the transcript, 
through which discursive and narrative features of the text were identified and 
analysed:  an informal ‘time line’ was also created, summarising the key events and 
experiences that had led to Charlie identifying as autistic (and the implications for her 
life subsequently).  From this, an interpretation of Charlie’s story was drafted and 
shared with her for her feedback; she confirmed that her data had been appropriately 
anonymised and that the interpretation reflected her views and experiences in a way 
that conveyed a sense of what she had hoped to communicate during the interview.  
Analysis 
The unstructured nature of the narrative interview (Emerson and Frosh, 2004; Schiff, 
2017; Stagg and Belcher, 2019) generated rich and extensive data, which was not 
neatly temporal in nature.  For the purpose of the interpretation below, however, a 
more conventionally temporal narrative structure was deployed, alongside a focus on 
discursive and narrative features of Charlie’s story (Foucault, 1972; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; White and Epston, 1990; Frank, 1995; Emerson and Frosh, 2004; 
Booker, 2007).  
Charlie’s story:  “I have been masking and camouflaging my entire life” 
Charlie is a thirty one year old white British woman, who is married and works as a 
social worker in a large city in the South West of England.  She self-identified as autistic 
at the age of 28, after hearing the story of another autistic woman at an autism 
conference; she was subsequently diagnosed with an ‘autism spectrum condition’ by an 
NHS psychiatrist at the age of 29.   
Charlie’s narrative depicted an early awareness of ‘feeling different’ and of not fitting 
in with her peers.  Dean et al (2017) report that autistic girls are often on the periphery 
of social groups, and this is consistent with Charlie’s experience of being in a friendship 
group of “smart kids” at school:    
“…on the surface I had friends but (.) I didn’t always feel like I knew what was 
going on.  More often than not, I felt like I was included because I matched with 
these people [in terms of academics and extra-curricular interests] and we got on 
well enough but I always felt like I was on the periphery, like I was stood on the 
edge watching (.) the interactions, and I would sometimes get things (.) wrong 
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and have (.) you know, periodic little (.) not full blown falling outs but like (.) you 
know, just misunderstandings and I would end up apologising and not necessarily 
knowing why...” 
Growing up, Charlie was able to make sense of this pervasive experience of ‘feeling 
different’ to some extent:  her parents moved from London to the small Scottish town 
where she grew up when she was a baby and their accents marked the family out as 
‘incomers’.  The family’s incomer status within their community did not, however, 
account for other difficulties Charlie experienced during her secondary school years, 
such as negotiating the school buildings between lessons: 
 ”…changing classes (.) into different parts of the building was an absolute  
nightmare.  Noisy, chaotic (.) my locker was never anywhere near any of my 
classes (laughs) […] we were allowed to take our backpacks around with us, so I 
would end up loading up like four periods worth of (.) books and everything with 
me so I didn’t have to try to negotiate (.) dodging round [the school]” 
As an adult with insight into autism, Charlie came to understand these difficulties as a 
consequence of her sensory sensitivities, together with differences in executive 
functioning: at the time, however, she had no way of making sense of why she 
struggled with aspects of everyday life at school that her peers seemed to take in their 
stride. 
Unexplained difficulties and social confusion became more frequent for Charlie when 
she reached her twenties and embarked on a career as a social worker.  She found 
herself struggling to cope with various aspects of working life:  for example, 
restructuring of teams was a common event, and something Charlie found “unsettling” 
and stressful.  Perhaps most problematic on a daily basis, however, was the physical 
challenge of open plan offices.  Charlie described how she often wore sunglasses and 
headphones to help her cope with the discomfort of fluorescent lighting and 
distracting noise, resulting in teasing from her colleagues: 
 “…my colleagues would joke and say I look like either Stevie Wonder or Ray 
Charles, and it’s like (laughs) ‘how this light is not painful for you I will never 
understand’, because it actually gives me a migraine, it makes my head hurt and I 
cannot concentrate with the noise.”        
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In ‘joking’ about Charlie’s resemblance to famous people with known visual 
impairments, her colleagues acted as a “normalising gaze” (Foucault, 1977, p.184) that 
served to highlight her differences to implicit norms.  This type of experience 
reinforced her assessment of herself “a bit weird”; a “bit of an odd duck” who 
struggled with aspects of life that others seemed to take in their stride: 
“I always felt like I was (.) you know, just trying to (.) to jam myself into this 
round hole and was a, you know, not necessarily a square peg, maybe a hexagon 
(laughs) but, you know, just never never fitting in.” 
At the heart of narrative inquiry is the assumption that we instinctively seek to make 
sense of our lives and our experiences in a coherent and meaningful way (Sarbin, 1986; 
Polkinghorne, 1988; Bruner, 1991).  Consistent with this view, it was evident that it 
was difficult for Charlie to lack a hermeneutic framework for understanding her sense 
of “never fitting in” and her perceived differences from an implicit norm of an 
individual who is at ease in social situations; readily adaptable to change; and 
comfortable with the sensory stimulation associated with public spaces.  In narrative 
terms, a lack of hermeneutic possibilities leaves an individual adrift in potential 
narrative ‘chaos’, characterised by a sense of “vulnerability, futility and impotence” 
(Frank, 1995, p.97) in the face of seemingly endless and insurmountable problems.  In 
Charlie’s case, these problems centred in particular on the workplace:  unsurprisingly, 
she experienced frequent episodes of work-related stress and anxiety during this 
period, and on two separate occasions was signed off work for several weeks at a time.   
During this stage of her life, Charlie was learning about autism as part of her role as a 
social worker in a children and families team.  The cases of autism she encountered 
were often associated with intellectual disabilities, but she also became more familiar 
with Asperger-type presentations.  She recalled that at this point her knowledge about 
Asperger-type autism was chiefly constituted by the gendered ’eccentric scientist’ 
discourse:   
“…like um, you know, the one that- the most famous undiagnosed character on 
TV, Sheldon Cooper on Big Bang Theory […] oh he’s textbook, clearly not 
understanding, you know, social niceties and that.  He just sees it as a waste of 
time. Um so yeah, I never even remotely considered it for myself.”   
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The discursive construction of autistic individuals as aloof, socially awkward boys and 
men who are more interested in science (or similar pursuits) than in the people around 
them (Asperger, 1991; Baron-Cohen, 2003; Quirici, 2015) currently permeates popular 
culture and is reified within mainstream research literature in the form of the so-called 
‘extreme male brain’ theory of autism (Baron-Cohen, 2002).  It was irrelevant to 
Charlie’s experience of herself as a caring woman who worked hard to fit in socially 
and whose interest in other people had led to her studying psychology as an 
undergraduate and pursuing a career in social work.  For much of her twenties, this left 
her with hermeneutic ‘absence’ and a resulting inability to make sense of her feeling of 
being ‘different’ to others. 
Charlie’s lacuna in self-understanding finally changed in a dramatic episode when she 
attended a national autism event for work purposes. She was interested to note that 
there were female speakers talking about their experiences of autism, and she went to 
listen to a psychotherapist talk about her experience of being diagnosed as autistic in 
her thirties.   
“…her story resonated so much with me and (.) I just sat there absolutely 
gobsmacked (laughs) listening to her speak.  And it shook me for the rest of the 
day.” 
Charlie described how she heard key aspects of own experiences ‘mirrored’ by the 
psychotherapist’s own story, from feeling on the ‘outside’ of groups to struggling in the 
loud and busy environment at school and work.  It was also an encounter with a new 
way of construing autism, consistent with the ‘neurodiversity’ discourse, according to 
which it is possible – as embodied by the psychotherapist speaker – to be both autistic 
and a woman drawn to work in a caring profession.  It offered Charlie a single, 
coherent explanation for the seemingly disparate elements of her life experiences such 
as her difficulties coping with change and in ‘de-coding’ social norms, alongside her 
interest in other people and her capacity to pursue a career as a social worker.   
Perhaps most significantly, the encounter provided her with a new understanding 
about the way that light and sound often seem to painfully assault her; she could now 
construe these sensory experiences as integral features of autism that are largely 
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problematic because of the disabling effects of educational and work environments 
designed by and for the neurotypical majority.  
Charlie subsequently carried out her own research into female autism, focusing in 
particular on the personal accounts of autistic women (see, for example, Simone 
(2010); James (2017); Uher (2017); Cook and Garnett (2018)).  She found that this 
confirmed for her that her disparate difficulties and experiences “[made sense] under 
the lens of autism”.   She then experienced a stage of wondering:  
“…is a self-diagnosis sufficient or should I pursue an official diagnosis, and […] I’d 
felt like I really had no choice but to pursue a formal diagnosis because I didn’t 
feel like I would be believed (.) you know ‘you can’t be autistic, you can make eye 
contact’, ‘you can’t be autistic, you’re holding down a job, you’re married’…” 
Charlie’s comments here illustrate the potentially ambiguous and fragile nature of an 
‘autistic identity’.  When discursively constructed as a form of ‘neurodiversity’, autism 
may be construed as a matter of personal identity and self-knowledge, for which 
‘diagnosis’ is no more appropriate than it would be for any other facet of one’s 
identity.  In contrast, within the dominant medical discursive framework, formal 
diagnosis is unequivocally essential and designated healthcare professionals (such as 
psychiatrists) act as “authorities of delimitation” (Foucault, 1972, p.46) who determine 
who may – and may not – be termed autistic.  In the extract above, Charlie conveyed a 
sense that “self-diagnosis” might be sufficient for the purpose of her own identity, but 
the lack of a “formal diagnosis” would potentially damage the credibility of her claim 
to be autistic in the eyes of (unstated) others.  
Charlie’s quest for medically-sanctioned validation led to a ‘regressive’ phase (that is, 
one characterised by moving away from a valued endpoint (Gergen, 2015) in her story 
as she described her struggle to obtain confirmation of her new autistic identity in the 
form of a diagnosis via her local NHS trust.  She was required to undergo the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS), in which she was faced with a series of tasks, 
such as being handed a picture book with no words in it and being asked to describe 
what was happening: 
“It was a story about flying frogs and (.) this is the thing, like (.) how is this 
appropriate for (.) an adult? […] I thought it was insulting.  And they said that I 
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was too creative in that particular thing because um (.) I was able to infer the 
emotions on the faces of the frogs.  But it was (.) a quite exaggerated illustration 
and I was read to a lot as a child.” 
Charlie was subsequently told that a diagnosis would not be forthcoming, on the 
grounds that she had been assessed as “too sociable and creative” to be autistic.  Her 
narrative conveyed a recognition that autism is constituted within the ‘medical’ 
discourse as something that cannot be concealed from others, and that she had been 
unable to perform this version of ‘autism’ satisfactorily after years of striving to 
conform to neurotypical norms:   
“I have been masking and camouflaging my entire life, trying to (.) feel normal, to 
fit in, you know […] when you wear these masks for so much of your life they 
become your face.  So it’s really hard (.) it’s really hard to separate that […] I can’t 
just dial up the autism (laughs) you know, to be able to (.) to get them to see 
what I actually am dealing with, because then I don’t want [the assessment 
team] turning round and saying ‘well it just seemed like you were performing’…” 
Charlie described herself as “absolutely floored and devastated” at the news that a 
diagnosis would not be forthcoming, a response that conveys the importance of the 
external validation of medical professionals and the potential fragility of her new 
‘autistic identity’ if it is withheld.  Her attempt to obtain a diagnosis could have ended 
at this point, but her previous research into female autism had left Charlie convinced 
that it was the correct explanation for her disparate difficulties with social situations; 
with change and transitions; and – above all – with overwhelming and often painful 
sensory stimulation.  She subsequently wrote a long letter to the assessment team, 
explaining the effects of a lifetime of “masking and camouflaging” any potentially non-
normative social responses and why she therefore disagreed with their conclusion.  For 
example, she highlighted that her training and experience as a social worker had 
helped her develop skills and compensatory strategies which enabled her to “infer the 
emotions” of the frogs in the ADOS picture task; a performance that had contributed 
to her being assessed as not autistic:  
“[I explained to them that] it’s hard to unpick (.) what is learned and what is 
inherent (.) how in the hell do you expect me to (.) you know, say ‘oh I-(.) I’m 
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able to just recognise these emotions, also I studied social work, I was trained 
effectively (laughs) to be able to- to pick up on these subtle expressions if I’m in a 
one to one situation with a client and be like ‘you seem a bit upset, do you want 
to tell me more about how you’re feeling?’.  You know, this is stuff that I’ve 
learnt, I can’t just (.) switch that off […] it’s not like you can (.) you know, re-wind 
to a stage when I was younger.” 
In response to her letter, Charlie was offered a second opinion with a psychiatrist.  This 
was a very different experience; instead of being asked to perform infantilising tasks, 
the psychiatrist spent over four hours exploring her life experiences with her (and with 
her husband and parents) before agreeing that a diagnosis of ‘autism spectrum 
condition’ “made sense” for Charlie.  
Charlie described her “massive, massive relief” when she received confirmation of the 
diagnosis.  For Charlie, diagnosis constituted ‘expert’ confirmation that the difficulties 
she had experienced in life – such as in conforming to social norms and in coping with 
sensory stimulation in the workplace – could be explained in terms of her “neurology”:     
“I do not believe [autism] is a disorder, you know, it’s (.) it’s a neurodivergence, a 
difference (.) yes, some are disordered by it (.) you know, that’s not to say that (.) 
you know, none of us suffer with autism because some do, some genuinely do (.) 
but (.) if anything it is a condition, it is a type of neurology, and it shouldn’t try to 
be corrected, as some people try to do.” 
Brownlow and O’Dell (2013) describe how the ‘neurodiversity’ discourse typically 
deploys and subverts the neurobiological claims of the dominant ‘medical’ discourse of 
autism (in which autistic ‘behaviours’ are deemed evidence of underlying ‘deficits’ in 
neurocognitive functioning):  this is evident in Charlie’s description of autism as a “type 
of neurology” that should not be corrected.  Being able to construct autism in this way 
had transformative consequences for Charlie; in particular, it meant that she herself no 
longer tried to “correct” her way of being in the world in an attempt to adhere to 
‘neurotypical’ norms.  She described how she has experienced the diagnosis as 
“permission to be kinder to [herself]”, in the form of lifestyle changes that 
accommodate her social and sensory needs.  For example, she has sought and 
obtained ‘reasonable adjustments’ in the workplace, such as a quieter office space and 
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permission to work part-time from home.  She has also joined an online community of 
autistic women, which in turn has led to rewarding and mutually supportive ‘real life’ 
friendships with women with whom Charlie does not feel the need to “mask and 
camouflage” her ‘authentic self’.  With these new friends “there’s no pretence , you 
know, you can just (.) say what’s on your mind.  They get you, they understand you”; 
an implicit contrast with Charlie’s social experiences with the neurotypical majority.   
Despite Charlie’s engagement with the ‘neurodiversity’ discourse of autism, the 
dominance of the ‘medical’ discourse was evident in the power and significance of her 
diagnosis within her narrative:  it is constructed as an essential step in the 
transformation of her personal identity from “strange” to autistic:   
“if I hadn’t gotten the diagnosis, if it- if it never came to fruition and I just kind (.) 
you know (.) almost became a catatonic version of myself, and just continued (.) 
you know, existing like an automaton and- and like just thinking ‘OK, I’m just a bit 
strange’ (.) you know.  I- I can’t (.) if I had- if I had to forecast my life (.) you know, 
without diagnosis I can only just see it as being very very grey […] [now] it’s so 
fucking colourful.” 
Booker argues that the stories we tell conform to a small number of basic plots or 
themes, and Charlie’s description of her “colourful” life post-diagnosis was redolent of 
his description of the classic ‘rebirth’ narrative in which the protagonist is liberated 
from the “depths of darkness [and] brought up into glorious light” (Booker, 2007, 
p.194).  He notes that this liberation typically involves a significant figure who 
‘awakens’ the protagonist43 and indeed this was the case in Charlie’s narrative with the 
autistic female psychotherapist serving this key role, setting in train the sequence of 
events which rescued her from a potentially “grey” and “catatonic” future.  Charlie’s 
encounter with the psychotherapist’s story provided her with a new and personally 
meaningful subject position to adopt: that of a caring and sensitive autistic woman 
who is creative and resourceful in finding ways to compensate for the difficulties she 
experiences as she negotiates ‘neurotypical’ life. 
 
43 Booker (2007, p.193) cites Sleeping Beauty as a classic example of the rebirth narrative, with the 
sleeping princess being awoken from the “dark spell” by the prince.   
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Discussion 
Charlie’s story of how she came to identify as autistic included descriptions of various 
ways in which she had experienced herself as ‘different’ to others over the years.  
These experiences clustered around the themes that characterise the diagnostic 
criteria for autism (WHOS, 1992; APA, 2013), such as apparent difficulties in making 
sense of social situations, and in coping with change (WHO, 1992; APA, 2013; Fletcher-
Watson and Happé, 2019).  Perhaps most significant of all in terms of her daily life, 
however, were her experiences of sensory sensitivities, especially in public spaces such 
as school and the workplace.  Unusual sensory sensitivities have long been known to 
be associated with autism (Ben-Sasson et al, 2009), but have received comparatively 
little attention from researchers to date, despite the potentially detrimental effects 
they are reported to have for individuals’ quality of life (Smith and Sharp, 2013; 
National Autistic Society, 2016; Ross, Elcheson and Cook, 2018; Belek, 2019).  Personal 
accounts like Charlie’s therefore play an important part in developing an ‘insider 
perspective’ on this poorly understood aspect of autistic experience.    
Fricker (2007, p.154) writes of the injustice that results from having important aspects 
of one’s experience “obscured from collective understanding owing to persistent and 
wide-ranging hermeneutical marginalisation”; a description that encapsulates the 
consequences of the longstanding neglect of female autism by researchers and 
clinicians.  Charlie’s story illustrates the potential effects of this epistemic injustice for 
the lives of individual autistic women, for whom androcentric constructions of 
knowledge about autism provide no way of making sense of their lived experiences.  
During this period of ‘hermeneutic absence’, Charlie experienced recurrent bouts of 
stress and anxiety without being able to make sense of underlying contributory 
factors, such as episodes of social confusion and misunderstandings, or of difficulties 
coping with the sensory stimulation of working in an open plan office.  
Charlie’s experience of hermeneutic ‘absence’ (Bhaskar et al, 2018) was eventually 
resolved by encountering a new discursive construct of autism:  one that was broadly 
consistent with the ‘neurodiversity’ discourse of autism (Bagatell, 2010; Robertson, 
2010; Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013; Ortega, 2013; Kapp et al, 2013; O’Dell et al, 2013).  
In contrast to the deficit-focus of dominant medicalised discursive constructions of 
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autism, the neurodiversity discourse construes it as an enriching and important feature 
of human diversity, albeit one that is currently under-valued and that is associated 
with difficulties in everyday life as a consequence of living in a world created by and for 
the neurotypical majority (Robertson, 2010; Brownlow and O’Dell, 2013; Kapp et al, 
2013; Strand, 2017; Den Houting, 2019).  Furthermore, where the ‘medical’ discourse 
of autism constitutes the autistic individual as an oblivious performer of non-
normative behaviours which are readily apparent to the “normalising gaze” of others 
(Foucault, 1978, 1977, p.184), the neurodiversity-informed perspective recognises that 
– for some - autism may be a largely private experience, not least as a consequence of 
a lifetime of working hard to conform to societal behavioural norms (Bargiela et al, 
2016; Hull et al, 2017).   It is rich with possibility as a hermeneutic resource for autistic 
women, creating a discursive landscape in which it is possible to be autistic and 
professionally accomplished (including in a caring profession); to be autistic and value 
close personal relationships; and – above all – to be autistic and female (Simone, 2010; 
Rowe, 2013; Hendrickx, 2014 and 2015; Kim, 2015; James, 2017; Uher, 2017; Cook and 
Garnett, 2018). 
Charlie’s narrative illustrates the potentially transformative effects of the 
neurodiversity discursive construction of autism at the level of individual subjectivity.  
Instead of continuing to wonder “what in the hell is wrong with me” as she struggled 
with aspects of daily life that seemed to come easily to others, she could now construe 
such difficulties as the inevitable consequence of being autistic in a world created by 
and for the ‘neurotypical’ majority.  Within her narrative, this was associated with a 
new sense of self-acceptance and changes in her everyday life in order to mitigate the 
potentially stressful effects of the ‘neurotypical world’.   It also led to social 
transformation for Charlie (Bhaskar et al, 2018), in the form of joining an online 
community of autistic women where she no longer needs to “mask and camouflage”, 
and which has led to her developing supportive and rewarding ‘real life’ friendships.   
This profoundly challenges dominant deficit-focused constructions of autism, which 
typically depict the autistic individual in stereotypical terms as ‘relationally impaired’ 
and lacking in normative social motivation  (Broderick and Ne’eman, 2008; Duffy and 
Dorner, 2011;  Milton and Moon, 2012; Milton, 2014;  Jaswal and Akhtar, 2019). 
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In focusing on a single narrative, the findings of this study are not intended to be 
generalisable and instead are illustrative of the socially contextualised meaning-
making of a specific individual (Bhaskar et al, 2018).  In particular, Charlie’s 
professional career as a social worker stands in contrast with the current and highly 
concerning employment data for autistic individuals as a group:  in 2016, the National 
Autistic Society reported that only 16% of autistic individuals were in full-time paid 
work, and a further 16% in part-time paid work.  At the same time, Charlie’s personal 
story serves to highlight the epistemic and ethical limitations of conceptualising autism 
solely in terms of ‘deficits’ and ‘impairments’ (O’Dell et al, 2016; Chown and 
Leatherland, 2018) and illustrates the need to develop knowledge about autism that 
fully recognises its rich heterogeneity and associated strengths (Russell et al, 2019).  In 
this way, the individual stories of autistic individuals such as Charlie are transforming 
the ways that we understand autism (Hacking, 2009).  
 
References  
[see main reference list]  
 
 
